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Hungary in 1945: An Introduction 
N.F. Dreisziger 
1945 was a fateful year in the history of Hungary and in the lives of her people. 
It began with some of the bitterest, most destructive fighting ever to take place 
on Hungarian soil: a life-and-death struggle between what was left of Hitler's 
armies and the largest military machine of World War II, the Red Army. And 
the year ended with the beginning of the slow reconstruction of "liberated" 
Hungary in the shadow of the victorious and powerful Soviet Empire. From 
experiencing death and destruction in January, the country passed to a stage of 
its development where it could experiment with a small degree of democracy and 
political pluralism but only as a result of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's decision 
not to impose Soviet-style totalitarianism on Hungary for the time being. 
Despite the existence of limited freedom and the fervent hope by 
Hungarians that more would come, the work of rebuilding war-torn Hungary 
progressed only slowly. Economic reconstruction, in particular, was impeded by 
the enormous damage that had been inflicted on the country during the war, 
especially in 1944 and 1945. The damage suffered by the capital Budapest is 
touched on by military historian Krisztian Ungvary in his study of the last days 
of the battle of Budapest. The overall damage is summed up in Professor Susan 
Glanz's paper: 
...between 420-450 thousand Hungarians died [during the war] and 
between 850-900 thousand were taken prisoners of war. Before the war 
Hungary had been an agricultural and industrial nation. In 1938, the 
last peace year, 37% of the national income was generated by agricul-
ture and 38% by industry. Due to the demands of war, in the period of 
1943-44, the ratio changed to 43% of national income generated by 
industry and 28% by agriculture. But after the war the destruction of 
the industrial sector left the country paralyzed. The damage,... caused, 
amounted] to $4.27 billion — which represented five times the national 
income of that year and 40% of the national wealth. The country's 
infrastructure was destroyed, and agricultural activity also almost came 
to a standstill as the armies moved through Hungary. Over 90% of all 
industrial plants suffered some damage and nearly all inventories 
disappeared. Coal mines ceased to function as nearly all were Hooded 
because of the lack of electricity needed to pump water out. The 
economic situation was made even worse by Hungary's foreign and 
domestic debt. By September 1945 the foreign debt had amounted to... 
$578 million.... [and] domestic debt [had reached] 14.2 billion pengos 
[already on the eve of 1945].' 
Had Professor Glanz wished to give a detailed picture of Hungary's 
economic difficulties in 1945, she could have filled several pages of her paper. 
To begin with, Hungary's transportation infrastructure was destroyed during the 
war. From March 1944 on, when Hungary became occupied by the Wehrmacht, 
the country was no longer spared by Allied air forces. In the balance of that ' 
year and early during early 1945, Hungary's railways, bridges, roads, as well as 
rolling-stock and motor transport manufacturing establishments were the targets 
of repeated attacks by the British Royal Air Force, the American Air Force and | 
by Soviet bombers. During the struggle for Hungary between the Axis forces 
and the Red Army, much additional damage was inflicted. As if this was not 
enough, further destruction was inflicted by retreating German and Hungarian 
forces. In their flight westward they blew up most of the country's river and 
railroad bridges. They ripped up railway tracks in many places and took most of 
the country's rolling stock to the Third Reich. Many merchant ships were sunk 
by the retreating forces, while the rest, including all barges and tugs, were taken 
upriver to Germany. The same fate befell most of the country's automobiles and 
motor transport vehicles. 
In regards to the state of the Hungarian economy during 1945 it might be 
added to what has been said above that, during the last phase of the war, the 
German High Command ordered a policy of systematic industrial dismantling 
and removals with the aim of denying the Red Army the chance of drawing on 
Hungarian economic resources. The consequence of this policy has been aptly 
described by economic historian Andras Gollner: 
about 500 important factories not severely damaged by Allied bombs 
were either wholly or partially dismantled, their equipment requisitioned 
or scattered around the countryside. Paralleling this action, a consider-
able quantity of immovable property was destroyed by Nazi demolition 
experts. The list of removals and destruction is very long indeed, 
consisting of vast amounts of industrial and agricultural goods. Even 
the country's entire gold and silver reserves were taken to Germany.2 
It also has to be remembered that, in addition to the loss of infrastructure * 
and equipment, Hungary lost people as well, beyond those who became victims 
of the conflict. In the first half of 1945 approximately half a million people fled 
Hungary. These refugees included members of the government, the bureaucracy, \ 
the military, and of the professions, as well as thousands of ordinary working 
people. From the point of view of economic reconstruction, most costly was the 
loss of a large numbers of technicians, engineers, plant managers and owners. 
Hungarians, however, were leaving the country not only towards the West, but 
they were also leaving towards the East. As the Red Army moved through the 
country, it collected a wide variety of people for deportation to the Soviet Union. 
There were the POWs — Hungarian soldiers who surrendered to the Russians; 
there were also soldiers that had gone into hiding and were discovered, members 
of the police forces, of para-military organizations, and so on. Then there were 
ordinary civilians — in some cases ethnic Germans, but more often than not 
Magyars — who were swept up by the occupation authorities and were sent to 
collection points from where they were transported to Soviet labour camps. It 
has been estimated that from the end of November 1944, the Soviets have 
removed from Hungary well over half-a-million people and scattered them 
throughout the GULAG — the world of POW, labour and penal camps that 
dotted the map of the vast Soviet countryside. According to our source, about a 
third of all those removed were civilians.3 
There were, however, further impediments to economic reconstruction, as 
has already been hinted at in the quotation from Professor Glanz's paper. In the 
armistice agreement Hungary's Provisional Government signed early in 1945, the 
country was compelled to pay a very stiff penalty for its involvement in the war. 
The terms of this agreement gave the U.S.S.R rights to war booty. Furthermore, 
all German or Italian-owned assets in the country had to be transferred to Soviet 
ownership. Moreover, Hungary was denied generous financial and material 
support from the UNRRA, while some other states in East Central Europe 
received much help from this agency.4 And, Hungary v/as confronted by other 
burdens. It is worthwhile quoting Professor Gollner again: 
After 1945 the difficulties stemming from the economic havoc wreaked 
by the war were accentuated unexpectedly by another obstacle: Soviet 
economic exploitation. It came to equal, if in a different way, the 
intensity of those pre-1945 constraints which had for so long denied 
decent socio-economic standards for Hungary's people. 
As the Red Army advanced westward through Hungary, all enterprises 
falling within its territory — some vacated only a few hours earlier by 
Nazi demolition experts — were assigned Soviet military commanders. 
These saw to it that factories still in working order began producing 
immediately for the war effort against the retreating Germans. Soviet 
military personnel also supervised production in the coal mines, and 
deliveries to the [Red] [A]rmy began forthwith.5 
In fact, documentary evidence published in Hungary in the early 1970s describes 
the overall impact of Soviet military management on Hungary between the early 
winter of 1944 and the late summer of 1945. In the words of Professor Gollner 
this "management' resulted in: 
1. The complete depletion of economic stocks... 
2. Wholesale removal of all liquid assets from Hungarian banks and 
enterprise safes... 
3. Widespread dismantling and removal of equipment from factories; 
4. Breakneck production under difficult working conditions, heedless of 
the need for maintaining equipment; 
5. Soviet requisitioning of industrial products without remuneration; 
6. The difficulty of ensuring labour supply because of arbitrary street 
arrests by Soviet patrols and deportation of large numbers of skilled 
workers to the Soviet Union; and 
7. The non-payment of workers' wages by Soviet military managers.6 
By the time Soviet military management had ended in Hungary during 
the summer, the country's economy was in worse shape than it had been six 
months earlier. To quote Professor Gollner again: "...the affected firms were in 
utter chaos. Thousands of valuable machines and tools were lost, stocks were 
used up, and machines left badly damaged. Most of the firms were also hope-
lessly in deficit...." In agriculture the situation was similar. The Red Army had 
requisitioned "vast quantities of agricultural goods without payment, and drove 
away tens of thousands of cattle, horses, and other livestock." From the summer 
on, the requisitioning was the responsibility of the Hungarian government which 
tried to compensate the peasants. "Consequently, Gollner remarks, "instead of 
the peasants bearing the brunt of the occupation cost, the load was shifted onto 
the Hungarian treasury." All-in-all, Gollner concludes, "Soviet military manage-
ment accelerated the collapse of Hungary's private sector,... impoverished 
millions of Hungarian workers and peasants, and confounded the country's new 
and inexperienced public administrators." Under such conditions it became 
necessary to introduce "the most thorough and encompassing central planning." 
"In 1945," Gollner goes on, "the Communist Party captured a commanding 
position in economic reconstruction — the Supreme Economic Council (SEC). 
This important instrument enabled it to sever the jugular vein of private capi-
tal..."7 
The situation was exacerbated by the regime of reparation payments 
which was imposed on Hungary. In compliance with the Reparations Agreement 
of June 15, 1945, the country was obliged to pay heavy compensation to the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The total sum of $300,000,000 
does not seem excessive at first glance; however, when we consider the price 
structure, the product mix, and the timing of the deliveries, we realize how 
onerous this regime was for Hungary's postwar economy. The agreement on 
retribution did not take into consideration the fact that in the summer of 1945 
much of Hungary's manufacturing was in shambles. Furthermore, no credit was 
given for the deliveries Hungary had made to the Soviet Union prior to the 
signing of the agreement. As a result, "almost 90% of Hungary's heavy indus-
trial production [became] tied down by reparations orders." According to figures 
produced by the Hungarian General Creditbank — "[by] August 1946, 76,000 
out of 95,000 employees in heavy industry were engaged in retribution work,..."8 
A further problem was the fact that the value of retribution goods delivered was 
calculated at the level of 1938 dollars which in effect meant that Hungary had to 
deliver three or four times as much goods as would have been the case if 1945 
dollars were used to determine their value. Underpricing, however, "was not the 
only factor substantially raising the nominal costs of the reparations package." 
The reparation agreement also overvalued the Hungarian currency. The net 
result, in the words of Professor Nicholas Spulber, was that "to obtain credit for 
one dollar of reparations, Hungary had to deliver goods worth almost 4 dollars at 
the current exchange rate."9 Professor Gollner concluded that "the combined 
effects of these factors pushed up the reparations bill's real value to about 1.5 
billion 1946 U.S. dollars."10 It is not surprising that in the immediate post-war 
era Hungary made little or no progress in economic reconstruction and her 
people experienced wide-spread privations and even, in some cases and in some 
regions, starvation. 
The situation was similar in the realm of politics. Though — as Profes-
sor Glanz points out in the first lines of her paper — some people in the early 
1990s still talked of the "freedom" that had existed in the country in 1945, this 
myth of post-war political liberty had arisen years later when there was no 
freedom in the country, and when what had existed before appeared in a much 
more favourable light than conditions at the time really warranted. 
There was only limited political freedom in the immediate post-war 
Hungary, and whatever freedom there was, existed by the grace of the Soviet 
leadership which was not ready for the time being to try to impose complete 
control over Hungary. Nevertheless, it did want to create conditions which 
would facilitate the imposition of complete control later and did not hesitate to 
use any means in achieving this. Some of the better-known methods used were 
the domination of such bodies as the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, 
the country's Supreme Economic Council, as well as the Ministry of the Interior, 
and through it, the security police forces. At the same time, the media under 
Soviet control — as well as military transportation facilities — were placed at 
the disposal of the Communist Party of Hungary. On the political "agenda" of 
the Communists in 1945, it is worth quoting Professor Bennett Kovrig, the 
author of the most detailed and most authoritative history of the Communist 
Party of Hungary: 
Stalin was intent on fostering compatible regimes in his newly 
acquired sphere of influence, but in the case of Hungary he proceeded 
more cautiously... Following his advice,... the [communist] party's... 
leaders developed an incremental strategy... Butting on a conciliatory 
mask, they called for national unity and set the pace for the implemen-
tation of the land reform... At the same time they sought to expand 
their power base by indiscriminate recruitment, by seizing a dominant 
position in the Trade Union Council and the police, and by creating a 
political police to pursue their enemies..., 
[After their defeat in the elections] the disappointed communists 
intensified their struggle from above and from below. Control over the 
interior ministry helped them to purge their opponents from the state 
administration, to persecute their enemies at large, to disband non-
communist youth organizations, and to harass workers into joining the 
party.... At the same time, while rejecting Western aid, they could not 
countenance criticism of Russian pillage, of the heavy burden of repara-
tions, and of disadvantageous commercial deals with the Soviet Un-
ion....11 
Though not too many people suspected at the time, in 1945 the commu-
nist transformation of Hungary was not a question of "if" but of "when." 
* * * 
In this special issue three research papers deal with themes that were central to 
evolution of Hungary in that fateful year of 1945: the war, economic reconstruc-
tion, and political as well as psychological rehabilitation. Dealing with the 
theme of the war, Krisztian Ungvary, in a case study of the collapse of Axis 
forces in Hungary, examines the antecedents and the events of the most disas-
trous of their defeats, the destruction of the German and Hungarian units that 
became trapped in Budapest (more precisely, Buda) when Soviet forces sur-
rounded the Hungarian capital. In the following paper Professor Susan Glanz 
looks at issues of economic and political reconstruction, focusing on the first 
post-war elections that Hungary experienced after being "liberated" by the Red 
Army. The third paper deals with the theme of the Hungarian nation's moral and 
psychological rehabilitation. An important element of this process was the 
business of finding out what had gone wrong in Hungary during the 1939-1945 
period and who were responsible for the country's tragedy. As Dr. Pal Pritz 
explains in his paper on the post-war trial of Premier Laszlo Ba/dossy, in 
Hungary — as in some other countries as well — this process did not stop at 
answering the above questions but imperceptibly transmuted into a search for 
scapegoats and the inflicting of retribution on those who were in power before 
1945. In an appendix-like documentary paper, the editor of this volume tries to 
throw a little more light on the mentality of Bardossy in the summer of 1945, at 
the time that he began to face the prospect of being accused of war-crimes and 
being brought before a war-crimes tribunal. He also argues that the former 
Hungarian Prime Minister was not the war-hawk that his critics have made him 
out to be, and suggests that some of the accusations that have been made against 
him should be qualified or, in at least one case, be dismissed. 
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The "Second Stalingrad": 
The Destruction of Axis Forces at Budapest 
(February, 1945) 
Krisztian Ungvary 
translated from the Hungarian by Sean Lambert 
The Strategic Situation from late-Sept., 1944, to early Feb., 1945 
Hungary became the primary theater of operations on the eastern front after the 
withdrawal of Romania from the war on August 23, 1944. In Poland, the front 
stood firm at the Vistula until January of 1945, thus both sides sought to resolve 
the stalemate on Hungarian soil. The Germans consequently sent a steady flow 
of reinforcements there: in September of 1944 the number of divisions from the 
Heeresgruppe Siid operating in Hungary had already reached eleven (four of 
which were armored); by January of 1945 the number of German divisions 
operating in the country stood at twenty-two (seven armored) and by early 
March thirty-one (ten armored). During this same time the front was constantly 
shifting due to the huge amount of weaponry deployed there and the conflict 
turned into a war of attrition. 
The goal of the Soviet command following the conclusion of the tank 
battle at Debrecen was to occupy Budapest on the march toward the Vienna 
region. In the autumn of 1944, Stalin was already thinking in terms of territorial 
partition with the allies and wanted to ensure his supremacy in Central Europe as 
soon as possible. With this in mind, on October 28, he ordered Marshall Mali-
novsky to take Budapest immediately. 
The capture of Budapest was of considerable strategic importance because 
without taking the capital city, further advance toward Vienna would not have 
been possible. As a result of the rash order to attack, the Soviet advance bogged 
down on the approaches to Budapest after the Hungarian First Airborne Battalion 
and units of the German 503rd Heavy Tiger Division disabled approximately 
fifty Soviet tanks on the outskirts of Vecses.1 The front stiffened on the peri-
phery of Pest and thus began the siege of the capital city whose duration of 
fourteen weeks was surpassed only in the sieges of Stalingrad and Leningrad. 
A subsequent Soviet attack launched on December 6 from the vicinity of 
Hatvan succeeded in breaking through the German lines; on December 10, Soviet 
troops reached the Danube and invested the city in a semicircle. On December 
22 the Soviets broke through the front at Lake Velence. Exploiting the complete 
absence of German reinforcements behind the front, the Soviet forces advanced 
to the western fringes of Buda on the 24th, penetrating into the city that after-
noon and to within five kilometers of the right bank of the Danube. 
The Soviets, however, were not equipped to exploit this opportunity fully, 
which fact allowed Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, the commanding general of the 
Ninth SS Mountain Corps, to organize a defensive base in Buda with the forces 
at his disposal. But this was only a temporary reprieve for the Germans. On 
December 27 the command of the Ninth SS Mountain Corps decided to evacuate 
Budapest and attempt a breakout toward the west.2 Preparations for the evacua-
tion had already started when, on December 28, Hitler forbade the attempt. The 
Fourth SS Panzer Corps was accordingly transferred from the Warsaw area to 
Transdanubia in order to reestablish contact with the forces under siege in 
Budapest. This operation, bearing the code name "Konrad," consisted of three 
successive actions which ultimately failed despite the fact that the Germans had 
employed all the military might at their disposal in order to force and end to the 
stalemate.3 
Antecedents to the Breakthrough Attempt 
On several occasions during the siege, the command of the German army in 
Budapest made plans to abandon the city and attempt to break out of the Soviet 
encirclement. Such an action would have been possible either in early January 
or in concert with the later German relief operations. Hitler, however, continued 
to deny permission to launch such an action. In Hitler's mind, the defense of 
Budapest was primarily of political rather than military significance. In light of 
the fact that the Germans had transferred more reinforcements to Hungary than 
any other theater of operations, it became vitally important to Hitler that he be 
able to produce some positive results where the greatest number of his armored 
divisions had been deployed. 
Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch acted in accordance with Hitler's orders until 
the very last moment. He engaged in no negotiations with Soviet military 
emissaries and directed the defense of Budapest for seven full weeks, until 
February 11. He only committed himself to a breakthrough attempt at the 
eleventh hour, after it had become evident that the remaining districts of Buda 
would soon fall to the Soviets. Throughout the entire war to that point, no 
German army had yet chosen to lay down its arms before the Soviets if a 
breakout operation remained a viable alternative.4 Psychological factors played 
the primary role in this: commanding officers could not face the odium of 
surrender and everyone feared Siberia and the Soviets. On the eastern front, 
total Weltanschauungskrieg was being waged. This sometimes had fatal impli-
cations for prisoners of war. Thus it was not only an ethos of duty and loyalty 
which compelled the Germans to resist to the final bullet, but fear as well. 
Between February 5 and 6 the Soviets captured Sas Hill, thus opening the 
western approaches to Castle Hill and the Citadel.5 On February 8 combat 
centered around the Southern Railway Station, on the 9th around Lesser Gellert 
Hill (Kis Gellerthegy), and by the 10th Soviet forces were laying siege to the 
Citadel. 
Pfeffer-Wildenbruch then decided to act. Since further resistance seemed 
futile, he decided to attempt a breakout. Because Hitler had prohibited any such 
action, it was only at the last minute, on February 11 at 5:50 p.m., that he made 
the following announcement on his radio: 
1. We have exhausted our rations and loaded our final cartridges. We, 
the defenders of Budapest, may choose between capitulation and massa-
cre. The remaining combat-ready fragments of the German army, the 
honved (Hungarian soldiers) and the Arrow Cross will together launch an 
offensive action in order to secure a new base of operations. 
2. At sunset on two-eleven I'm breaking out. I request rendezvous in the 
vicinity of Szomor-Mariahalom. 
3. Signal: twice green equals friendly forces. 
4. Effective strength: 23,900 Germans of whom 9,600 are wounded; 
20,000 Hungarians of whom 2,000 are wounded; and 80,000-100,000 
civilians.6 
Immediately after the announcement, personnel of the signal unit demolished the 
radio equipment, rendering the launching of the operation irreversible. 
The German and Hungarian Forces Defending Budapest 
At this time Pfeffer-Wildenbruch had only very limited forces at his disposal. 
The German divisions were in a state of total battle weariness. The SS and 
police units consisted primarily of poorly trained ethnic-German — so-called 
Volksdeutsche — conscripts from Transylvania and Hungary,7 whose esprit de 
corps often left much to be desired.8 An unsteady supply of ammunition was 
also a source of great difficulties. Survivors recall that rations were very bland, 
consisting generally of horse meat and beans. There was certainly no lack of 
horse meat since two cavalry battalions had been trapped in the city and most 
Hungarian supply trains were horse-drawn. 
Most of the remaining heavy weaponry had either been destroyed already 
or was tied down in battle and could not be utilized as part of the breakout 
attempt owing to the fact that the majority of vehicles could not be redeployed 
undetected to the starting point of the operation.9 
The state of the Hungarian troops was even more appalling. Of the 
14,000 combat-ready soldiers which constituted the Tenth Infantry Division in 
early November, by January at best only 2,500 had remained. The great 
majority of these, 1,800 troops, defected to the Soviet side on February 1 when 
the front line shifted to Margit Boulevard.10 The Twelfth Reserve Division by 
mid-December had dwindled to a force consisting merely of six, weak, 200-man 
battalions, and seven artillery batteries. During the seven-week siege, this 
number was further reduced by approximately one-half. The First Armoured 
Division, which in the middle of December still possesssed ten serviceable tanks, 
presented an even more discouraging picture. By January all its armored 
vehicles had been destroyed and by the beginning of February the division's 
effective strength amounted to only about 200 men. The Fourth Hadik Hussar 
Regiment by this time had counted only sixty men. Around February 8, its 
commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kokay, summoned his remaining men 
and issued furloughs to them, thereby dissolving his own unit. 
The morale of the troops defending Budapest was generally not the best. 
Most Hungarian soldiers attempted to extricate themselves as quickly as possible 
from participation in the seemingly futile resistance and deserted, defected to the 
Soviet side or simply lingered behind the front lines. This explains why the 
number of troops receiving rations in Budapest outnumbered the standing 
personnel of all the combat units in the city approximately five-to-one! For this 
reason, Pfeffer-Wildenbruch had little regard for the combat effectiveness of the 
Hungarian troops and, during the final stages of the siege, did not even take 
them into consideration. 
The German army was in somewhat better shape, if only for the reason 
that, being on foreign soil, made it more difficult for German soldiers to go into 
hiding. Also, the Germans were more frightened of the prospect of capture by 
the Soviets than were the Hungarians. It was known at the time that the 
Russians often did not spare the lives of SS personnel — who constituted half of 
the German forces in Budapest — when they fell into captivity. It should be 
mentioned that the SS units defending Budapest were not made up of crack SS 
troops from the Reich, but consited in part of conscripted S-"abians from the 
Bacska and Banat regions of the southern part of the Carpathian Basin (primarily 
the Twenty-second SS Division), and of Transylvanian Saxons (the Eighth SS 
Division) from what is present-day Rumania. There were also French, Spanish, 
Walloon and Flemish conscripts in these units. 
The Operational Plan of the Breakout 
On the morning of the 11th, Pfeffer-Wildenbruch convened a meeting of his staff 
at which, after heated debate, it was decided that the breakout would be con-
ducted through wooded terrain in smaller detachments and without the aid of 
heavy weaponry. According to the plan, the main forces were to commence the 
operation at 8:00 p.m. from Szell Kalman (today better known as Moszkva) 
Square and Szena Square, with several smaller commando units moving out from 
along the entire length of Margii Boulevard. The first objective: Hiivosvolgyi 
Avenue to the Budakeszi junction, regrouping of the troops first on Remete Hill 
and then in the woods lying to the east of Tinnye. They planned to reach 
Tinnye by morning which they would capture through concentrated attack; from 
there they would execute a breakout to the south if circumstances permitted. 
According to their calculations, they would reach their own lines in the neigh-
borhood of Szomor the next day at around noon. They also adopted the 
watchword for establishing contact with their own troops: "Hitler-Hindenburg." 
In order to preserve strict secrecy surrounding the operational plan, it was only 
revealed to the divisional commanders at 2 p.m., to the regiment commanders at 
4 p.m. and to the troops at 6 p.m. It was only at this time that the Hungarian 
troops — along with their commanding officers — were informed of the plan 
because the Germans feared betrayal from them. Before the operation was 
finally launched, they destroyed their remaining serviceable vehicles and 
materiel. 
It is revealing of the true degree of secrecy surrounding the plan that 
several of those who participated in the operation (including Hungarians) 
remember having suspected on the morning of the 11th, and even as early as the 
evening of the 10th, when the operation was to be launched.11 
Wild notions regarding the breakout attempt spread among the troops. 
Many believed that they would reach their own lines after a short march. Some 
claimed that it would be a mere fifteen to twenty-kilometer march, that the 
Soviets had only service units poised against them and that the rescue forces 
were already waiting to meet them at Pilisszentkereszt. Shortly after 6 p.m. 
General Schmidthuber, the commanding officer of the German Thirteenth 
Armored Division "radiates a paternal air among his circle of intimate friends 
and declares, 'Well, we're not just going to stand here and let ourselves be captu-
red are we? By the day after tomorrow we'll all be on the other side, sitting 
together comfortably and drinking a little wine.'"12 The same sort of reasoning 
prompted an entire army of civilians to prepare for the breakout, often with 
strollers and stacks of furniture. 
Sober observers suspected, however, that the operation might not be so 
successful. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Dorner's 
500 SS police and Ivan Hindy, the commanding officer of the Hungarian First 
Corps, perhaps not by chance, chose another route: they planned to bypass the 
most critical phase of the operation — the penetration of Soviet lines — by 
taking the Ordogarok (literally: the Devilditch) underground sewage canal as far 
as the Bolyai Academy. 
The Soviets likely suspected that a breakout attempt was imminent. 
There was every reason to believe this since the Germans had always attempted 
this if at all possible. Neither could the direction of the breakout attempt have 
remained a mystery because it was obvious that the Germans would choose the 
shortest wooded route where they would not have to engage their forces in open-
field combat with the superior Soviet armor. In addition, there is evidence 
indicating that the German operational plan had been betrayed.13 
Soviet expectations are revealed by the fact that they formed three lines 
of defense at the eventual point of the breakout attempt. The first at the height 
of Szell Kalman Square, the second at the height of Janos Hospital with the third 
extending along the slope of the Janos Hill. People who lived in the vicinity at 
the time recall that most residents of Retek Street, Lovohaz Street and the lower 
section of Filler Street as well as Szell Kalman Square were evacuated in the 
week preceding February 11. The Soviets planned to withdraw from the first to 
the second line of defense at the beginning of the attack from where they would 
contain the enemy assault in the correspondingly formed pockets. More forces 
were stationed between Budapest and the front, such as the Second Armored 
Guards and the Fifth Mounted Guard Corps. The Soviets also positioned an 
armored unit near Dorog in order to seal off the Tinnye-Perbal road in the event 
of a breakout attempt. 
There is very little information available regarding the immediate military 
preparations preceding the breakout attempt. According to some sources, at 6 
p.m. the Germans infiltrated Soviet-held sectors along Margit Boulevard and 
elsewhere with an advance unit dressed in civilian clothing whose mission it was 
to roll up the front line. The Soviets had earlier employed this strategy during 
the capture of the Southern Railway Station.14 The Hungarian First Army Corps 
also maintained a plainclothes "diversionary unit" which likely participated in 
preliminary actions prior to the breakout attempt.15 
According to other sources, a detachment of German commandos dressed 
in Soviet uniforms inaugurated the breakout action. Posing as Soviet guards 
escorting German prisoners, they succeeded in disarming the Soviet sentry post 
at Szell Kalman Square.16 
Interestingly, Pfeffer-Wildenbruch and the other German officers who 
survived the breakout attempt did not recall any such advance operations. They 
claim that the Kiindiger Rangers were to open the front at Szell Kalman Square. 
Works on the siege of Budapest repeat uniformly that "the Russians began to 
cover the castle in an incredibly dense barrage at precisely 8 p.m., just as troops 
began streaming out from the castle..."17 This is cited above all to serve as proof 
that even the smallest strategic details of the breakout attempt had been betrayed. 
This, however, was not actually the case. The artillery bombardment 
became increasingly heavy until 10 or 11 p.m., only then reaching its climax.18 
Although the Russians had predicted the site of the breakout attempt, they were 
probably not completely certain of its timing, if not for any other reason than the 
fact that, during the siege of Budapest, German-Hungarian forces had carried out 
more than twenty attacks which were never immediately distinguishable from the 
beginnings of a breakout attempt. 
The Beginning: "Der erste Akt der Verzweifelung" 
The first units of storm troops began their attack at 8 p.m. According to the 
operational plan, the two primary assault units were to have been Haller's Eigth 
SS Mounted Division and Kiindiger's 271st Volkisch Grenadiers, both of which 
were supplemented by other units. 
We rush across the open square. There is crackling, rattling and 
whistling in front of us, beside us and behind us. Machine guns 
clattering, submachine guns sputtering, shots ringing out, hand grenades 
exploding — fire everywhere. No time to think. There is a burning 
armored vehicle in front of me. There must be Russian guns ahead 
which are firing nonstop into the swarm of attackers. Direct hit follows 
direct hit. Those who get hit stay down. Like lemmings rushing 
blindly down into the sea, the previously disciplined assault forces now 
raced headlong toward oblivion.19 
At Ostrom Street the surviving members of Vannay's Rangers regrouped. 
Their gear and equipment consisted of a winter jacket made of bed sheets, a 
small bag containing chocolate, pdlinka (Hungarian brandy) and lard, a helmet, 
grenades and submachine guns — many of which were of Soviet make, which 
were advantageous in that it was not difficult to obtain ammunition for them. 
One former member of Vannay's Rangers present at Ostrom Street recalls 
that among those present 
three spoke impeccable Russian, one ethnic German from Bessarabia..., 
[another man who] had been a prisoner of war for ten years and the 
[third]... a Ruthenian boy. They took ladders and slid them horizontally 
across the artillery trenches and crawled across into the darkness on all 
fours, speaking with the Russian sentries — and they made it over! 
Dispatch back: second squad may proceed. In the meantime all hell 
broke loose: powerful mine explosion, machine guns and other small 
arms. In spite of this, the majority of the second squad made it across 
to the postal building where they met up with several of Vannay's men 
who had been holding out inside.20 
Several people recall that in the hours before the breakout attempt, the Soviets 
played the hit song "Hiaba menekiilsz, hiaba futsz" ("No Sense in Running, no 
Sense in Flight") and blared the message "We know that you're going to try a 
breakout and we're waiting for you!" via loudspeaker.21 
Soviet flares bathed Szell Kalman Square in daylight and machine-gun 
fire swept down upon the troops spearheading the breakout. Soviet armored 
vehicles and anti-tank guns dug in at Janos Hospital made any advance difficult. 
The attack stalled here for quite some time until a tank which had miraculously 
made it through unscathed was incredibly able to destroy them. 
The attacking German and Hungarian troops used bazookas to destroy 
several of the Soviet armored vehicles which had taken up position along the 
Varosmajor - Janos Hospital - Budagyongye line. However, one must keep in 
mind that the attackers were only able to take six or seven kilos of arms and 
ammunition with them — some hand grenades, a rifle or submachine gun, a 
maximum of seven magazines while a few of them had bazookas. Very few 
carried machine guns because an extra man was required to carry their maga-
zines and the entire apparatus was extremely heavy. Due to the intense combat, 
most soldiers had run out of ammunition after the first kilometer of the advance. 
The command of the First Hungarian Armored Division reached the foot 
of Szilagyi Erzsebet Avenue between ten and eleven o'clock followed by a swell 
of humanity from Moszkva Square which included civilians and mothers pushing 
baby carriages. 
Suddenly three Soviet armored vehicles rolled out from Pasareti Street 
and from a distance of approximately 400 meters fired shells and tracers 
at the compact columns of people. What resulted was unimaginable. 
The shells blew away ten people next to me and when you tried to get 
out of there, you would step on some guy who started moaning.22 
The initial wave of several thousand attackers — probably owing to sheer 
physical pressure exerted from behind by subsequent waves of troops — broke 
through the line of the Soviet 180th Division, trampling over mounds of corpses 
of those who had fallen before them, and proceeded up Szilagyi Erzsebet Avenue 
to Budagyongye where they reached as far as the pharmacy located at the 
Budakeszi junction. This advance was won at an unbelievable human cost. The 
losses were so appalling that the vanguard of the second attack wave did not 
dare move forward. The narrow streets of the Castle District were jammed with 
troops from the rear who could not see the carnage and were trying to make 
their way to the front line. The blockage often lasted for hours. 
The breakthrough did not entail a total mop-up of the occupied ground. 
Soviet soldiers hid in buildings and occasionally opened fire on those fleeing the 
city. 
The second echelon reached the front line between approximately 9 p.m. 
and 11 p.m. General Schmidthuber, the commander of the Thirteenth Armored 
Division, was killed on Retek Street and Zehender, the commander of the 
Twenty-Second SS Mounted Division, had his right leg blown off and committed 
suicide. Major General Rumohr and three of his officers did likewise. 
The Soviets had already evacuated the entire civilian population of the 
area between February 10 and 11. Soviet soldiers either withdrew or hid in the 
attics of nearby buildings. They were not immune to the shock of combat and 
panic broke out in several places among the Soviet troops.23 As a result of this, 
gaps emerged in the Soviet defenses through which it was possible to exit the 
city unimpeded. 
Lieutenant-General Billnitzer reached Szena Square at only around 11 
p.m.: 
Here our unit was greeted by a horrible sight. It must have been 
around midnight. In the middle of the square there was a medium-sized 
armored vehicle whose German insignia was clearly visible. The 
flaming vehicle illuminated the entire square making it possible to see 
the aftermath of combat since it was from here that the first breakout 
attempt was launched in the direction of Olasz Avenue. We saw 
corpses and the wreckage of vehicles lying in every direction. We 
reached the foot of the street leading to Olasz Avenue where mostly 
German wounded lay moaning in the first floor windows of the build-
ings, asking for cigarettes to relieve their suffering. It was from them 
that I learned that the breakout attempt had been unsuccessful and that 
they had seen a huge number of dead. During this time there was 
relative calm. One could hear the sizzling sound of burning vehicles 
and snatches of conversation from the wounded resigned to their fate.24 
At around midnight relative calm descended upon Szell Kalman Square: 
A few hours later, when we got back down to Szena Square... the newly 
forming crowd instinctively set off in the direction of Olasz Avenue 
because they thought this would be the way out. We joined up with 
bigger and smaller groups. There was no unified command. Movement 
wasn't uniform and various groups of people moved toward the city as 
well. In the calm of the night they were obstinately, stubbornly trying 
to get somewhere, apparently without any direction. I clearly remember 
reaching Bimbo Street... from where we wound our way uphill with the 
crowd. After we had made it up out of the valley we perceived combat 
sounds and the braking and squeaking of tracked vehicles was even 
audible.25 
A few officers still maintained a measure of control over their troops. 
Helmut Wolff, the first lieutenant of the Feldherrenhalle Anti-tank Brigade, and 
later colonel in the Bundeswehr, saw that it would be impossible to advance any 
farther in the direction of Szilagyi Erzsebet (Olasz) Avenue and ordered his 
remaining intact battalion to attempt to break out across Vermezo-Kekgolyo 
Street. This was an unexpected success. They were able to pass through presu-
mably abandoned Soviet positions with practically no resistance. By daybreak 
they were already on the steep heights above the Budakeszi junction. During the 
course of that day another approximately 2000-strong detachment joined forces 
with them, increasing their total strength to nearly 3,200 men.26 
Sources recall a dense fog extending down to the foot of the Buda Hills 
on the morning of February 12. Many groups took advantage of this weather, 
including many civilians who at this time were proceeding in several groups of 
various sizes (two to three thousand), some in the direction of Szabadsag Hill 
and others to the north, in the direction of Remete Hill and Harmashatar Hill. 
Thus the breakout attempt was successful in so much as approximately 16,000 
people reached as far as the hills surrounding the city. 
The German Command's Passage through Ordogarok 
According to the operational plan, the staff of the German headquarters — 
Colonel Dorner's 500-man storm-trooper unit as well as the Luftwaffe's anti-
aircraft personnel and marines (the hand-glider pilots trapped in Budapest) and a 
few other special units — were to get behind Soviet lines via the Ordogarok 
sewage canal. However, because the existence of the underground passage did 
not remain secret, various groups attempted to use it as an escape route without 
permission, especially after the collapse of the organized breakout attempt.27 
It had already become light when the Germans reached the mouth of the 
Ordogarok. The emerging storm troopers were greeted by heavy artillery and 
machine-gun fire, making further advance impossible. Some of the Germans at-
tempted to proceed via the narrower canal running beneath Budakeszi Avenue 
which branched off from the main canal beneath Hiivosvolgyi Avenue. Pfeffer-
Wildenbruch was among those who tried this route. After exiting the sewage 
canal he and the ten to fifteen people next to him sought refuge in one of the 
villas cm Budakeszi Avenue. However, the Russians discovered them later that 
morning. A Soviet officer recalls that 
During the battle for the house we sent a Hungarian civilian who spoke 
German over to the enemy in order to offer them a chance to surrender. 
In order to lend more authority to our ultimatum, we positioned our 45-
millimeter gun — which was manned by First Lieutenant M.U. Zago-
ryan — opposite the house. The answer from the enemy was that they 
would lay down their arms under the following conditions: (a) we 
ensure their lives and (b) a Soviet officer of at least the rank of major 
take them into custody. Major Skripkin, the commander of the divi-
sion's chemical unit, was there and wrote on a piece of paper with a 
finger dipped in ink[!] that he, .as a major in the Red Army, was 
prepared to take them prisoner.?8 
The planned breakout through the Ordogarok sewage canal ended in 
complete failure. As far as we know, of those who set forth on this route, not 
one managed to make it over to their own lines and it is questionable whether 
anybody even made it beyond Pesthidegkut. After Ivan Hindy and his escort 
turned back before Budagyongye at around noon, he decided that he would try to 
sneak out undetected somewhere in the city and disappear. Since it was not 
possible to get out at the Ordogarok outlet or through the collapsed vault at 
Dobrontei Square, the detachment chose to take the original exit where they 
were immediately captured.29 
The Fate of the Troops and the Events of February 11-13 
I 
The withdrawal of the Soviet first line of defense opened several gaps through 
which a significant number of people were able to slip through the encirclement. 
Reaching wooded terrain was naturally the primary goal because there one would 
not be forced to contend with Soviet armor and progress was much quicker than 
in urban areas. 
Troops attempting to break out managed to reach woodland at several 
places. One group of approximately two to three thousand men set off in the 
direction of Harmashatarhegy, Solymar and Csobanka. Another group of fleeing 
German soldiers chose the Harmashatarhegy - Szarvas Hill - Nagyszenas route 
from which they escaped into the woods between Tinnye and Derbal. A third 
group, to which Lieutenant Colonel Wolff belonged, moved south from Nagy-
kovacsi. The air force even dropped supply canisters — whose remnants long 
lay rusting in the woods — down to them on the crest of the Voros Pocsolyas. 
This group reached the woods in the vicinity of Budajeno and Telki. 
The fleeing troops and civilians were able to travel through the woods 
relatively undisturbed if one overlooks the attacks by Russian airplanes. The 
risk factor always increased dramatically once one left the woods for the open 
field where one had to contend with Soviet cavalry and armored vehicles 
patrolling the roads. The Russians often fired mortars at groups appearing on 
the western slopes of the Buda Hills, forcing them back into the woods. 
A significant number of people, including Lieutenant General Billnitzer 
and his troops, veered off toward the south in the direction of the Nagykopasz 
and the Game Preserve (Vadaspark). Many of the troops participating in the 
operation, such as First Lieutenant Litterati and many Germans, attempted to 
break out along the cogwheel railway line. Some of them made it all the way to 
Szabadsag Hill, but were massacred there by Russians waiting in ambush who 
spared only the Hungarians.30 All semblance of discipline crumbled among the 
starved and half-mad troops who occasionally turned on one another over food.31 
Many of the fleeing soldiers discarded their weapons so that they could move 
faster in the deep snow.32 By this time many had indeed given up the fight: 
The Germans moving ahead of us stopped dead in their tracks, so we 
stopped too — but since we didn't know what was going on, we 
continued forward with the captain. Up ahead the ranking German 
officer, Obersturmbannfiihrer Fliigel, was lying in the snow screaming 
that he had had enough of this madness, that it was all in vain and that 
he wasn't going to take another step forward etc. His men just stood 
there around him...33 
According to those who participated in the operation, after two or three 
days everybody was on the verge of madness. Soldiers saw houses, kitchens and 
food before them in the fields of snow or imagined that they were at the 
Southern Railway Station. Many were driven insane by constant privation.34 
Only somewhat more than 700 men managed to reach the German lines, 
a large number of whom belonged to the group led by Lieutenant Colonel 
Helmut Wolff. On February 13 they marched all the way to the western fringes 
of the woods above Nagykovacsi to the Budajeno heights. After dark they broke 
through the interior Russian line which lay before them and — engulfed in a 
continuous fire-fight — reached the lines of the German Third Mounted Division 
at dawn.35 Reserve First Lieutenant Laszlo Szilasy led the first group to arrive. 
By the evening of the 13th they had already reached the Anyacsa-Pusztai heights 
between Szomor and Mariahalom. They crossed into German lines near the 
chapel in the cemetery of the Szomor Catholic Church with a total of four 
officers — three Germans and one Hungarian — and twenty-three privates. The 
Germans could attribute their successful crossing primarily to Szilasy's knowl-
edge of the local terrain.36 
Most of the 624 men who succeeded in reaching German lines did so on 
February 16. Only very few — at most eighty to one hundred men — arrived 
after this date.37 
For some, the breakout operation ended only weeks or months later. 
Some German soldiers, fearful of being captured, hid out in the woods, and 
sometimes even the city itself, until spring and even summer. 
Those who stayed behind: Events at the Castle and the Military Hospital 
People remained in the Castle for various reasons. The order calling for a 
breakout operation simply did not reach many troops while many stayed behind 
intentionally because they thought the undertaking to be hopeless. Hungarians 
constituted the majority of the former group and nearly all of the latter. The 
number of Hungarians who took part in the operation could not have exceeded 
five thousand. 
Several thousand seriously wounded men remained in the Alagut (Tun-
nel), the Castle Hospital, the basement of the National Bank, and elsewhere. 
"Many of them were crying in fear of what tomorrow would bring" is how one 
of the survivors remembers the mood which prevailed in the Tunnel at the 
beginning of the breakout. And to make matters worse, the head physician fled 
with his staff leaving his charges to their fate. 
Staff physician Hiibner, seeing that the breakout attempt had failed, 
turned back in order to remain with the wounded whom the other doctors had 
left to fend for themselves in the dressing stations in the cellars of the Royal 
Palace. Here approximately 2,000 wounded remained without any care or 
supervision. 
The Russians decided to close the hospital and picked the doctors out 
from among the P.O.W.s in order to help with the wounded. Medical Sergeant 
Aladar Konkoly Thege remembers it this way: 
I had to go to the second floor below ground. We were moving ahead 
slowly, only a few lamps and candles flickered. The air was dense and 
stuffy. The smell of blood, decay, pus, excrement, sweat, urine, to-
bacco smoke and gun powder mixed together to form a thick stench. It 
permeated the corridor, nauseating, unbearable. Flashlights plucked 
faces from the dark. Wounded lay in long lines along both walls of the 
corridor on wooden bunks — some of which were multilevel — al-
though many received nothing more than bare concrete. Most of them 
were in uniform with bandoliers, maybe the side-arm holster wasn't 
empty, there might be hand grenades in their pockets. Bloody, fester-
ing, soggy bandages, open fracture wounds held together by loose wire 
splints.38 
Fires broke out at the dressing stations several times, though they were 
put out immediately. The fires were probably started by cigarettes. Estimates as 
to the number of lives claimed by the blazes vary from 300 to 800. The 
wounded from the dressing stations were transferred to Honved Military Hospital 
Number Eleven (on the present site of the College of Physical Education), with 
the survivors returning home during the summer of 1945. 
Epilogue 
The Budapest breakout attempt went down in history as one of the most desper-
ate operations of the Second World War. It followed Central Europe's bloodiest 
urban siege. Out of the 43,900 German and Hungarian troops serving in 
Budapest on February 11, forty-six percent were killed during the course of the 
breakout attempt (see the appendix on page 30). Less than two percent of the 
soldiers who had been defending Budapest escaped, and of these, fewer than ten 
percent were Hungarian. Nearly half of the soldiers who participated in the 
breakout operation, 17.000 men, perished in the space of a few days. It is not 
by chance that Budapest is often referred to as a "second Stalingrad" in German 
memoirs. 
Germans, especially those wearing SS uniforms, could not count on 
clemency. What happened fifty years larpr in Grozny and Sarajevo was a brutal 
reality in Budapest during the winter of 1944-45. In many cases, those giving 
themselves up were simply slaughtered, as occurred next to the Janos Hospital 
where German corpses with their hands raised in surrender lay strewn on the 
ground.39 The wounded were also often shot, "accidentally," presumably because 
they were not fit for work and presented nothing but a burden to the Soviets.40 
Members of the SS were often forced to dig their own graves, such as at the 
Budakeszi community athletic field41 Russian and Ukrainian soldiers serving in 
the German armed forces were shown the least mercy of all: they were shot 
summarily.42 
What prompted the the German command to undertake such a desperate, 
insane operation, as it did at Budapest on February 11? 
The breakout operation is only comprehensible when considered as a 
manifestation of total war psychosis. Alas, the German command was not equal 
to the great challenge with which it was faced: its fear of the Russians — and, 
especially, being captured by them — impaired its judgment and, instead of 
surrender, it chose to drive its panic-stricken troops toward certain destruction. 
The ultimate responsibility, however, for the carnage at Budapest — 
throughout the winter of 1944-45 but in particular in the final phase of the battle 
— rests with the supreme war leaders: Stalin and, especially, Hitler. For both of 
them the struggle for the Hungarian capital became less and less a military 
necessity; it gradually turned into a battle to gain political advantage or to score 
psychological victory. In the end, it became a contest of wills. By the fall of 
1944 Stalin had definitely aimed at grabbing as much land in Central Europe as 
possible to strengthen his hands in the forthcoming negotiations at Yalta and, 
ultimately, at a post-war peace conference. Hitler, on the other hand, was 
desperate to prove that, once he had concentrated substantial forces in Hungary, 
he would not have to yield Budapest to the Russians. He could have offered a 
rescue to the city's defenders by allowing them to break out with a fair chance of 
success in December when the local command had deemed such operation still 
feasible. By the second or third week of January, when the IV SS Panzer Corps 
got close to the western outskirts of the city, the chances of a successful break-
out had diminished greatly, but had not disappeared completely.43 Hitler, 
however, cared not for his soldiers but only for the triumph of his will. Like the 
German panzer thrust toward Stalingrad in December of 1942 (Operation Winter 
Storm), the IV Panzer Corps' drive toward Budapest aimed not at rescuing the 
besieged forces but at re-establishing German control over the city. On both 
occasions a reasonable opportunity to rescue the trapped Axis forces was missed. 
By prohibiting a timely evacuation of Budapest by its defenders, Hitler showed 
the same callous disregard for human suffering and human lives that he had 
demonstrated at Stalingrad or, as a matter of fact, Stalin had shown toward the 
population of Leningrad during the siege of that city by the Germans. 
The blame for the virtual annihilation of what was left of the forces 
defending Budapest by February of 1945, can be placed squarely on the Fiihrer's 
shoulders. Contrary to the dictates of military necessity he, instead of trying to 
save the precious few military formations the Reich still had, allowed more of 
them to be trapped deep behind Russian lines. By the second week of February, 
the defenders of Budapest — diminished in numbers, broken in spirit, exhausted 
and starved — faced the choice between mistreatment (and possible death) 
through surrender and death through fighting to the last bullet. Their command 
chose the alternative that was no longer viable: a breakout attempt. Not surpris-
ingly, it resulted in still another of the war's great slaughters. 
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Appendix 
Effective personnel of the Hungarian and 
German forces in Budapest as of February 111 
43,900 (including 
11,600 wounded) 
100% 
No. of prisoners taken between Feb. 11 and 152 ca. 22,350 50.9% 
No. of prisoners taken after February 15 max. 1,000 2.3% 
Identified in mass graves3 ca. 5,000 11.4% 
No. of soldiers who reached German lines max. 700 1.6% 
No. of soldiers who went into hiding4 max. 700 1.6% 
No. of soldiers killed and missing ca. 14,250 32.5% 
Total no. killed during the breakout attempt ca. 19,250 43.9% 
Notes to the Appendix: 
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Economic Platforms of the Various Political Parties 
in the Hungarian Elections of 1945 
Susan Glanz 
In the 1989-90 elections in Hungary, politicians reminisced of the good old days 
of 1945 and kept saying how "free" the elections of that year were. Were those 
elections as free as they would like us now to believe? 
This paper will examine the economic platforms of the various parties 
that were allowed to participate in Hungary's first post-war elections. It will also 
suggest that the elections seemed free, because the Western Allies — the British 
and the Americans — had a "hands off policy" at that time toward Hungary. 
They were more preoccupied with problems elsewhere in the world and as a 
result, by default, they conceded Hungary as an area falling under the Russian 
sphere of influence. The Soviets on the other hand, were not that sure how 
much pressure they could apply in Hungary and, as a result, they intervened in 
the elections less than in those of the other East European countries. 
In the 1944-45 period the exhausted nations of Europe began the task of 
rebuilding their destroyed economies. The dual tragedies of the Great Depres-
sion and the war had created an atmosphere where direct government involve-
ment in the economy became accepted as the norm. A surge of idealism 
combined with a disillusionment with the old order resulted in radical leaders 
gaining strong moral and political influence. The desire for change in political 
life and the acceptance of government control in many areas of the economy was 
illustrated by the many parliamentary seats won by Social Democrats and 
Communists in most of the European countries. 
Hungary's losses in the Second World War had been devastating. 
Estimates are that between 420-450 thousand Hungarians died (higher than 
British, Italian, French or American losses), and between 850-900 thousand were 
taken prisoners of war.1 Before the war Hungary had been an agricultural and 
industrial nation. In 1938, the last peace year, 37% of the national income was 
generated by agriculture and 38% by industry. Due to the demands of war, in 
the period of 1943-44, the ratio changed to 43% of national income generated by 
industry and 28% by agriculture.2 But after the war the destruction of the 
industrial sector left the country paralyzed. The damage, in f938 prices, was 22 
billion pengos — using the 1938 exchange rate of $1=5.15 pengos, the damage 
caused amounts to $4.27 billion — which represented five times the national 
income of that year and 40% of the national wealth.3 The country's infrastruc-
ture was destroyed, and agricultural activity also almost came to a standstill as 
the armies moved through Hungary. Over 90% of all industrial plants suffered 
some damage and nearly all inventories disappeared. Coal mines ceased to 
function as nearly all were flooded because of the lack of electricity needed to 
pump water out. The economic situation was made even, worse by Hungary's 
foreign and domestic debt. By September 1945 the foreign debt amounted to 
890 million pengos plus $578 million. In addition, to meet the reparation 
payments imposed after the First World War and to finance the increasing 
budget deficit, the Hungarian government sold more and more bonds beginning 
in 1931, rapidly increasing domestic debt. By the end of 1944 domestic debt 
was 14.2 billion pengos,4 
Discussions to form a post-war Provisional Government began in 
Moscow, in November 1944, since Russian forces were already on Hungarian 
soil. Earlier, in mid-1943, the Hungarian Social Democrats formed an alliance 
with the Smallholders' Party, but the rapidly changing political situation rendered 
their program outdated by the end of the war. The Communist Party began 
formulating its social and economic policy for the post-war Hungary in Septem-
ber 1944 in Moscow. Its program was published in Debrecen on November 30lh, 
1944. 
On December 3, 1944, the Hungarian National Independence Front was 
formed by the Social Democrats, Smallholders, Communists and National 
Peasants and Civic Democratic Party members; these were the largest legal and 
some illegal opposition parties. The Front accepted and republished the Commu-
nist Party's program as its own. The Front's plan for economic recovery can be 
grouped around four ideas: 
1. Land reform; distribution of land to the peasants and the abolition of 
the production quota system introduced during the war. 
2. Nationalization of mines and utilities, and state supervision of cartels 
and monopolies. 
3. Balancing the state's budget and the introduction of a stable currency. 
4. The extension of social welfare legislation to include health and old-
age benefits to agricultural and domestic workers, payment of unem-
ployment compensation to the unemployed and the indexation of 
wages to inflation rates.5 
The Provisional Government, which took office on December 22, 1944, 
in Debrecen, responded to and formally declared the international agreement as 
specified by the Yalta "Declaration on Liberated Europe" as being "broadly 
representative of all democratic elements of the population." The government 
that was formed consisted of 2 Social Democratic Party members, 2 Smallhold-
ers' Party members, 2 Communists, 1 National Peasant Party member and 4 
unaffiliated representatives.6 These parties were the largest anti-fascist parties. 
The Provisional Government was officially voted into office by the 
Provisional Assembly meeting in Debrecen 27, 1944. The 230 members of the 
Provisional Assembly were elected in areas liberated by the Soviet Army. Of 
the members 71 were Communists, 55 were Smallholders, 38 were Social 
Democrats, 16 represented the Peasant Party, 12 represented the Civic Demo-
crats, 19 were union representatives and 19 were unaffiliated.7 There is dis-
agreement regarding the official and true affiliation of the assemblymen, but we 
will accept the official Hungarian data.8 
In January 1945, the Provisional Government signed the armistice 
agreement with the Allies, in which it agreed to pay $300 million in compensa-
tion within 6 years; $200 million was to go to the Soviet Union, $70 million to 
Yugoslavia and $30 million to Czechoslovakia,9 and all German and Austrian 
property was given to the Soviets. The armistice agreement also obligated the 
Hungarian government to preserve German property in the condition it was on 
January 15, 1945. As the government could only extend its jurisdiction slowly, 
it simply had to assume responsibility for the damages to these properties. 
Between January and April, 1945, the bank note issue of the Hungarian 
National Bank ceased completely, as the gold reserves of the Bank had been 
confiscated by the Hungarian Nazis and removed from the country. In its place 
the Russian Army issued significant quantities of military money, also denomi-
nated in pengos. State revenue collections were nonexistent, and production — 
both industrial and agricultural — was minimal, nevertheless the demands for 
food and other necessities were increasing. As a result, prices began to escalate 
rapidly. In addition the obligation of paying for the upkeep of the Russian Army 
was enormous, which also added to the inflationary pressure.10 
Although the Provisional Government officially did not have an economic 
policy until the summer of 1945, we can safely assume, that for the first six 
months its policy was the same as that of the National Independence Front. This 
is suggested by the decrees issued by the Government. 
The two decrees which affected the future history of Hungary were the 
ones on workers' committees and land reform. One of the first decrees passed 
by the government was regarding the workers' committees, which was issued on 
February 15, 1945. The committees were charged with restarting production in 
the factories and representing the interest of the workers to management. These 
committees were created to increase the influence of the Communist Party in the 
factories, as the unions were traditionally supporters of the Social Democrats. 
On March 17, 1945, even before the fighting on Hungarian soil was over, 
the decree on land reform was passed. This decree provided for the compensa-
tion to landowners for expropriated land holdings of 142 to 1,420 acres (100 -
1,000 hold). None of the compensation was ever paid. For holdings of over 
1,420 acres, no compensation was even promised. Over 35% of the country's 
territory was distributed to more than 642,000 families, creating a new land 
owning class." To some this seemed radical, but even the US State Department 
Advisory Committee, charged with formulating US peace proposals after the 
Second World War, suggested on May 1, 1944 that "electoral reform and land 
reform are requisites to the achievement of a democratic Hungary... a thorough-
going land reform would open the way for peaceful development of social and 
political democracy and would eliminate the control of a reactionary minority 
which has in the past monopolized power..."12 
The harvest in 1945 was a disaster, caused by bad weather, lack of seed 
and tools, and by the war conditions. As a result there was no surplus produce 
available to be delivered to the urban areas. The Russian head of the Allied 
Control Commission refused the food aid offered by the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration, and food rationing that was introduced during 
the war had to be continued and soup kitchens were also opened for the 
hungry.13 Because of the decreasing value of the currency, the economy reverted 
to a barter system. The state intervened by creating a Barter Office of the 
Ministry of Public Supply to facilitate and regulate this burgeoning barter 
business. To make matters worse or, according to this Ministry, to improve the 
supply of agricultural commodities, peasants were forced to pay all kinds of 
taxes in commodities. This further reduced the market supply of goods. 
In the nine month period from November, 1944 to July 1945 Hungarian 
companies were under military management and 75% of their output was 
requisitioned by the Russians for their military and reconstruction.14 A typical 
example of the economic conditions was described by the manager of the 
Hungarian General Credit Bank (Magyar Altalanos Hitelbank) in a letter sent to 
both the Provisional Government and the Budapest National Committee on 
February 5, 1945. He wrote, that "on the 30th of the last month a committee of 
Russian officers came to our offices, forced open the steel cash registers and 
safes and took roughly 113 million pengos in cash, from larger safes they 
removed about 800 suitcases, and broke into about 1,400 safe-deposit boxes and 
took their contents.... These officers also seized stock certificates belonging to 
both our clients and the bank itself. These represent an additional several 
hundred million pengos in loss. The officers aico confiscated typewriters, 
calculators and bookkeeping machines, which were essential for restarting our 
business."15 
On the political front the situation was not much better. In this same 
time period the Provisional Government was reshuffled twice. In both cases the 
government took a decided turn to the left. The last resignations in July 1945 
resulted in a Communist-Social Democratic majority in the cabinet.16 
On August 27, 1945 the Hungarian government signed the Hungarian-
Soviet Economic Pact. This agreement provided for the establishment of Soviet-
Hungarian joint-stock companies in bauxite-mines, oil exploration, refineries, 
shipping and air-transport. The stocks of these firms were equally divided 
between Hungary and Russia. The general manager of these companies was 
nearly always a Soviet citizen, though their chairmen were Hungarian. These 
companies were exempted from paying taxes, and export and import duties.17 
The Hungarian contribution to these firms was the existing assets of the firm, 
while Soviet contribution came from the assets acquired through reparation 
payments or requisitions. The US and British governments lodged mild com-
plaints that this pact ignored the equal treatment of the Allies, as they were not 
informed of this pact. The complaint stated that the Soviets came to control 
50% of the Hungarian industry. But this protest was ignored.18 
Based on the perceived successes of the May Day rallies, the Communist 
Party raised the issue of elections. Towards the end of August the cabinet 
discussed the timing of the elections. Since the Communists and Social 
Democrats were now a majority in the cabinet, their timetable won. The motion 
was made and passed that the elections would be held in two rounds, first to be 
held would be the Budapest municipal elections on October 7th, and then the 
national elections on November 4th. The Communists and Social Democrats felt 
sure that they would win in the Budapest municipal elections. These two parties 
thought that they had a broad-base support in .the capital city, 40% of the eligible 
voters belonged to either the Communist or the Social Democratic Parties.19 
The Nationwide National (Election) Committee (Orszagos Nemzeti 
Bizottsag) was formed on September 17, 1945 and charged with granting 
permission for participation in the elections. Of the ten parties requesting 
authorization to participate in the Budapest municipal elections and in the 
national elections, seven were granted permission. The participating seven were: 
1. The Smallholders' Party, 
2. The Social Democratic Party, 
3. The Hungarian Communist Party, 
4. The Civic Democratic Party, 
5. The National Peasant Party, 
6. The Hungarian Radical Party, and 
7. The Democratic Popular Party (the one headed by Istvan Barankovics) 
The three parties that were denied permission were Count Jozsef Palffy's 
party which was also called the Democratic Popular Party (De.mok.rata Neppart), 
the Traditional Democratic Party of the Intellectuals (Ertelmisegi Osztaly Osi 
Demokrata Pdrtja) and the National Democratic Party (Nemzeti Demokrata 
Part).20 [Other sources list the Christian Women's Camp (Kereszteny Noi Tabor) 
as the third party not permitted to run, instead of Palffy's Democratic Popular 
Party.]21 At the end of September Palffy's Democratic Popular Party joined with 
the Civic Democratic Party. 
The Party Platforms 
1. The Smallholders' Party (officially called the Party of the Independent Small-
holders, Agricultural Day Workers and of the Middle Class (Fiiggetlen Kisgazda, 
Foldmunkds es Polgari Part) did not have a detailed platform for the fall 
elections. Their platform was the previously published party program. Accord-
ing to the Party leaders the issues these elections will be decided on were not 
economic issues, but on the visions of Hungary's future. On the day of the 
Budapest municipal elections, the party paper summarized the Smallholders' 
position by saying "this election will not decide whether we need to fight against 
inflation, reactionary politics or the black market,... in these questions the 
Hungarian public has already spoken. The issues this election will determine 
are: what road and what ideology the Hungarian Government will take in the 
future."22 
It is interesting to note that this party was originally formed to represent 
the interest of peasants and small property holders, but did not formulate a land 
reform program of its own. A proposal that was considered in early 1945, but 
which did not get published, showed some similarities to the program of the 
Social Democratic Party. The proposal expressed doubt that land reform could 
be accomplished in the planned time frame (March 17 and October 1, 1945), and 
it argued that land must be worked by those who own it, also suggesting that 
land should never be sold, but only be inherited.21 By the time the elections 
were held, this issue was moot, as land reform had been accomplished. 
The central theme of the party's program was the concept of maintenance 
of private property and the freedom of enterprise, both in industry and in 
agriculture. They also spoke out against agricultural cooperatives, and did not 
openly discuss the nationalization of industry as suggested by the Independence 
Front, and they argued for a non-partisan civil service. A unique suggestion by 
the party was the right to strike by peasants.24 
The Smallholders' agenda also included the demand for a progressive 
income tax structure and argued against sales taxes. The party also spoke of the 
urgent need of establishing a socialized health care system and an old-age 
pension system for all.25 
2. The Social Democratic Party's (Szocialdemokrata Part) platform was accepted 
at its 34lh congress held in August 1945. In agriculture the party called for the 
importation of livestock, sale of agricultural machinery at reduced rates, the 
provision of cheap credit to farmers, the establishment of sugar refineries and 
canning factories and the extension of health care and old age benefits to 
agricultural workers to the same level as those of industrial workers. In industry 
the party called for the nationalization of mines, electric utilities, and other key 
industries, with special attention to the light-metal fabrication industry and for 
the limitation of foreign trade rights exclusively to the state or to cooperatives. 
To help revive the economy the party suggested that trade agreements be signed 
with neighbouring countries, and that all trade agreements should have a barter 
provision. The platform also proposed a new progressive tax system. To 
prevent funds from leaving the country, the Social Democrats campaigned for 
strict foreign exchange controls, a balanced budget and state control of privately 
and publicly held banks. To "prevent" the spread of discontent, it advocated the 
nationalization of the radio and movie industry and proposed to subsidize 
publishing houses and exhibition halls.26 
3. The Hungarian Communist Party's (Magyar Kommunista Part) official 
platform was published in September. The platform's cornerstone was a three 
year plan to develop industry, transportation and agriculture. One of the plan's 
point was to set maximums for — and eventually to fix — the prices of wheat 
and bread, as well as those of raw materials such as coal, iron ore, electricity 
and oil. The platform also spoke of the state being the supervisor of industrial 
production and of setting ceiling prices to 70% of consumer goods. The 
Communist Party promised low cost loans to new farmers, and the establishment 
of agricultural cooperatives in order to take advantage of economies of scale in 
production, purchasing and sales. They promised to stabilize the currency by 
balancing the budget and by forcing the wealthy to pay higher taxes and to give 
the government a one-time loan. The platform included a progressive tax 
system, the freezing of foreign bank accounts and wealth abroad, state monopoly 
of foreign trade, and the nationalization of utilities and mines. It also promised 
to establish a price parity between agricultural and industrial products, such as 1 
pair of work boots would equal 1 metric ton of wheat.27 
4. The Civic Democratic Party (Polgdri Demokrata Part) positioned itself as the 
party representing the middle and lower middle classes. It sought the termina-
tion of political appointees in public service and the running of the country by 
decrees. It proposed that issues of universal interest be decided by referendums. 
The platform included the introduction of a progressive tax system to eliminate 
income inequality, a higher tax rate on wealth than on earned income. It also 
called for government control of trusts and cartels and the reduction of the role 
that banks traditionally played in the Hungarian e c o n o m y . F o r the long-run, 
the party advocated the introduction of a single tax system such as the one that 
had been advocated by the American economist Henry George (1839-1897) who 
in 1879 had called for a single land tax to replace all other taxes. They also 
proposed subsidies to establish agricultural entities and the payment of unem-
ployment compensation to the unemployed. The party further advocated an 
industrial policy that emphasized industrial development outside Budapest to 
provide employment to rural workers. The platform also included the promise of 
universal health coverage and pension system, a balanced budget, .a stable 
currency and the introduction of liberal trade policies.29 This party was at a 
disadvantage as it did not have a nationwide party network. 
5. The National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Parasztpdrt) saw itself as the representa-
tive of the poor peasants, those who received land in 1945. It saw the land 
reform only as the first step toward the creation of a nation of small farmers. It 
promised seeds, animals and machinery, as well as long-term interest free loans 
to start the new farms created by land reform. The party also promised to help 
organize farmers into cooperatives in order to take advantage of large scale 
production and purchasing.30 
6. The Hungarian Radical Party (Magyar Radikdlis Part) only received permis-
sion to publish its position paper a week before the Budapest municipal elec-
tions. The party viewed itself as the party of the "working intellectuals." They 
announced that they did not want to "participate" in power, but only wanted to 
take part in the changes occurring in Hungary. They stated that they did not 
oppose "socialism, if socialism means a fairer social and economic system."31 
To achieve a more equitable income distribution, the party demanded the 
divestiture of monopolies, elimination of tariffs, establishment of public work 
programs for the unemployed and seeking of foreign loans to reduce the rate of 
inflation. The program also spoke of the need to balance the state's budget by 
reducing expenditures. In order to make displaced government workers emplo-
yable, the program suggested that the state pay for their retraining.32 
7. The Democratic Popular Party (Demokrata Neppdrt) was given permission to 
run, but choose not to participate independently due to the lack of campaigning 
time and the dearth of funds. The party saw itself as the Hungarian equivalent 
of the Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. Its representatives ran 
on the same ticket as the Smallholders.33 The chairman of the party in his 
September 25lh speech defined the goals of the party. He stated that while the 
party supported the concept of private property, it proposed "the nationalization 
of those industries that are for the public good". To increase agricultural 
productivity and fair distribution, the creation of agricultural cooperatives must 
be encouraged. The party would maintain the network of religious schools, and 
support the charitable works of religious institutions; also, churches should be 
compensated for their expropriated lands.34 
In summary, the six parties did not have significantly different platforms. 
They could not, as the Nationwide National (Election) Committee would not 
have given them permission to run, as it refused permission to other parties. The 
parties that were not members of the Independence Front were also disadvan-
taged by the short time between the announcement of the elections and the 
elections themselves. All parties talked of the importance of private property, 
privately owned means of production, the freedom of the enterprise, and private 
initiative, though the Communist platform subjugated these to the interests of the 
state. The Communists saw private firms playing a decreasing role in the 
economy. In addition, the largest four parties — the Social Democrats, the 
Communists, the Smallholders and the Civic Democrats — called for a social-
ized health care system and a revision of the pension system. 
The Communists had the most detailed campaign platform. Also, their 
campaign was the best run as they were most liberally supplied with print media 
and means of transportation by the Russian occupation forces. Overt displays of 
anti-communist agitation was restricted by both the Russian army and the 
Hungarian AVO (Allamvedelmi Osztaly — State Defense Department).15 
None of the parties opposed the land reform, but the Smallholders 
opposed the concept of cooperatives. All parties kept the nationalization 
program of the Independence Front, that is the need to nationalize only utilities. 
All the parties also called for a more equitable, and progressive tax system. 
Only the Social Democrats talked of the type of government they envisioned, a 
People's Republic. This is interesting because in an internal document prepared 
a year earlier by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, they called for 
the same thing.36 Of all the parties only the Communists offered a concrete 
solution to the rampant inflation. The emphasis placed on balancing the budget 
by all parties is interesting, since the accepted budget philosophy since the 1930s 
was "functional finance" which in fact suggests that the government aims at 
neither a surplus nor a deficit but at accomplishing its goals. It is obvious that in 
the post-war period Hungary could not balance its budget, so the call to increase 
the tax burden of the rich to balance the budget was empty political rhetoric. 
Both the Social Democrats and the Communist Party platforms called for 
state control of foreign trade, the other parties talked of liberalizing foreign 
trade. This was one of the areas where the platform of the Social Democrats 
went further than the platform of the British Labour Party, as the BLP only 
called for state aid to revive foreign trade. The other area where the Hungarian 
Social Democrats' platform was much more detailed than the British is in its 
provisions concerning agriculture. Here the differences between the two 
programs are self-explanatory, since by the end of the Second World War in 
England's economy agriculture played only a small role. 
The campaigns were marred by violence around the country, several 
people were injured and a few were killed. On September 26, a few weeks 
before the municipal elections, the Communists and the Smallholders agreed to 
reduce the violence of the campaign, both in the media and at rallies. The 
Smallholders terminated holding rallies and opted for door-to-door campaign-
ing.37 
In the Budapest municipal elections held on October 7th, 1945, the Social 
Democrats and the Communist Party ran on the same ticket, called the "United 
Workers' Front"(Dolgozok Egyseglistaja).38 In spite of their expectations, they 
did not win. The Smallholders won by receiving 50.54% of the vote, the 
"United Workers' Front" received only 42.75% of the vote. The remaining votes 
were distributed among the Civic Democratic Party (3.83%), National Peasant 
Party (2.01%) and the Hungarian Radical Party (0.086%).39 The'Communist 
Party blamed its loss on the severe economic crisis, on the right-wing of the 
Socialist Democrats and, of course, on the anti-Soviet attitude of the middle class 
and the influence of the Catholic Church. The Social Democrats blamed their 
defeat on the United Workers' Front and on October 12th decided to run inde-
pendent campaign in the national elections.40 
The Western media applauded the results of this election, but they also 
talked about the fear that was already gripping the country, a fear caused by 
rampant inflation and increasing crime in the streets. On October 9th The New 
York Times reported that a state of siege was declared in Hungary as "political 
unrest leads t'o murder and robbery."41 
On October 16, Klementi Y. Voroshilov, the chairman of the Allied 
Control Commission and a member of the Soviet Politburo, in order to avoid a 
similar "disappointing" outcome, suggested that in the nationwide elections the 
parties run together on one list (which, of course, means that they all would have 
won or they would all have lost at the same time!) His suggestion also stipu-
lated that the distribution of seats in the post-election Parliament be predeter-
mined.42 The US and British members of the Allied Control Commission did not 
take a strong stand against this suggestion. Instead, they said that a joint list 
would not meet the "Yalta requirements". The Smallholders and the Social 
Democrats also held their ground by insisting on running independently and the 
Russians were forced to compromise. After several days of negotiations an 
agreement was reached. It was agreed that regardless of the outcome of the 
elections, the new government would still be a coalition government43 
On October 18, the newly appointed Roman Catholic Cardinal of 
Hungary, Cardinal Jozsef Midszenty, published a pastoral letter urging Catholics 
to vote for the Smallholders. This letter was extremely critical of everything that 
had happened in the country44 As a countermeasure against Midszenty's 
pastoral letter, the communist-controlled police arrested the vice-president of the 
Budapest stock exchange, as well as four brokers, a foreign exchange trader and 
several bankers. They were accused of "causing" inflation.45 
On October 23, after the loss in the Budapest Municipal elections, the 
Social Democratic Party published the proposals it had made earlier to the 
Provisional Government to overcome the economic problems and to enhance the 
party's chances in the national elections. These proposals went further than the 
party's platform in the Budapest elections. It is the first time that the party 
spoke of the need to reduce the rate of inflation and the need to make work 
obligatory for all adults. To overcome the growing dissatisfaction among the 
populace, the party proposed food and clothing subsidies for those employed in 
industries directly involved in rebuilding the nation. Going beyond the proposals 
of their previous platform, the Social Democrats suggested the creation of 
agricultural supervisory committees. The task of these committees would be to 
see that those who work the land are the owners of the land. The tools the 
committee would have to achieve these goals would be the power to confiscate 
the land from those who did not work it, or from those who did not meet their 
production quota requirements. To achieve the goal of balancing the budget, the 
party proposed to index tax obligations to the inflation rate. The Social Demo-
cratic Party maintained that industry should remain in private ownership but with 
strict state supervision over production and distribution. This proposal also 
spoke of limiting access to the media and suggested that only members of the 
Independence Front should be allowed to own newspapers.46 
After their victory in the Budapest elections, the Smallholders expanded 
on the theme of free agricultural enterprise and promised to reevaluate the claims 
of those peasants who either did not receive any land or received too little land 47 
In spite of the previous agreement, the Communist Party kept up its 
attacks on the Smallholders and the right-wing of the Social Democrats. The 
left-wing of the Social Democrats joined with the Communists in attacking 
Smallholders. These attacks intensified after the Budapest elections 48 
To counterbalance the Russian influence, to show that the US saw the 
elections as free and fair, and to help the non-communist parties, the Truman 
government recognized the Provisional Government on November 2, 1945. 
On November 4th the nationwide elections were held. The result of the 
election was a resounding victory for the Smallholders who received 57.03% of 
the vote. The Social Democrats came in second with 17.41%, the Communists 
third with 16.95%, the National Peasant Party with 6.87%, the Civic Democratic 
Party with 1.62% and the Hungarian Radical Party received 0.12% of the votes.49 
It is interesting to note that the public mood at the time was in favour of 
nationalization, despite the fact that the party with the largest following, and the 
winner of the elections, the Smallholders' Party, did not endorse it. A public 
poll taken at the time showed the following results:50 
People were asked whether or not they favoured the nationalization of 
factories and banks. The answer was: 
Factories Banks 
Support nationalization 67% 75% 
Oppose nationalization 32% 23% 
Don't know/no answer 1% 1% 
On November 15, the Provisional Government resigned and the new 
cabinet was sworn in. Of the 18 cabinet posts 9 or 50% were given to Small-
holders, 4 (22 %) to the Communists, 4 (22%) to the Social Democrats and 1 (6 
%) to the Peasant Party. Due to the agreement before the elections, the Small-
holders, the Social Democrats and the Peasant Party received fewer cabinet 
appointments and the Communists were given larger percentage of seats than the 
election results warranted. Of the 32 deputy ministry spots only 9 (28%) were 
assigned to the Smallholders.51 
So, in spite of the electoral victory, the Smallholders did not form a 
government. The clever "salami tactics"52 used by the Communist Party during 
the next three years, eventually lead to the exclusion of all other parties from 
power and to complete one-party rule in Hungary. The appeasement policies of 
the two other large parties, the Smallholders and the Social Democrats, slowed 
this process but could not stop it. 
The elections seemed free, because six parties participated, although the 
playing field was far from level. Other individuals and groups that to form 
political parties early in 1945, but were denied permission to organize. Authori-
zation had to be granted by both the Independence Front and the Allied Control 
Commission. Some of the groups that were denied permission to organize were 
the Coalition of Hungarian Patriots for Freedom and Freedom Party (Magyar 
Hazafiak Szabadsag Szdvetsege es Szabadsag Part), the Independent Popular 
Socialist Party (Fiiggetlen Szocialista Neppart) and the Nation-building Peace 
Party (Nemzetepito Bekepart). Others, such as the Hungarian Party (Magyar 
Part), the Party of Hungarian Agricultural and Industrial Workers (Magyar 
Foldmuves es Munkaspart), the Hungarian Republic Party (Magyar Koztarsasag 
Part), and the Kossuth Party were given permission to organize, but joined with 
the Smallholders within two months of their founding.53 
Not only did the Soviets aid the Communist Party directly, by providing 
it access to the media and transportation, they also helped the party indirectly: 
e.g. when the Communist Party stalwart Zoltan Vas became the Mayor of 
Budapest, the Russian Army gave food loans to the starving citizens of the 
capital — from previously requisitioned Hungarian stores. Soviet goals were 
made abundantly clear even before the election. When American Secretary of 
State James Byrnes informed Marshall of the USSR Army and Foreign Minister 
Vyacheslav M. Molotov, that the US "would join others in observing elections 
in Italy, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria," Stalin is reported to have 
responded that a "freely elected government in these countries would be anti-
Soviet and that cannot be allowed."54 However it was the 50-50% agreement 
between Churchill and Stalin regarding Hungary, that made the Soviets push for 
less radical changes and allowed change to occur slower than in other 
countries.55 
The British and American governments had a hands-off policy toward 
Hungary. They voiced complaints against egregious disregard of previous 
agreements through the Allied Control Commission, but this was not going to 
change Russian policy. As the chair of the Allied Control Commission was a 
Russian, the other members needed his permission to travel in Hungary and to 
communicate with the cabinet. The British were the first to admit that Hungary 
was not important to them, when in March 1945, Sir Orme Sargent, then under-
secretary and later permanent under-secretary at the British Foreign Office, stated 
that British policy viewed Hungary as an "issue not vital." He foresaw that the 
"governments in these countries would be modeled on totalitarian lines.56 
Actually Stalin was truly candid when he told Milovan Djilas that "This war is 
nv,t as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social 
system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It 
cannot be otherwise."57 
In 1952 communist leader Matyas Rakosi, in talking about the post-war 
years, bluntly summarized the aim of the Communist Party as havinp been the 
achievement of total domination in all spheres of life: 
In stating our demands, we carefully weighed the probable effects of 
them, and whenever possible proceeded cautiously, step-by-step, so as 
to make it hard for the enemy to muster and mobilize all his strengths 
against us. We gradually increased our demands in every possible field, 
using provisional forms. In the banking line, for instance, we insisted 
at first only on state control over the banks, and only later, on national-
ization of the three major banks. We proceeded in a similar way with 
industry, first demanding state control over the mines, then expanding 
our demands to the control of large machine manufacturing factories 
and smelting industry, and ending by their nationalization. Thus we 
achieved the nationalization of industry by dividing the process into 
four or five stages during the span of several years.58 
And, indeed, the communist takeover proceeded rapidly as soon as it 
became clear that the US and Britain would not interfere. Some examples of the 
rapid transformation of the Hungarian economy to a command economy began 
when in 1946 coal and bauxite mines and aluminum producers, and the five 
largest industrial holding companies were nationalized, while the Hungarian 
National Bank was placed under state supervision. The following year all banks 
were first placed under state supervision and then were nationalized. Political 
witch-hunts, arrests and incessant media campaigns left the opposition parties 
decimated. The 1947 elections reflected this: the once mighty Smallholders, for 
example, received only 15% of the vote.59 In 1948 all companies having over 
100 employees were nationalized and the stock exchange closed its doors. In the 
same year the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party merged. In 
1949 all companies employing over 10 workers were nationalized; and the rest is 
history. 
The politicians who in the 1990 elections talked of their parties continu-
ing the traditions of the parties of 1945, were actually representing parties with 
directly opposite economic platforms. All parties in the early '90s talked of 
reducing the role of the government in the economy, and of the importance of 
the market and of the need to privatize enterprises. 
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War-Crimes Trial Hungarian Style: 
Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy 
Before the People s Tribunal, 1945 
Pal Pritz 
translated from the Hungarian by Daniel Szekely 
Like a snow-white rococo wig, so did the one-time Royal Hungarian Prime 
Minister Laszlo Bardossy's hair gleam in the courtroom.' His face was also 
pale. Frail as ever, his figure grew even more ethereal after the tribulations and 
privations he had undergone during the previous months. On the small table, by 
which he was seated, a heap of paper was towering along with a glass of water 
and some medicines to strengthen his sickly body if needed. 
However his eyes — a mirror of his intellectual character — were bright, 
and keenly ranged over the courtroom. He intently listened to what was said in 
an effort to anticipate and fathom the dangers hidden in the questions put to him. 
Evidently, the stakes were very high. They were much higher than his mere 
earthly existence — since he had long realized that he would soon die a violent 
death. What was at stake was the very essence of his whole life. All of his 
efforts were aimed to demonstrate that — while he admitted to have been 
responsible for the tragedy of his fatherland — he had not committed a crime, 
still less a series of crimes, and that his responsibility was to be extenuated by 
the pressure of powerful external forces which had caused Hungary's tragedy at 
the end of World War II. 
He could often feel his superiority over his opponents, including the 
presiding judge Akos Major (who only a short time earlier had been a judge-
advocate of the Royal Hungarian Military Court), as well as the public and the 
political prosecutors. He was more knowledgeable, more informed, and he could 
I chose his words in a more refined and inventive fashion. He would often take 
advantage of his superior language proficiency by using foreign terms and 
expressions to confuse the court. True, he was not always successful in this 
s effort: to his Latin-language citations the presiding judge immediately rejoined in 
kind. His English terminological explanations were responded to — to his great 
surprise — also in English by the political prosecutor Sandor Szalai. 
Sometimes he thought to have found allies among the audience. 
Although he did not know and could not know that, often, the presiding judge 
would receive anonymous threatening telephone calls, but he could rightly 
reckon with the sympathy of the audience filling the rows of seats in the major 
Concert Hall of the Music Academy of Budapest which functioned as a make-
shift courtroom. He believed that the audience would not unfavourably receive 
his references to Hungary's successes in recovering certain Hungarian-populated 
territories which had been detached from her under the Trianon Peace Treaty 
following World War I, and that the audience would look upon him as a gallant 
Hungarian champion of the idea of territorial revision. 
Indeed, there were many among the audience who tended to feel and 
think in this manner, because the audience was composed, to a considerable 
extent, of the members of the middle class, and also of intellectuals who wanted 
to absorb the historical atmosphere of the trial. However, there were also many 
who did not and could not feel at home with the Hungarian society of a period 
hallmarked by Miklos Horthy's name: those to whom fatherland had allotted — 
instead of goods — nothing but hard work, or even a great deal of hardship and 
privation if unemployed. And there were also those in the audience who 
originally had lived the good life, but whose circumstances had increasingly been 
made difficult by the regime's anti-Semitic legislation, and who in the end hardly 
managed to save their lives.1 
* * * 
The Bardossy-trial as a process had several extraordinary features. It was 
extraordinary that justice was not administered by the regular judiciary, but by 
the so-called People's Tribunal, a body newly created by four prime ministerial 
decrees, which was later enacted by Parliament as Act VII of 1945. Another 
unusual feature of the trial, which opened on October 29 1945, was that it was 
for the first time since the People's Tribunal had been instituted that a widely 
known personality was brought to trial. It was extraordinary indeed because this 
person was the one-time prime minister of the country and in this capacity he 
ought to have been judged by a parliamentary jury especially set up for this 
purpose in pursuance of several laws — and mainly under Act III of 1848 — 
which were still in force at the time. On this account, throughout the trial, 
Bardossy contested the competence of the People's Tribunal in his case. True, in 
the armistice agreement, signed in Moscow on 20 January 1945, enacted some-
what later and included in the National Body of Laws as Act V of 1945, 
Hungary undertook "to assist in arresting the persons accused of war crimes, in 
extraditing them to the governments concerned and in condemning [them]."2 It 
logically followed that a newly created judiciary should pass sentence on such 
war criminals. Thus it was also quite natural that those responsible for such 
crimes should be sought primarily among persons who had held the highest 
public offices during the war. Yet to those with a sense of justice, to those 
steeped in constitutional law, i.e. to the generation grown up in the spirit of the 
traditional Hungarian legal system, this procedure seemed to be unacceptable. In 
this context, it will suffice to refer to the conduct of Vince Nagy, minister of 
home affairs at the time of the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1918, who — 
out of similar considerations — refused to act as public prosecutor in this trial, 
though he naturally insisted on proceedings being brought against Bardossy. 
Instead, he accepted the political prosecutor's role in the trial of Arrow-Cross 
leader Ferenc Szalasi.3 
The circumstances themselves were extraordinary too. The courtroom 
was unheated, and the audience watched the events all wrapped in winter coats. 
Even the members of the tribunal had their hat on (except when they were 
photographed so that posteriority might see their uncovered heads). Although 
the guns had been silent for several months, the signs of destruction of the past 
months were clearly evident. The country and its capital lay in ruins and the 
wreckage of the bridges that used to link Buda and Pest slowed the flow of the 
Danube River. The everyday life of the population could only slowly get back 
to normal. Feeding and clothing the population, providing people with work, 
were all towering as virtually insurmountable difficulties. Still more serious than 
the losses of material life were the several wounds inflicted on the lives and 
souls of people. There was hardly any family that was not mourning someone, 
or searched desperately for a missing father, mother, wife or child. Grief gave 
rise to passions, and the throbbing mental pains prompted people to look for the 
underlying causes of the tragedies that befell them, and also for those who were 
responsible for these. 
There was Laszlo Bardossy sitting in the courtroom, first in the Music 
Academy, then (in late-December, 1945) in the hall of the appellant court, in one 
of the few undamaged parts of the Parliament Building. From time to time 
passions flared up around him and not without reason as it was clear even to the 
less informed people that it had been during Bardossy's prime ministry that 
Hungary got involved in World War II. The Hungarian Army had crossed the 
country's southern borders in April 1941 to participate in the occupation of 
Yugoslavia. Two months later Hungarian troops penetrated into the territory of 
the country's giant neighbour, the Soviet Union. Moreover, in December 1941, 
Hungary followed the example of Nazi Germany and declared war on the United 
States. 
It is always the business of a court of justice to put the facts onto the 
scales of justice and to weigh the pros and cons soberly and objectively. Under 
such unusual external pressures as existed in this particular trial, however, the 
court was unable to be free of emotions. The People's Tribunal viewed Bar-
dossy, and let him be seen, as an "evil" person who had committed such 
monstrous crimes as "were unprecedented in the whole history of the world."4 
On the other hand, Bardossy's pleading was strengthened not only by his 
superior intelligence, wide knowledge, and by his ability to formulate his 
sentences in a brilliant, almost literary style — or by his abilities as a debater 
who did not refrain from some sophistry — but also by his argumentation built 
on emphasizing the necessity of revising Hungary's post-Trianon borders. This 
line of argument inflamed sentiments which remained unanswered because the 
court — under the country's international situation at the time — was not in the 
position to pay regard whatsoever to national feelings and sensitivity. Namely, 
at the end of World War II, Hungary had to accept a peace treaty, the territorial 
provisions of which were even more disadvantageous than those of the Trianon 
Peace Treaty, whose terms had appeared quite inconceivable to Hungarians at 
the time they were proclaimed. At the same time, Bardossy built his defence on 
the undoubtedly advantageous territorial consequences of the First and Second 
Vienna Awards and of the subsequent Hungarian actions in Sub-Carpathia and in 
the South-Hungary (also known as Bacska or Voivodina).5 
It was in this connection that the proceedings would often become heated 
on the pattern of Sophoclean dramas. At a certain moment of the proceedings, 
for example, the presiding judge got carried away to such an extent that he told 
Bardossy to shut up, had him shackled and led out of the court-room. The 
provocation for this deed was an unfavourable remark by Bardossy about Endre 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky — who had been so infamously executed by the Arrow-Cross 
regime hardly a year earlier.6 
Still in 1945, based on serialised reports of the Hungarian National 
Reporter and the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency, the proceedings of the Bar-
dossy trial were published in a thin volume,7 in the same way as those of the 
other major war criminals. The value of this brochure as a historical record is 
not really significant, because this thin publication could not represent the main 
lines of the trial in their due proportions. However the little volume succeeded 
in stressing those elements of the proceedings which made it possible to place 
Bardossy in the most unfavourable light. At the same time other components of 
the trial were either missing or were only very faintly represented on its pages. 
Nevertheless, since over the decades even historians virtually lacked access to 
the proceedings of the trial — which, or more precisely fragments of which, 
have been kept in the Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs — the 
brochure has come to mean much to historians interested in this subject. A 
similarly small volume, entitled A nemzet vedelmeben (In defence of the nation),8 
was published in Switzerland in 1976, containing nothing but two highly 
elaborate speeches of Laszlo Bardossy. Namely, those which he had delivered 
as his last pleas before the courts of first and second instance, respectively. So 
one extreme was followed three decades later — and on foreign soil — by 
another, representing opposing points of view. 
One-sided views, however, are never suited to give a true picture of the 
past. As early as 1945, it was envisaged that the proceedings of the trials 
conducted by People's Tribunals in the case of each major war-criminal should 
be published in full, as textbooks to help educators to shape the historical 
consciousness of future generations. As it clearly appears from proceedings of 
the Bardossy-trial — first of all from the reasons adduced to the sentence of the 
court of first instance — the real objective of the trial was not only to condemn 
Laszlo Bardossy, the former Royal Hungarian Prime Minister, but to put the 
entire political system of the post-World War I Hungary on the pillory. 
Therefore it seems to be justifiable on several counts that the contempo-
rary reader — and anyone who wants to be well-informed of the stormy history 
of Hungary in the 20th century — should take a volume in his hand, which is 
not a tendentious selection but contains each important still existing page of the 
Bardossy trial's proceedings.9 
The trial scrutinized not only Bardossy's activity as Prime Minister and 
his conduct in later years, but it also offered an all-inclusive picture of Hungar-
ian society after 1918-1919. At the same time — as is so often the case — it 
also cast light upon the way of thinking and attitudes of those passing judgement 
on Bardossy in 1945. Thus, half a century later, a historian can simultaneously 
weigh two things, namely the message of the proceedings concerning Bardossy 
and the Horthy-era in general, and the extent to which the facts revealed — and 
the view of history formed during the trial — could survive in later historical 
works on this subject. This weighing can be sober and circumspect only if the 
investigator will not yield to the great temptation of projecting the immense 
socio-political changes of today on his subject, which is multi-layered anyway. 
It is the main task of a historian to reconstruct the events of the past to the best 
of his knowledge. Therefore, in order to complete the record conveyed by the 
published documents, these questions should be addressed briefly. 
* * * 
Laszlo Bardossy was born on December 10, 1890, in the city of Szombathely, 
into a gentry family whose members had traditionally served in the state admin-
istration. His father, Jeno Bardossy, was a ministerial counsellor. His mother's 
maiden name was Gizella Zarka de Felsoor. He attended secondary schools in 
Eperjes (now in Slovakia) and in Budapest. He studied law at universities in 
Budapest, Berlin and Paris, partly to enrich his knowledge of foreign languages 
— which included English as well — and to widen his intellectual horizons. He 
soon rose above the intellectual level of his classmates. The real underpinning 
of his early successes was, above all, his mental alertness. There is a story 
about him to the effect that at the time of examinations his fellow-students 
passed the news: "Laci Bardossy is to sit for examination, let's go to listen to 
him!" He was characterized, for the most part, by idealism, high ethical stan-
dards, receptivity to and demand for beautiful forms, and a keen interest in 
aesthetic qualities. So it was not by chance that, having graduated from the 
university in 1913, he could start his career as an employee of the Ministry of 
Culture. His activity in the ministry provided him a good opportunity to get 
acquainted with the contemporary Hungarian state administration, with its 
working methods, and its mentality. 
Like most of his colleagues, Bardossy could only slowly advance in rank. 
First he was junior clerk, and he was still a ministerial assistant secretary as late 
as 1918. Hungarian history had already reached the years of the counter-revolu-
tionary period,10 when he was appointed ministerial secretary in 1921, which was 
still rather a low civil service grade and pay category. Though in the meanwhile 
he also had a more pleasant and meaningful work, as he was acting for some 
time as the school-inspector of Pest County. 
The only positive development of those years was Hungary's attainment 
of independence — though only so far as this independence could be to the 
advantage of a territorially mutilated and internationally isolated country, faced 
by the need for social progress of which had come to a halt. The country's new 
situation required the establishment of an independent Hungarian ministry of 
foreign affairs. In fact, this work had already been started at the time of the 
bourgeois democratic revolution in autumn 1918, but due to the tremendous 
political upheavals of the time, the bulk of the work remained unfinished. In 
the early 1920s, the work was resumed, especially in establishing Hungary's 
diplomatic service. As a possibility, the new foreign ministry could choose to 
take over the officials with Hungarian citizenship who had been active in the 
formerly common Austro-Hungarian foreign service. There were so many of 
these that they could have easily filled all the diplomatic posts needed by a small 
country such as Hungary. But the contemporary Hungarian public opinion 
mistrusted those officials who were imbued with the spirit of the Ballhausplatz. 
Accordingly, this professionally quite natural solution, was not accepted. 
Instead, the high officials of the new ministry chose to select and employ highly 
qualified persons — with a wide knowledge foreign languages — from the 
existing Hungarian public administration. Bardossy belonged to this group. The 
fact that Bardossy got to the Dfsz Square — the place where Hungary's Foreign 
Ministry was located in the interwar period — was also helped by the fact that 
he had participated in the preparatory work for the peace treaty. 
He assumed his post with the Ministry on February 18, 1922. He was 
assigned to the press department to be its deputy head. In 1926 he was pro-
moted counsellor to the departmental head, and not much later he was appointed 
head of the press department. In 1930, he became counsellor to the Hungarian 
Envoy in London, i.e. he became the first among the subordinate officials of the 
Legation. He was to act for the envoy in case of his illness or absence. 
It was anything but a cheering task to participate in the guidance of 
Hungarian press policy at the time. The country's international prestige was at 
its lowest, and the well-known circumstances under which the counter-revolution 
had come to power, were enough in themselves to give rise to great international 
aversion to Hungary, which was still further enhanced by the anti-Hungarian 
propaganda campaigns that were conducted by Hungary's enemies at the time. 
Efforts to counteract the effects of all this met with two major difficulties. The 
first was that Hungarian propagandists of the times ignored the fact that support 
for the cause of Hungarian revision could not be won solely by an endless 
complaining about Hungary's injuries. During the whole period, Hungarian 
officialdom was unable to understand the real causes of historical Hungary's 
collapse, and not until the thirties was the impossibility of the re-establishment 
of historical Hungary realized — and even then only by a rather narrow circle. 
The other reason for Hungary's inability to counter hostile propaganda was the 
shortage of funds. Funds available for propaganda by Hungary represented only 
a fragment of what was spent by the Little Entente countries for similar pur-
poses. 
In these years, the formerly idealistic young Bardossy increasingly turned 
into a cynical and disillusioned man. This behavioral pattern was not peculiar to 
him. A lot of cynicism may always be found among those in power, and adding 
to this was also the Hungarian reality of the twenties. Bardossy's psyche was 
even more distorted by his weak physical condition. His permanent nervous 
tension made his stomach so sick that he had to undergo a serious operation in 
which half of his stomach had to be removed. His faculty of quick perception 
could but hardly tolerate the much slower grasp of his colleagues and subordi-
nates, his constitution could not suffer any vagueness, not even the necessary 
circumspection or careful consideration of matters. Over-confident in his quick 
perception, Bardossy not infrequently made over-hasty — and hence often wrong 
— decisions In addition, his scathing remarks rarely failed to give offence to 
others. Exceptionally clever and intelligent though he was, Bardossy failed to 
grow in prudence and sagacity. It seems necessary to dwell upon this topic, 
mainly because these personal traits were to play a significant role in developing 
all what was negative in his actions as Prime Minister. 
Bardossy had served until the summer of 1936 in London, when he was 
moved to Bucharest, now in the capacity of envoy. Later he rose to the foreign 
minister's post which he occupied in February 1941 after the unexpected death of 
the Count Istvan Csaky. It is worthwhile noting, however, that the idea of his 
being appointed minister had already been brought up when Kalman Kanya had 
to be replaced in late 1938. At that time, however, Bardossy had refused the 
offer of promotion for fear that Csaky, a very ambitious man, would not tolerate 
being ignored and would try to sully Bardossy's reputation. It was rumoured that 
at the time the two had frankly discussed this delicate situation." 
As regards his view of Hungarian society, Bardossy agreed with those 
who maintained the necessity of reforming and modernizing the country's social 
system. He thought modernization could be achieved through right-wing 
radicalism, suggesting that his views resembled those of Gyula Gombos (Inci-
dentally, he had a family connection to Gombos: he had married a divorced 
woman who happened to be a sister of Gombos's second wife.) Furthermore, 
when he was appointed Prime Minister after Count Pal Teleki's suicide on 3 
April 1941, Bardossy — in an address to Parliament — spoke highly of 
Gombos's genius and of his political objectives. What he had had in mind, 
however, was probably a greater degree of social justice, a moderate land 
reform, the modernization of public administration, the promotion of public 
health, and a more advanced social policy.12 Unlike Gombos, who was forced 
from power because he had aimed at the elimination of parliamentarism, 
Bardossy did not take steps to limit further Parliament's authority, although his 
predecessor, the renowned Count Teleki — in an environment imbued by the 
spirit of the Nazi "New Europe" — felt it necessary to move from parliamenta-
rism towards a corporative political system. 
A phenomenon not rare among the members of Hungary's Christian 
middle-class, anti-semitism was not alien to Bardossy either, though his attitude 
towards Jews was basically influenced by the country's actual political constella-
tion, both at home and abroad. Presumably, he shared Gombos's views in this 
respect, and the differences between their actions arose as a result of the 
different nature of the actual conditions existing at the time. In 1932 Gombos 
reached a reconciliation with Hungary's Jewry, or at least with "the patriotic 
element" thereof — as he put it. Consequently, no measure detrimental to the 
Jews was taken while he was in office as Prime Minister. Bardossy, in contrast, 
was responsible for the submission of the third anti-Jewish bill to Parliament and 
its being approved as Act XV of 1941. This legislation banned marriage 
between Jews and non-Jews, and declared sexual intercourse between such 
persons as "criminal miscegenation." 
It was also during Bardossy's prime ministership that some 18 thousand 
Jews were killed in the vicinity of Kamenev-Podolsk, in occupied Russia, in late 
August of 1941. Hidden in the background of this great tragedy was the 
Hungarian government's idea — in fact, the plan — that Jews who lacked 
Hungarian citizenship and those who had fled to Hungary from neighbouring 
countries, should be "repatriated" to the place from where they had originally 
come from, i.e. mostly to Galicia (in present-day Ukraine and Poland). The 
attack on the Soviet Union provided a good opportunity for the implementation 
of this plan. True, Hungary's political leaders — including Bardossy — had not 
been fully aware of the fact that this deportation could end up in a massacre of 
the Jews in question. When a Jew who had escaped the slaughter and made his 
way to Budapest, told this terrible story to Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, the Minister 
of Internal Affairs at the time, the deportations were immediately stopped, and 
Bardossy did not overrule this decision.11 
Bardossy held his office as Prime Minister for slightly more than eleven 
months. This time-span represents hardly more than a split second in the life of 
a country. Yet, these short months brought changes which resulted in a great 
tragedy for the nation. 
Having taken office as Prime Minister, Bardossy's first days were already 
burdened with immense tensions. The suicide Pal Teleki had committed just a 
few hours earlier was a memento: Hungary shall not participate in alliance with 
the Germans in the elimination of the South-Slav state. The "escape to death" of 
the immediate past prime minister also demonstrated that not even Teleki had 
the strength to keep his country from taking advantage of a good opportunity for 
further territorial revisions. Bardossy was deliberately appointed to this post as 
one capable of ensuring the smoothest possible execution of that process. 
Initially, Regent Horthy had offered the post to Keresztes-Fischer, but he refused 
it. The point that certainly weighted with Keresztes-Fischer in his decision was 
that, while disapproving the whole action, he was not inclined to face the 
consequences of opposing the wishes of Horthy and his military advisers. 
Bardossy, however, thought otherwise. In fact, he changed the position he had 
taken earlier in this matter. Namely, in late March and in early April, he had 
shared Teleki's view that Hungary should not unrestrainedly side with the 
Germans, and both of them sought to achieve what was virtually impossible: the 
Hungarian involvement in the war should not go beyond the point where it might 
come into conflict with the Anglo-Saxon Powers. Although the conditions 
formulated at the session of the Supreme Council of Defence, held on April 1 
1941, formally made Hungary's participation possible in this fashion, but the 
wide gap created by these conflicting endeavours was unbridgeable even by the 
most brilliant of formal solutions. 
The People's Tribunal found Bardossy guilty mainly on four counts. One 
of them concerned the occupation, or rather, recapture of historic South-Hungary. 
It should be noted — as opposed to the prosecution's main argument at the trial 
— that the purported disagreement between the approach to this issue of 
Bardossy and Teleki — at least until Teleki's suicide — was a contrived one. It 
is in fact, not accurate to state that Bardossy hastily, irresponsibly and arbitrarily 
acted in this matter. As regards its final outcome, the action in South-Hungary 
undoubtedly had a negative effect on the country. Bardossy's personal responsi-
bility extended only so far, but no farther, as he had executed what the then 
official Hungary wanted. It must be clearly seen that Great Britain — while 
having threatened Hungary with the negative consequences of siding with the 
Germans — failed to do anything to shield the country from German pressure. 
Hitler may well have been able to solve the Yugoslav question without any 
Hungarian co-operation as German troops could have advanced easily into 
Yugoslavia through one-time Austria. Hungary's military cooperation in itself 
was not indispensable at all for Berlin. However, it must also be taken into 
consideration that German actions against Yugoslavia and Greece should not be 
separated from the Fall Barbarossa, i.e. the planned attack on the Soviet Union. 
The campaign against the Balkan states was also planned to be a lightning war 
(.Blitzkrieg) to promote the successful execution of the Barbarossa Plan. Thus 
the Germans were interested to develop the widest possible front — preferably 
on open terrain so that they might solve all the tasks of this campaign "in one 
blow." Hungarian support was also indispensable from the point of view of 
politics. Germans were keen to demonstrate that it was not their own interests 
that counted, but that the campaign was aimed to remedy the unjust decisions of 
the Versailles peace treaties by creating a new Europe where the Croats would 
regain their independence from the Serbs, and half a million Hungarians would 
also be liberated from the assimilationist policies of the multinational Yugoslav 
Kingdom. 
It is hardly realistic to assume that the general public of Hungary, 
strongly nationalist as it was at the time, would have tolerated inaction by its 
government, namely, that it would let half a million of Hungarians be subjected 
to German rule after Serb dominance, when there was a possibility of regaining 
them for the fatherland. In contemporary Hungary, no one believed that the 
recovering of Northern Hungary, Sub-Carpathia, Northern Transylvania, and 
South-Hungary actually meant a territorial expansion of the country. As the poet 
Mihaly Babits said: "Do not say that the fatherland is expanding — The 
fatherland, the fatherland has always been the same."14 
Bardossy abode by the Teleki-created formula — the very essence of 
which was that Hungary would not deploy its troops before the collapse of the 
South-Slav state — to such an extent that he was not inclined to let the Hungar-
ian Army go over to the offensive in spite of repeated German requests to this 
effect. 
The Bardossy-trial placed a great deal of emphasis on the Soviet warning 
against any involvement by Hungary in Hitler's Yugoslav campaign. True, 
Hungary had been warned by the Soviets, and it was also a fact that the Soviet 
Union had concluded a friendship and non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia just 
one day before the start of the German attack. However, a much more important 
aspect than that is that — in the discussed period — the Soviet-German relations 
were regulated by a mutual non-aggression pact concluded on 23 August 1939. 
In the spirit of this pact, then, the Stalinist Soviet Union had its Embassy in 
Belgrade closed barely one month after the German attack on Yugoslavia.15 
Relying on all these facts and looking at the events from the perspective 
of almost half a century, the historian cannot but conclude that, though the 
occupation of the historical South-Hungary in the end spelt disaster for the 
country, the circumstances surrounding the year 1941 hardly offered a better 
outcome for Hungary than that. 
Quite different is the situation with the other main count of the indict-
ment against Bardossy, the one that concerned Hungary's attack on the Soviet 
Union. 
The fact is that the events of April, 1941, did not enhance the country's 
capacity for manoeuvring. The re-occupation of South Hungary hitched the 
Hungarian wagon even more tightly to the German train. Great Britain contin-
ued to refrain from an open declaration of war against Hungary for the time 
being, restricting itself to breaking off diplomatic relations with Budapest. 
Furthermore, the occupation of much of the Balkans further strengthened 
Germany's position throughout Europe. Not surprisingly, Hungary's pro-Nazi 
Arrow-Cross Party gained further ground in domestic politics, and Arrow-Cross 
politicians with a not insignificant lung-power began demanding that Hungary 
show an unambiguously positive attitude towards the Germans and take sides 
with them openly. Though the military leadership was not so vocal, yet behind 
the scenes it kept pushing the government in the same direction. As soon as 
reports on Hitler's plan to break the 1939 pact with the Soviets began arriving, 
Henrik Werth, the Chief of the General Staff, and some other generals of similar 
mentality, tried to force the government to join forces with the Germans in their 
planned military campaign against the Soviet Union. Strong pressure of the 
same kind was exerted on the Hungarian leadership by Dome Sztojay who, as 
Hungarian ambassador to Berlin, was occupying a key position in Hungary's 
hierarchy, and of whom it could not be known whether he represented Budapest 
in Berlin, or Berlin in Budapest.16 
When the Wehrmacht, without any declaration of war, launched its 
assault on the surprised Red Army on 22 June 1941, Romania and Italy also 
declared war on the Soviet Union. What the Hungarian government did at this 
point was only to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Hitler 
— in contrast with the attitude he had shown at the time of his offensive against 
Yugoslavia, when he had explicitly invited Horthy to participate in that cam-
paign - now only requested that the Hungary's eastern borders be reinforced. 
This indicates that the Hungarian participation in this case was by far less 
important for Hitler than had been the case in the attack against the South-Slav 
state. Of course, it does not follow that he did not consider Hungarian participa-
tion to be important, he "only" wanted to avoid having to pay any price for it. 
He could undoubtedly reckon with Hungary's entry into the war before long; in 
the meantime, the lack of Hungarian military participation would not disturb his 
relations with Romanian Premier Marshal Antonescu and Slovak President Tiso. 
The German Army advanced deep into the Soviet territory at an amaz-
ingly rapid rate. At the June 23 session of the ministerial council, Karoly 
Bartha, Minister of Defence, expressed his "expert opinion," namely that the 
German army would overpower the Soviet Union in less than six weeks. 
Though, at the 1945 trial, Bartha's above-mentioned statement provoked a roar of 
laughter among the audience, it still remains a fact that this belief had been 
shared by the whole Hungarian military leadership at the time, and the same 
view had been held by many — either with fear or with hope — throughout 
Europe. 
On June 26, Finland also entered into war on the side of the Germans. 
("Independent" Slovakia and Croatia had already taken similar steps somewhat 
earlier.) Hungary was the only state among Germany's allies that had not got 
involved in the war — except for Bulgaria, whose participation was seen as 
impossible and had not been reckoned with by the Germans from the outset. 
And it was precisely on the following day that the Kassa air-raid took place — 
an event whose circumstances have never been clarified — which gave Bardossy 
the final push to decide in favour of entering into the war. 
At the time of the re-occupation of South-Hungary, the Yugoslav air-
force had inflicted much heavier air-strikes on some southern cities of Hungary, 
but all that could not divert Bardossy from his resolution to start actions only 
after the independence of Croatia had been declared. Now, however, a much 
poorer pretext was enough for him to make his fatal decision.17 Why? Certainly 
because the bombs released over Kassa gave only the final thrust to taking a step 
the preconditions of which had already been ripening ever since the birth of the 
"counter-revolutionary" system in 1919. Thus it is understandable that Molotov's 
so often cited message — i.e. a cipher telegram dispatched by Jozsef Kristoffy, 
Hungarian envoy to Moscow, and the related question of whether Bardossy had 
made it known to the ministerial council and the head of the state — is not of so 
great importance as was attached to it by the tribunal, by the reasons adduced in 
the judgement, and later by historiography itself. What was really important at 
the moment for the Hungarian policy-makers was not so much the Soviet 
message as the seemingly victorious rush with which the German forces were 
advancing towards Moscow. On the other hand, there was marching the entire 
reorganized Little Entente now under the aegis of the Germans, as Endre 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky so vividly depicted it in his letter of 19 January 1942 to 
Bardossy.18 What was really of decisive importance was that the foreign policy 
horizon of the whole Hungarian ruling elite was unable to fathom the situation's 
all-European dimensions, let alone world dimensions. It was also of great 
significance that the elite could not grasp at all the decisive importance of the 
potential might of the forces opposed to fascism, that is it could not comprehend 
the fact that the Soviet Union had found firm allies in the western democracies 
in this struggle for global domination. 
It was often brought up during the trial that Hungary had declared war on 
the Soviet Union, and later this interpretation became so deeply rooted in 
Hungarian historiography that even the historical chronology, published in 
several editions by the Institute of History of Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
during the eighties, contained the entry "declaration of war." In reality, however, 
Hungary had never declared war on the Soviet Union. Bardossy had much more 
sense than to commit such a blunder. 
Besides, this approach includes something paradoxical. In case of the 
German attack the — justifiable — accusation was that it had been launched 
without any prior notice, i.e., without a formal declaration of war. In the case of 
the Hungarian attack, which was preceded by a formal notice, i.e. a statement 
about the "existence bf a state of hostilities," always the term "declaration of 
war" is used. 
Furthermore, during the trial it was often mentioned that Bardossy had 
ncted contrary to the constitution. In this instance too, the reality is that, while 
Lite political leadership had not completely adhered to certain prescriptions and 
provisions, it was not justifiable to state that Bardossy had explicitly violated the 
"constitution" as it virtually had not existed. Act XVII of 1920, empowered the 
Regent of Hungary to order "the deployment of the army outside the borders of 
the country, provided all Hungarian ministries assume full responsibility and the 
Parliament's subsequent approval would be applied for immediately" and it 
would be obtained. Since, at its session of June 26, the ministerial council 
certainly voted for the country's entering into the war and as it was Horthy rather 
than Bardossy who actually made that decision, the only "violation of the 
constitution" Bardossy committed was the fact that he applied to the Parliament 
for the subsequent approval of these actions rather late, i.e. only on July 24. The 
weight of this negligence (as a charge against Bardossy) can be measured 
correctly only if we add to this the fact that the approval by the Parliament came 
as late as 23 October 1941. Not that Parliament had been pondering the issue 
for several months, its delay might be ascribed much more to the fact that it 
considered the practising of its mandate so much just a formality and so insignif-
icant that it simply did not care for putting the issue on the agenda earlier than 
that. All this clearly shows that the country's entry into the war was not the 
over-hasty and ill-considered act of one single man, but the decision of the entire 
"official Hungary." 
With these appropriate qualifications made, we can return to the question 
of Bardossy's personal accountability. His tremendous personal responsibility for 
the ensuing tragedy lies in the simple fact that he entangled his country in a war 
in which Hungary had no interest. It is beyond doubt that avoiding involvement 
in the war would have required immense efforts. It would have required acts of 
extraordinary statesmanship. Under ordinary circumstances, highly educated and 
diligent government officials may often exercise a fairly good leadership over a 
country. But pity a country in the midst of a world crisis that lacks outstanding 
statesmen! Horthy had gradually grown into a widely popular personality, in fact, 
he had overcome the challenges that came his way during the 'twenties and 
'thirties, mainly because he received wise advice, especially from Prime Minis-
ters Istvan Bethlen and Pal Teleki. He was never able, however, to rise to the 
level of a great statesman, even though he was inclined to believe so after 
having been flattered endlessly by members of his entourage. Bardossy was an 
intelligent man and it must have been clear to him that he was constitutionally 
unable to act as an outstanding statesmen. We do believe that he had no ulterior 
motives and that he was speaking quite frankly, when — during the trial — he 
declared to have been nothing but a government official.19 And, of course, it 
was beyond the power of a government official to turn the decision of 26 June 
1941 in a proper channel — largely because in this case he would have had to 
surpass himself. 
In this context, it would be important to know exactly everything that 
was said at the June 26 session of the ministerial council, and so to clarify who 
among those present — and to what extent — tried to avert the country's entry 
into the war. The minutes of the session were signed by Bardossy and suggest 
that only Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer spoke up against the war. However, accord-
ing to a subsequent statement by Istvan Barczihazi Barczy, who had kept the 
minutes, the record had been falsified. According to another version of the 
minutes — which were actually prepared by Barczy much later, as late as 1945 
or perhaps even later — the number of those voting against the war was higher. 
The documents of the trial cast serious doubt on the trustworthiness of Barcy's 
statements. While Bardossy's version certainly tended to soften, Barczy's 
statement intensified the voice of those opposing war. It is difficult, if not 
impossible to know which of the two versions approach reality.20 Never-the-less, 
one thing can be taken for granted: even if Barczy's version happens to reflect 
reality, it does not suggest that the ministerial council as a whole favoured 
neutrality in the war and, even if it had, it would have been very difficult to put 
such a conviction into effect. 
All things considered, we still have to maintain that the country's prime 
minister should not have taken steps to embroil the country in war: the prime 
minister as a statesman ought to have realized that the ongoing war was a 
world-wide struggle from which Germany would never emerge victorious. Nor 
was it a decisive argument that the ruling layers of Hungarian society had long 
cherished the hope of attaining a possible peace-agreement in case the Germans 
were likely to lose the war against the Soviets. As a statesman, Bardossy ought 
to have known that the war was a total one. Though Bardossy could easily 
reject the judgement against him — which based some of its arguments on the 
Atlantic Charter, a document that had been drafted after his "crime" had been 
committed. But it was a serious error on his part that in 1941 he never confided 
— for reasons quite unknown, perhaps out of personal animosity — in the words 
of his envoy to London, Gyorgy Barcza. Under the circumstances it is under-
standable that during the trial Bardossy made every effort to discredit Barcza and 
question his expertise. But it is not so easy to understand why in 1941 he had 
failed to meditate over the reports Barcza had sent him. Probably he had failed 
to realize that Great Britain in 1941 was no longer the same isolationist country 
that he had come to know during his diplomatic service there between 1930 and 
1936. In this new Great Britain, those appeasers who had sought to come to 
terms with Berlin in order that the fascist aggression might be turned against the 
Soviet Union, have long been discredited. This was the Great Britain of 
Churchill who in those days promised his people nothing but blood and tears, 
but, for the future, he held out the prospect of victory. 
Although Teleki's conception of an "armed neutrality" met with failure 
when Hungary joined the German aggression against Yugoslavia, even at this 
point in time the country's involvement in the war was still not inevitable. There 
was still time to consider things over and over again, which Bardossy did. He 
held the view that the Germans' demands should be met as soon as possible, so 
that — by a punctual fulfilment of their minimum demands — the fulfilment of 
their maximum demands might be warded off. History, however, refuted this 
manner of political thinking, because it was precisely this readiness to comply 
with the first German requests that enabled them to squeeze the maximum out of 
the country. The number of casualties was not possible to be reduced by this 
political line. What actually happened was just the opposite: compared to the 
size of the country's population, the number of Hungarian casualties ranked 
highest in the region; much higher than, for example, in the case of the Czech-
Moravian Protectorate. 
Bardossy very self-consciously refuted the accusation that he had con-
ducted a class policy. He very emphatically stressed his being a true Hungarian, 
emphasizing that both himself and his acts were always governed by the true 
interest of the Hungarian nation. But in the same way as the national unity, 
which he had a special penchant to refer to, had never existed, he had never 
been able to separate the national interest from class interests, i.e., from the 
interests of the given political establishment. This also means that promoting the 
real national interests always came up against serious obstacles, to such an extent 
that class viewpoints would finally always overpower the specific national 
interests. Thus it happened what Peter Gosztonyi, a well-known Hungarian-born 
historian working in Berne, described in the following words: "There have been 
but a few wars in which a country was so carelessly involved as Hungary was 
rushed into danger by its leaders in June 1941."2I 
The third main group of charges made by the People's Tribunal against 
Bardossy centred around Hungary's entering into war — or as it was formulated: 
"declared war on" — with Great Britain and the United States. In this instance, 
the situation was very much the same as with the accusation of attacking the 
Soviet Union. Namely, while the country's room for manoeuvring had continued 
narrowing down, yet Bardossy's responsibility was clearly evident. 
That the country's room for manoeuvring had become restricted more 
than before was shown by the fact that while in the Soviet case official Germany 
had wrapped itself in silence, now it exerted an explicit pressure on Hungary to 
declare the state of war. Despite all this, at this point a statesman-prime minister 
ought to have put up resistance to the German pressure, or thwarted it by 
cleverly using his diplomatic skills. By that time it had become quite clear that 
any further widening of the war would doom the Third Reich to defeat. 
Consequently, the fatal nature of Hungary's close alliance with Germany should 
have also become clear — at least in the eyes of a politician who was able to 
see the future amidst the clamour of everyday propaganda. Bardossy, however, 
instead of resisting the German-Italian demands, used his diplomatic inventive-
ness and skills to have a formula accepted by the ministerial council on 11 
December 1941, which could be "further developed" at any given time, that is, 
which enabled him to break off diplomatic relations and to "further develop" this 
— without consulting the ministerial council anew — all the way to announcing 
the "onset" of a state of war. (Bardossy's conduct could be seen as diplomatic 
only so far as he restricted himself to merely establishing, instead of declaring, 
the state of war. By this he wanted to express that this was not to mean an 
arbitrary Hungarian step, and it meant not more than Hungary had taken notice 
of the recent changes in the international situation and had drawn the conse-
quences, involuntarily though.) 
In addition to what has been discussed above, two more components of 
Bardossy's motives should be taken into consideration. The first is a deep-seated 
resentment psychosis that strongly influenced him and his acts at both the 
national and the personal levels. At the national level: why should he have 
avoided war with Great Britain, when Great Britain had acted so unjustly against 
Hungary. In his opinion, which he expressed both to the American Envoy in 
Budapest and then to Parliament, "Great Britain want[ed] to give assistance to 
the Soviets by terrorizing and... even sacrificing Hungary."22 Bardossy's funda-
mental position, then, was that it was Great Britain that had done serious 
injustices to Hungary, first when it had actively participated in the dismember-
ment of Hungary, and second, when it had given support to the Bolshevik Soviet 
Union by sacrificing Hungary instead of appreciating the country's eminent role 
in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. It was in this manner that the ex-prime minister 
explained away the fact that Britain, following the logic of a joint anti-fascist 
struggle against Germany, failed to spare Hungary, a country which — being at 
war with the Soviet Union — was causing damage to this anti-fascist coalition. 
On the personal level: Bardossy's resentment against the British had fed 
on the fact that during his service in London, his wife — who had been a 
divorced woman — was not acceptable in the highest circles of English society, 
a circumstance that deeply offended Bardossy's gentlemanly pride. 
The other component of Bardossy's motives was his singular belief in the 
power of "destiny." In the life of the Bardossy couple many human tragedies 
had taken place which had greatly affected them and which had produced an 
almost magical effect on their weak nerves. These human tragedies included the 
untimely and extremely painful death of Mrs. Bardossy's sister, who — as has 
been mentioned — was Prime Minister Gombos's wife. Gombos had also 
suddenly died a few years later at the age of 50. Bardossy's old colleague and 
immediate predecessor as foreign minister, the Count Istvan Csaky fell victim, at 
age 47, to an incurable disease. Gombos's successor as Prime Minister, Kalman 
Daranyi, died of an acquired disease at 53. When Bardossy became heir to the 
Sandor Palace,23 he could not but help seeing before his inner eye the shades of 
Teleki's tragic last night. It was probably due to this fact that Bardossy and his 
wife, as if under a spell, were reluctant to move into the palace, on the walls of 
which there hung the portraits of several figures of Hungarian history who had 
met tragic deaths. It was not until malicious gossip in the capital city — namely 
that the new premier would not last long in his office -— had come to the ears of 
the Bardossys that they decided to move in, presumably with heavy hearts.24 
The fourth main group of accusations against Bardossy concerned the 
years following his activities as prime minister. In 1943 he had undertaken to 
act as the president of United Christian National League and in 1944 he was 
elected to Parliament as the representative of Szombathely, his native town. He 
delivered speeches arguing for the continuation of war, worked to promote the 
close collaboration of the extreme rightist parties, participated in the National 
Alliance which aimed to block any attempts to withdraw Hungary from the war. 
All this gave rise to displeasure and incredulity even among those who until then 
had sympathised with Bardossy or at least received his actions with understand-
ing. It was at this time that Bardossy published the book: Magyar politika a 
mohacsi vesz utan (Hungarian Politics after the Mohacs Defeat).2<i While 
working on his book, he had consulted eminent Hungarian historians; Bardossy, 
however, was not led by a strong desire to contribute to the advance of histori-
ography. For him the historical material was to help him in justifying his 
actions. He projected his own person on the figure of the Cardinal Frater 
Gyorgy,26 whose unsuccessful political line seemed to him to be a good excuse 
for the failure of his prime ministry and a good argument for his exoneration. 
Bardossy had involved the country in the war against the Soviets, and 
then accepted the state of war with Great Britain and the United States, in order 
that he might ward off the country's occupation by the Germans, potentially the 
greatest evil — as he believed it. In this belief he could write with deep insight 
about Frater Gyorgy: "...the thought underlying his policy was to keep the 
conflicting parties out of the country rather than to provide opportunities some-
times to one other times to the other... to exert influence and to play a role in the 
nation's life..."27 
With the progress of World War II, people in increasing number began 
suggesting that Hungary had taken sides with the weaker party in this struggle. 
"Only the simpletons may delude themselves," Bardossy retorted, "with the 
short-sighted s wisdom' that what has to be done is nothing but simply to take 
sides with the stronger.... As if it could be foreseen who would turn out to be 
the stronger, and as if a cowardly defection to the other side,... would not bring 
about, sooner or later, a danger twice as great as the one they wanted to avoid."28 
As the probability of an Axis defeat increased, efforts to explore the 
internal implications of the expected defeat came to the fore. Bardossy tended to 
regard the lack of national unity, rather than his own fatal steps, as the source of 
danger: "What can an individual do, at whose efforts a fatigued generation is 
looking indifferently and without any understanding, and who is surrounded by 
mistrust, suspicion, in fact, by hatred, but whose soul is possessed by the 
objective he once set himself, but who is no longer able to reckon with the 
means and the circumstances... The petty-minded little men swaggering around 
the giant have not understood, perhaps have not even seen the objective."29 
Having read Bardossy's book, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky became extremely 
agitated because in early 1942 he still considered Bardossy a statesman. In one 
of his letters Bajcsy-Zsilinszky wrote: "This man, one of the main villains of the 
thousand-year-history of Hungary," has the audacity not only to excuse himself 
by showina^the events of the past in a false [light] but also to teach us a general 
lesson of how a real politician, a great statesman, should behave."30 
Supposedly, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was exaggerating here much in the 
same way as he did in his letter of 19 January 1942, when he had written about 
Bardossy in a very favourable manner. Basically, he was closer to the truth in 
the former case, because Bardossy was really mistaken when he tried to explain 
the motives of his actions through the example of Frater Gyorgy's policies. 
Beyond all this — and admitting that some similarities can be found in the 
situations after Mohacs and after the spring of 1941 — the analogy was 
misleading because, while the sovereignty of the Hungarian Kingdom was 
threatened by two great powers in the 16th century, the Soviets were not a real 
threat in 1941 as compared to the very real threat posed by Germany. So it was 
Bardossy who, with his move to embroil his country in the war, virtually invited 
his and the country's tragedy. Gyorgy Martinuzzi's greatness as statesman 
manifested itself in the fact that he sought to extract better conditions for the 
Hungarians at a time when the country had been split into three parts. Bardossy, 
in turn, strove to thwart the German threat and, with his basically mistaken 
policy, he exposed the country to another danger. It is hardly appropriate to 
bring up the point in his defence that the other countries of this region also 
shared the same fate as Hungary after World War II. There is no reason for 
entering into explanations of the type "what could have happened if...." It 
should suffice to refer to the immense difference between being in the good 
graces of three great powers and being at war with them. In the former case 
Hungary could have got into the Soviet sphere of interest under more favourable 
conditions, as a minimum. 
* * * 
As the front line drew nearer, Bardossy and his family left for his native 
Szombathely in 1944, then in early 1945 — with the help of the Edmund 
Veesenmayer, Hitler's plenipotentiary commissioner in Hungary — moved to 
Bavaria to find refuge there. In late April 1945 when Nazi Germany was living 
its last days, Bardossy called on Hans Frolich, the Swiss envoy to Germany, and 
applied for an entry visa to Switzerland. The envoy considered Bardossy a 
diplomat, a person who essentially had done his duty as required by his post, and 
proposed that the visa to be granted. The Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
seems to have agreed with Frolich. In a few days Bardossy crossed the border 
of Switzerland and was placed in a camp set up for refugees. 
This situation, however, hurt his gentlemanly pride. He believed that, 
being in possession of a diplomatic passport, he and his family had the right to 
move freely. With this belief — consciously or unconsciously, who knows — 
he prepared his own demise. His case was brought before the Swiss minister of 
justice who was not so tolerant as Frolich had been. Although before the final 
decision on Bardossy's fate they asked for the opinion of the ex-envoy Jaeger, 
who had served in Budapest, as well as of that of Janos Wettstein, Hungarian 
ex-envoy to Berne — and neither of them was against Bardossy — the Swiss 
government decided to expel Bardossy from Switzerland. Thus on May 4 he, 
together with his family, was transferred to Germany, to a place where American 
troops had already arrived. He was arrested and a few months later he was 
transported in shackles, in the company of a group of other alleged war-crimi-
nals, to Hungary. 
* * * 
It appears from the trial as a whole, but particularly from the sentence passed by 
the court, that there was a definite intention by the court to introduce a new view 
of history. The death-sentence pronounced was passed not only on Bardossy 
himself but also on all what had happened in Hungary during a quarter of 
century between 1919 and 1944. This view was quite understandable at the 
time, amidst the still smouldering ruins and hurting wounds. It is quite another 
thing that this view remained essentially unchanged for several decades to come, 
and a long time had passed before it was slowly replaced by the more reasonable 
view of history. It was still considered appropriate as late as 1977 to echo the 
verdict of that trial and to describe Bardossy as an utterly wicked criminal who 
"involved Hungary in World War II by attacking Yugoslavia and declaring war 
on two world powers, the Soviet Union and the United States,...."31 
Historical analyses will certainly demonstrate that Marxist historical 
works produced in the fifties and sixties were inspired by the spirit of People's 
Tribunal trials which had condemned the major war criminals. Among the 
reasons for this four deserve special mention. The first undoubtedly has much to 
do with the fact that the trials were so near in time to the events of the war. 
Secondly, producing a constraining effect on historiography was also the fact 
that the regime in power after 1948, strove to legitimize its rule through control-
ling the writing of history. In its view, the more evils were said about the 
political regime of the previous quarter of a century, the more "convincing" 
became the arguments for the "advantages" of the new system. The third reason 
is connected with the international obligation imposed on Hungary of treating the 
question of Trianon as taboo. Finally, the fourth was the fact that the source-
materials made available for use by historians was fragmented and/or tenden-
tiously selected. 
Today, half-a-century after the events, we have a historical perspective 
that is adequate for judging the events of the Second World War. Politics, of 
course, has its particular viewpoints even today, though often with an opposite 
tendency, which historians are expected to take into consideration. However, a 
historian who can ward off the fluctuations of everyday political life and does 
not aim at benefiting from day-to-day changes in public opinion, can easily and 
safely resist these pressures. True, the present-day Hungarian historiography is 
still in debt for clarifying problems related to the so-called Trianon-complex, but 
there are no longer obstacles in the way of a consistent work on this topic. In 
fact, sometimes care must be taken lest the aspects of the Trianon-issue should 
obscure other important factors. It was with this in mind that the material of the 
Bardossy trial was published to help to clarify some of these problems. 
In connection with the conduct of the Bardossy-trial, it seems sufficient 
to establish that its verdict was not predetermined, even though the probability of 
passing a very severe sentence had been very high right from the beginning. 
Bardossy's wartime actions provided more than enough material for his just 
condemnation without any special preconception. 
Somewhat different is the situation with the actual sentence passed by the 
court: first he had been sentenced to death by hanging, which was approved by 
the National Council of People's Tribunals, and it was only on the day of the 
execution that the Supreme National Council changed the sentence into death by 
firing squad. The utter severity of the sentence gave rise to many disputes at the 
time, which would be even more justifiable today. What makes the severity of 
the sentence even more disputable is an international comparative investigation 
of the post-war legal retaliations, from the findings of which it appears that, for 
example in Austria — where a not insignificant portion of the population 
participated in the Nazi oppression and persecution — not more than 32 persons 
were executed for similar war crimes, while the corresponding figure for 
Hungary was 189.32 
At the same time the conduct of the trial was not perfect in several 
respects. This is suggested by the fact that the editor of the material of the trial 
had to add a good number of explanatory notes, had to rectify errors, correct 
false interpretations, and revise careless citations and references. Not infre-
quently the editor had to rectify strongly biased, in fact, ill-willed misrepresenta-
tions or to call the reader's attention to the presiding judge's unacceptable 
practice of sometimes referring to provisions of acts as source of law which had 
long been repealed, etc. 
Nevertheless, the People's Tribunal essentially did not violate the usual 
norms of jurisdiction. This is proved by the fact that neither Bardossy, nor his 
defence counsel appealed to the principle of "nullum crimen sine lege" (there is 
no crime without law), in other words, a lawful sentence may only be passed on 
a deed which had been already banned, or had been designated as a crime, at the 
time it was actually committed. Bardossy, however, never admitted the compe-
tence of the People's Tribunal as a court, and his defence counsel at the trial of 
second instance went as far as submitting a claim of mistrial against the trial of 
first instance on the grounds that the presiding judge, Akos Major had not the 
proper legal qualifications either as judge or as a lawyer, but the defence counsel 
did not bring up the principle of "nullum crimen sine lege" against the whole 
procedure. This obviously came from the logic which Bardossy so consistently 
followed in connection with his acts. It was the principle of "rebus sic standi-
bus," i.e. one must interpret, define and face things as they are under the given 
circumstances. It was with reference to this principle that Bardossy tended to 
justify his breaking the eternal friendship pact with Yugoslavia in 1941, as well 
as his right to occupy the South-Hungarian region. Bardossy was also aware 
that law used to cope with the changing situations, adjusting itself to the new 
circumstances, and that obligations undertaken under international contracts 
would necessarily make their effect felt in the internal legal system as well. In 
the shadows of death — leaving behind the cynical traits of his attitude he had 
assumed in his life, he also came to recognize and feel the seriousness of 
sufferings caused by World War II — Bardossy worded his feelings thus: "I 
admit that all the emotions and bitterness that had justifiably accumulated should 
be vented. It should be made possible that the soul could feel some relief only 
in order that the soul recovering from its sufferings might find its way back to 
national unity. No sacrifice will be great enough to achieve this end." True, he 
still added that the making of such sacrifices had "nothing to do with jurisdic-
tion,"33 yet the basic idea underlying his statement was the recognition of the 
justness of emotions and bitterness. 
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Document 
A Dove? A Hawk? Perhaps a Sparrow: 
Bardossy Defends his Wartime Record before 
the Americans, July 1945 
Introduced and edited by 
N.F. Dreisziger 
When the 56-year-old former Royal Hungarian Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy 
was transferred from Switzerland to the American-occupied zone of Germany in 
the spring of 1945, his chances of being brought before a special court of justice 
or war-crimes tribunal increased exponentially.1 For the time being, he was 
detained in a camp near the city of Augsburg, probably very near the site of the 
battle where, a millennium earlier, an international army under the command of 
Holy Roman Emperor Otto I dealt a crushing blow to a Hungarian force that had 
been allied with Otto's German enemies. Now, after an even larger-scale defeat 
inflicted on German and Hungarian forces, another Magyar leader awaited the 
judgement of the victors. He must have had in mind the terrible retribution that 
had been inflicted in the summer of 955 on the commanders of the defeated 
Magyar army.2 But 1945 was not 955, and taking vengeance was not instant, 
especially not in the lands occupied by the Western Allies. Before the victors 
would mete out justice to the vanquished, much preparation had to be done. The 
preliminaries of these preparations would involve the interrogation of prospective 
subjects of judicial prosecutions. Bardossy himself was interrogated by person-
nel of the German Intelligence Section of the 7th American Army. A transcript 
of this interrogation survived and can be found in the records of the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS). It is published here for the first time. 
The text containing Bardossy's interrogation, like the transcripts of the 
interrogation of numerous other prominent Axis personalities who had fallen into 
American hands, is not a source that throws much new light on the events of the 
Second World War. The officers conducting the questioning rarely knew much 
about the background and activities of the person they interrogated, and the little 
they knew tended to be derived from sources that were highly prejudiced against 
anybody associated with the Axis. Furthermore, the persons interrogated were 
apparently not in a position to prepare for their questioning; they were probably 
not allowed to bring notes with them, and they were certainly not in possession 
of the records which could have refreshed their memories of events. These 
circumstances notwithstanding, the transcripts of these interrogations are useful 
in that they reveal much about the frames of mind that those questioned experi-
enced at the end of the war. This fact is no doubt true of the transcript of 
Bardossy's interrogation. 
Though it is not obvious from the document — the matter is mentioned 
explicitly only in the concluding section — what was in the back of the former 
Hungarian Prime Minister's mind throughout the interrogation was the probabil-
ity that he would soon face judicial prosecution before some kind of a war-
crimes tribunal, though he must have hoped that this would be an international 
one and not one in Hungary or in another East European country.1 For this 
reason the answers Bardossy gave to his interrogators' questions were phrased 
especially to demonstrate his innocence in the decisions his government had 
made while he had been in office, decisions that his captors and prospective 
judges could view as having contributed to the slaughter and human suffering 
that was experienced during the war. According to the testimony Bardossy gave 
to his American interrogators in July of 1945, he had shouldered only limited 
responsibility for his nation's involvement in the war. 
Bardossy employed a series of arguments to prove his minimal respon-
sibility for Hungary's becoming a belligerent on Germany's side. First of all, he 
stressed that, during his "short" term in office "(eleven months)" "every decision 
of the government over which I presided ha[d] been [taken]... with the consent 
of the Regent and with the explicit or tacit approval of the Parliament." These 
decisions, according to the former Prime Minister, were dictated "only by the 
interests of our... nation." According to Bardossy, two of the principal aims of 
his government in 1941 had been to "keep the unity of our nation" and to "fulfil 
our national obligation toward our Hungarian brethren [in] the territories severed 
from Hungary in 1919." 
To keep the "unity" of the Magyar nation, in Bardossy's view, was to act 
in accordance with Hungarian public opinion; and public opinion in Hungary 
obliged Bardossy to embark on the very steps that four years later brought 
against him accusations of being a war criminal. "Public opinion," he argued, 
demanded that Hungarian troops enter the Magyar-populated regions of Yugo-
slavia, once that state had collapsed under the German Wehrmacht's onslaught. 
The Hungarian nation would not have tolerated the occupation of Vojvodina by 
German troops, and its transformation into a German Gau under a Nazi Gaulei-
ter. Public opinion, that is, anti-communist sentiments, were also instrumental in 
Hungary's involvement in the war against the U.S.S.R. To go against national 
consensus, according to Bardossy, would have destroyed the political unity of the 
country and would have exposed it to foreign (i.e. German) influence and 
interference to a degree even greater than had been the case under his leadership. 
The most important consideration in Bardossy's decisions, as he explained 
to his American interrogators, had been the "national obligation" his country had 
to the Hungarians beyond the borders of truncated Hungary. As has been 
mentioned, that particular motive played a vital part in the April, 1941, move to 
send troops into Hungary's one-time southern provinces, as it had been the 
motivating force behind many of the actions of Bardossy's predecessors from the 
fall of 1938 to the spring of 1941. 
These were Bardossy's main arguments in 1945 in defence of his record, 
aside from his somewhat confusing statements as to when and why Hungary 
followed the German example in declaring war on the United States after the 
onset of a state of war between the U.S. and Japan. Since in July of 1945 
Bardossy was not in possession of his private papers or of the relevant govern-
ment records, and had no access to legal or other pertinent advice, he could not 
make an effective defence of his actions of four years earlier. In fact, an 
examination of the evidence enables historians to say more in defence of his 
leadership. As Dr. Pal Pritz has pointed out in this volume, Bardossy cannot be 
exonerated for some of his over-hasty and ill-advised decisions he had made 
while he had been in office, it is nevertheless true that he was not the "hawk" 
that he has been made out to be in the nearly fifty years after his death, and that 
his vilification as a war-criminal is quite unwarranted. 
The most onerous charge that was levelled against Bardossy after the war 
by his detractors has been that he was the Hungarian leader most responsible for 
engineering his country's involvement in war against four countries, including 
three great powers. These four nations were (in chronological order) Yugoslavia, 
the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States. Viewed from a historical 
perspective of half-a-century, and in light of the documentary evidence, it is 
obvious that these charges have to be qualified and, in one instance at least, 
should be dismissed altogether. 
* * * 
The Hungarian decision regarding involvement in the occupation of the Magyar-
populated regions of Yugoslavia had been actually taken before Bardossy 
became Prime Minister. It should be recalled that it was that decision, enthusi-
astically endorsed by Regent Miklos Horthy himself, that caused enough grief to 
Prime Minister Pal Teleki to prompt him to take his own life. Bardossy might 
have agreed with Horthy and, as he would argue in 1945, with the rest of the 
country's population, but he only implemented a policy that he had inherited 
from the crisis that pre-dated his appointment. This circumstance does not 
absolve him entirely from shouldering responsibility for Hungary's actions at the 
time, but it places the issue of his guilt into different light. 
The circumstances of Bardossy's responsibility for the involvement of 
Hungary in the war against Soviet Russia are different. On the one hand, in this 
case he had been at the helm of the government for some three months and, 
therefore, he cannot distance himself from the decision on grounds of its timing. 
On the other hand, however, Bardossy's guilt in this matter is not straightforward 
for another reason. The reason for this is the fact that the record of his actions 
prior to the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. suggests that he was not in favour 
of Hungarian participation in that war, and opposed those among Hungary's elite 
who thought otherwise. 
Hungarian participation in the invasion of Soviet Russia had not been 
counted on by the Nazi leadership. Unlike in April of 1941, when Yugoslavia 
was invaded, the Germans did not need Hungary as a staging-ground for their 
deployment against their intended target. Furthermore, in June of 1941 Hitler 
considered the Hungarians a risk to the security of Operation Barbarossa and 
refused to inform them of his plans until the last minute. In Budapest, however, 
no one of importance seems to have doubted the probability of war between the 
Reich and the Soviet Union. There was, however, no agreement among Hun-
gary's political and military circles regarding the question what role Hungary 
should play in the expected conflict.4 
The division of views on the question of cooperation with the Third 
Reich was not new. Ever since the start of Hitler's program of expansion in 
eastern Europe there had been men within the Hungarian leadership who had 
opposed the idea of military collaboration with the Nazis. However, with Pal 
Teleki dead and the cautious elder-statesman Istvan Bethlen's leverage in the 
country's government reduced, the influence of this group had reached its nadir 
by the summer of 1941. At the same time, the position of their opponents had 
been strengthened as a result of the Germans' great victories during 1940. The 
accession of Rumania to the Axis camp the same year also had an impact: 
Hungary now had an influential competitor for Hitler's graces. The leaders in 
Budapest had four times succeeded in revising the territorial provisions of the 
Treaty of Trianon in their country's favour in less than four years, each time with 
German support or acquiescence. By 1941, however, it became evident that, 
unless Hungary outperformed Romania in the race for the FUhrer's good will, the 
spoils might go to the Rumanians in the future.5 
Despite the existence of these complicating factors, there is no evidence 
that Prime Minister Bardossy sought his country's participation in the planned 
German attack on Soviet Russia. A different outlook prevailed, however, among 
some members of the Hungaiian military. The chief spokesman for Hungary's 
pro-German officer corps was General Henrik Werth, the Chief of the General 
Staff. During the late spring of 1941 Werth made repeated attempts to convert 
Bardossy to the idea of voluntary participation in the expected German invasion 
of the Soviet Union. Werth's demands for a Hungarian-German military alliance, 
however, were firmly rejected, and the government continued to maintain its 
stand for a while even after the start of the German invasion of Russia on June 
22nd.6 But soon enormous pressure was exerted on Bardossy's government to 
change its course. Pro-Nazi and stridently anti-Soviet elements within the 
country demanded a show of solidarity with Hitler's "crusade" against commu-
nism and a warning came from Rome that Hungary's inaction might have 
harmful consequences. Slovakia had also joined the war against the U.S.S.R., 
leaving Hungary as the only central European state not to have done so. More 
important still was a message received from Germany through unofficial chan-
nels to the effect that if Hungary wanted to participate in the campaign against 
Russia, she would have to join immediately and voluntarily.7 The message was 
delivered in "emphatic" language by General Kurt Himer, the German High 
Command's representative in Hungary, to General Werth who passed it on to 
Bardossy. Evidently disturbed by developments, in the afternoon of the 24th 
Bardossy summoned Otto von Erdmannsdorff, the German Minister to Hungary, 
for an interview and told him that the matter of Hungary's participation was up 
to the country's civilian government to decide. If Germany desired Hungary's 
assistance she would have to request it through the regular diplomatic channels.8 
The Hungarian Prime Minister's response to the German demand deserves 
attention. There may be those who would dismiss it as posturing, or even an 
attempt to extract concessions from Germany in return for Hungarian participa-
tion. But it is doubtful if Bardossy could really expect the Fiihrer practically to 
beg for Hungary's assistance, especially when all of Germany's other friends had 
offered their help voluntarily. Bardossy's motives were probably different. In 
telling the Germans that Hungary's government would consider the question of 
participation in the war if Germany had asked for this officially, the Prime 
Minister probably wanted to avoid his country's involvement in the war without 
having to admit openly that Hungary did not want to participate. Three times 
during the past three years Hitler had moved or was about to move against one 
of Hungary's neighbours, and three times the Hungarian leaders proved most 
reluctant — on two occasions they had in fact told Hitler in advance that they 
would not join him in a war (at the time of Hitler's planned attack on Czechoslo-
vakia in the late summer of 1938, and in the summer of the following year, 
before the invasion of Poland). Taking Hitler's temper and power into consider-
ation, Bardossy could not tell the Germans for a fourth time that Hungary 
wished to stay out of the conflict, but he hoped to accomplish this through 
requesting what the Germans had promised not to do: ask for Hungarian help 
formally.9 
Bardossy continued to stand by his policy of non-involvement only for 
another day. The event that prompted him to abandon his original stance took 
place on the 26th, and it was the air-raids on Kassa (today's Kosice, in Slovakia) 
and other places in northeastern Hungary. It was this development that unnerved 
him. There is no need to re-tell tue story of these raids in detail, as they have 
been the subject of a great many studies.1" Compared with the attack on Kassa, 
the attacks on targets in Sub-Carpathia left little or no damage. Near the town 
of Raho (Rakhov) trains were attacked. Some sources refer to action against the 
city of Munkacs (Munkachevo), although what, if anything, was bombed there 
no one seems to know. More familiar is the story of the attack on Kassa where, 
a few minutes after one o'clock in the afternoon, unidentified aircraft approached 
the town, dropped their bombs, and departed. Several buildings were destroyed 
or damaged in the bombing, including the local post- and telegraph office. It 
should be added that, contrary to certain historical accounts of the event, the 
Hungarian Air Force did not have a base at Kassa. There was only a small 
airfield, used by the training craft of the Miklos Horthy Air Force Academy. 
None of these planes was in a position to give chase to the attackers. 
The consequences of the attack are better known. After an on-the-spot 
investigation, the local military authorities concluded that the attackers had been 
Russian and reported the news to Budapest accordingly. In the capital, reaction 
was one of indignation. On hearing the news, Horthy is reported to have become 
so agitated that he gave orders for immediate reprisals. Bardossy reacted 
differently. He could not believe that the intruders were Russians. He saw the 
whole affair as a plot to force his hand and to involve Hungary in the conflict. 
And if the advocates of war resorted to such underhanded and ruthless means to 
achieve their ends, resistance was useless. It was in this mood that Bardossy 
convened his cabinet. Given the circumstances and the moods of the participants, 
the outcome of their deliberations was predictable. That same day the cabinet 
passed a resolution calling for the declaration of the existence of a state of war 
between Hungary and the USSR. Thus, within several hours after the Kassa raid, 
Hungary was plunged into war." 
* * * 
The accusation that Bardossy had been also responsible for the onset, in 
December of 1941, of a state of war between Hungary and the United Kingdom 
is even less valid than the charge that he had "deliberately" involved his country 
in the German war against Soviet Russia. Yet it has been repeated numerous 
times, and in some cases his government has been squarely accused of issuing 
the Hungarian declaration of war on Great Britain.12 In reality, however, it was 
not the Hungarian government that had declared war first, but the government of 
Great Britain. The roots of this development go back to the summer of 1941. 
The German invasion of the U.S.S.R. had ended the Berlin-Moscow 
alliance and created a military alignment between London and the Kremlin. Not 
surprisingly, a few weeks after the German attack, the British and Soviet 
governments began discussions concerning the conduct of the now common war 
effort against the Axis powers. In early September the question of what to do 
with Finland — whose armies were now fighting alongside the Wehrmacht and 
threatened the security of Leningrad — came up in an interview Sir Stafford 
Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, had with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. 
During the discussion it became evident that Stalin wanted Britain to declare war 
on Finland. This request was formally presented to the Foreign Office in 
mid-October by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Four days later, 
Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, .pressed the British Foreign 
Office "very urgently for a favourable reply." The British leaders had two 
reservations about complying with the Soviet request. They believed that united 
action by the members of the British Commonwealth was necessary in the 
matter, and they were worried that a British declaration of war on Finland would 
displease the American public which was thought to be quite sympathetic to the 
Finns.13 
The idea of declaring war on Finland was also unpopular in Canada, in 
particular with the country's Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King. At 
a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa on the 29th of 
October King predicted that there would be "popular reluctance" in both Canada 
and the United States to accept further declarations of war, especially when 
urged by the Soviets. According to King, there were additional reasons for 
rejecting Stalin's demands. One of these had to do with the fact that many Finns 
were employed in essential industries in Canada, a situation which could be 
"adversely affected by a declaration of war." Taking all this into consideration, 
the War Committee agreed that British Government should be told that for the 
time being the Canadian government was not prepared to comply with the Soviet 
demand.14 
In view of the doubts that existed both in London and Ottawa concerning 
the wisdom of declaring war on Finland, and the apparent impossibility of 
achieving Commonwealth unity in the matter even if the U.K. government was 
ready to agree, Downing Street refused Stalin's request. But the Soviet leader 
persisted and went even further, insisting that the British, as well as the other 
members of the British Commonwealth — and even the United States! — 
declare war on Finland, as well as on Hungary and Rumania. Finally, at the end 
of November the U.K. leadership decided to give in to the requests of their 
Russian ally. The governments of the Commonwealth countries were urged to 
act in unison and, after some discussion and a brief delay, they agreed. Thereaf-
ter the British Foreign Office issued ultimatums to the governments of Finland, 
Hungary and Rumania, demanding that they end their military operations against 
the U.S.S.R.; and as these demands were not complied with, the U.K. govern-
ment decided to go ahead with the planned declarations of war.1' In the morning 
of the 7th of December, the members of the British Commonwealth declared war 
on Finland, Hungary and Rumania. In the evening of that day came the news 
that the forces of Imperial Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, causing the outbreak 
of war between the United States and Japan. 
Bardossy played no role in these decisions, other than the fact that his 
administration did not comply with the British ultimatum, but it was hardly in 
position to do so. Somewhat different was the next and last declaration of war 
that the Hungarian Prime Minister is accused of. This followed the onset of war 
between the U.S. and Japan, and the decision by Hitler to demonstrate the Third 
Reich's solidarity with its ally by declaring war on the United States. On this 
occasion, the Germans treated the Hungarians differently from the way they had 
dealt with them in June of 1941. At that time, it might be recalled, no official 
demands were issued to Budapest to join the war against the Soviet Union. Now, 
five months later, the Germans squarely told Bardossy that paragraph 3 of the 
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Tripartite Pact, to which Hungary had also acceded, required 
a Hungarian declaration of war against the United States.16 There was not much 
Bardossy could do to argue in face of such an explicit demand, and he did not 
get into any arguments. In the wake of the British declaration of war on 
Hungary, Bardossy probably felt that whether his country was at peace or at war 
with the United States, mattered little under the circumstances. 
* * * 
Bardossy was at the helm of the Hungarian government in a fateful period. 
During this time Hungary drifted into the war even though that was not the wish, 
and certainly not the aim, of her Prime Minister. Bardossy might have been a 
quick-witted and knowledgeable person, but no amount of astuteness and verbal 
ability could help him to stir the ship of his nation in exactly the direction he 
desired in the stormy times that he was in office. He was the agile sparrow 
among hawks and doves, but his gifts were not enough to handle the grave 
hurdles fate threw at him and his nation during his time in office. Certainly, he 
was not a dove of peace, but men of such persuasion could not have risen to the 
head of the Hungary's government under the internal and international circum-
stances of the times. His American interrogators concluded that he was a 
"sparrow... perhaps a hawk." And a hawk he was found to be by his nation that 
after the war began looking for explanations for the tragedy that befell it, and 
ended up singling out scapegoats for that tragedy. 
From near Augsburg, Bardossy was taken to Salzburg in Austria where 
the Americans collected the Hungarians who were to be returned to Hungary to 
face charges.17 He was put on the very first plane that took these men back to 
Budapest, and — as Dr. Pritz has outlined in his paper in this volume — he was 
the first to be condemned to death by the special People's Tribunal established to 
try Hungary's "war criminals." The sparrow became a victim of the whirlwind 
that the hawks of war had unleashed on the world two generations ago.18 
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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No. 9. 
SUBJECT: Interrogation of Dr. Laszlo de Bardossy, former Prime Minister 
and some-time Foreign Minister of Hungary. 
TO: Commanding Officer, PWB-CPT, 7th Army. 
Portrait of a Gentleman and Diplomatist 
On the 21 June, 1945, a Hungarian aristocrat set down on paper the 
skeleton of his life. Life had been good to him, it had never been dull - and 
while the stuffy little room at Camp Baerenkeller near Augsburg was not a 
prison cell, it was certainly not as pleasant as a villa on Balaton Foeldvar [sic, 
Balatonfoldvar], Besides there was his room-mate: "An old man who is always 
complaining". The aristocrat disliked complaints and people who complained. 
He had always liked his privacy. When he finished writing the outline of his 
life, it looked like this: 
Bardossy, Laszlo 
Born in 1890 (10.12.) in Szombathely, Hungary 
Entered the Hungarian Civil Service in 1913 
Has been taken over to the Hungarian Diplomatic Service 1922 
Appointed Counsellor to the Hungarian Legation in London 1929 
Appointed Hungarian Minister in Bucharest 1934 
Nominated Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Feb. 1941 
Nominated Hungarian Prime Minister 6. April 1941 
Demissioned 6. March 1942 
He later added that he had been educated at the universities of Paris, 
Geneva and Budapest. He had received an LLD in 1912 - "Naturally from 
Budapest". 
He thought of all the interesting and entertaining people he had known, 
and reflected on the bitter jest of being cooped up with a nobody who com-
plained. 
"If only I had something to read - something that could be read over 
and over again. I have my Bible, of course, - but could you get me 
something like Shakespeare?" 
* * * 
When one sees him face to face in animated conversation, the frail, quiet 
man has the alertness of a sparrow. His finely molded and expressively mobile 
features together with his long, fine, silver hair remind one of a portrait of Franz 
Liszt. As he converses in his fluent English, he is poised and has full command 
of himself. Sometimes his long fingers unconsciously toy with an enamelled 
signet ring on his right hand. He is gracious: "I am so glad you brought this up, 
for that permits me to say..." He makes concessions in a gentlemanly manner: 
"You are perfectly right! Absolutely right! I must agree, but..." And as a result 
of these graceful "buts", one imagines him in the red robe of a Cardinal of 
Richelieu 's time. A sparrow? perhaps a hawk. 
From Trianon to Treachery? 
In retrospect the diplomatist sees his high policy as having been deter-
mined by three guiding principles of great clarity: 
"During my short term of office (eleven months) every decision of the 
government over which I presided has been - always with the consent 
of the Regent and with the explicit or tacit approval of the Parliament -
directed only by the interests of our country and nation. Our aim was: 
(1) To keep the unity of our nation; (2) Not to allow foreign interfer-
ence in our state affairs internal or external; (3) To fulfill our national 
obligation toward our Hungarian brethren on the territories severed from 
Hungary in 1919. 
"Ad. 1.) The keeping of the nation's unity has been served by the 
government in refraining from all decisions which could have provoked 
division within the Hungarian nation. That is: The government has 
always put special point to remain in constant harmony with the 
Hungarian public opinion which during my term of office could express 
itself freely. 
"Ad. 2) In order to keep out direct foreign interference, it seemed 
necessary, even unavoidable at given occasions and to a certain extent, 
to fulfill the wishes of Germany [so] that her government should not 
find false pretext to invade the country and to take over the handling of 
our affairs. 
"Ad. 3) The national obligation to free [those] Hungarians living outside 
the national frontier line of 1919 under alien servitude, has spelled for 
us the moral duty to liberate when possible, former Hungarian territories 
with a Hungarian population..." 
It was the attempt to achieve both points 2.) and 3.) that led to the 
diplomatic dance on eggs and sleight of hand that characterized Hungarian 
foreign policy from 1933 to 1945, and finally resulted "in direct foreign interfer-
ence", the "fulfilment of the wishes of Germany" and the eventual loss of 
"Hungarian brethren on the territories severed from Hungary in 1919". 
The critical [events?] in Hungarian foreign affairs took place while 
Bardossy was in Bucharest as Hungarian Minister from 1934 to early 1941. As 
far as he personally was concerned at this time he regarded his major problem 
the question of Hungarian minorities - is outlined in 3.) above. The particular 
segment of this problem that he as Hungarian Minister to Rumania had to deal 
with was the question of Transylvania. 
Bardossy was asked to define exactly what he meant by "public opinion" 
- in authority which he in common with other Hungarian statesmen invariable 
appealed to as an ultimate ratio in the whole matter of Hungarian minorities 
abroad. 
"I am so glad you brought this up! It allows me to say that 'public 
opinion' in this question meant the entire people - the whole country, all 
classes. If I may be permitted to do so, I should like briefly to review 
the history of this question which pros the statement. 
"You will recall that immediately after the last war Hungary had a 
Communist government for a brief time under Bela Kuhn [sic, Kun], 
Even this government had at the very outset as one of its cardinal 
principles the re-attachment to Hungary of territories with Hungarian 
majorities. 
"Later on a peasant government called the 'Party of Small Landowners' 
whose leader was Szabo Nagyatadi also declared as one of its cardinal 
principles opposition to the Trianon Treaty. 
"The upper classes, as represented by Counts Bethlen and Teleki -
well, I might say that they were naturally against it". 
In the light of this tradition and weight of public opinion, Bardossy 
conceived his major task in Bucharest to be "to point out the impossibility of the 
situation" with regard to Transylvania. As Minister in Bucharest I never felt 
German support in this direction. We had more or less the support of the Rome 
government. The head of the Fascist state declared his sympathy in 1935. As to 
Germany - they didn't want to expose themselves. They didn't mean to mix in 
these "Danubian affairs'". 
The first German support came in the shape of the Second Vienna Award 
in 1940, ceding half of Transylvania to Hungary. Although "it seemed that the 
initiative came from Rumania in asking that an award be made, the Vienna 
decision "satisfied neither the Rumanians nor the Hungarians". "Relations 
became more strained. We were on the point of being forced to take action by 
public opinion". 
Nevertheless Hungary and the Hungarians felt a "certain gratitude toward 
Germany for the awards", particularly since all other governments had failed to 
show interest in helping Hungary. 
* * * 
"We did not declare war on Yugoslavia - we merely carried out a 
military action in what had become a vacuum". 
This statement sums up the Premier's attitude toward the whole affair of 
Hungarian annexation through military occupation of the Bacska [Bacska] region 
from Yugoslavia on 10 April, 1941. 
It was all quite legal, if posing certain nice difficulties, in the Premier's 
view. After the putsch which overthrew the pro-German AInoar-Markovitch 
government of Yugoslavia ("until then the most cherished nation for Germany in 
the Danube Valley"), the German government approached Count Teleki asking 
him to join Germany against Yugoslavia and thus regain her lost territories. 
"It was very enticing offer for the dream of all Hungarians - very 
tempting. On the other had we had a moral duty. We had concluded a 
friendship agreement with Yugoslavia at the behest of Germany only a 
few months before. It was a very difficult situation for poor Count 
Teleki"! 
The fact that Count Teleki committed suicide during this crisis is brushed 
aside by Bardossy as "the result of a breakdown of a feeble nervous constitu-
tion, the call of a family heritage in a moment of despair when he felt he could 
no more bear the strain of the burden which governmental duties were putting on 
him for more than three years". 
It was at this critical juncture that Bardossy was called by the Regent to 
jump into the breach. "His Highness perhaps thought I was less mixed up in 
internal affairs and thus less prey to their pressure because I had been in 
Bucharest all these years". 
The "very difficult situation" which spelled "a moral duty" and had called 
Count Teleki's "family heritage in a moment of despair", was dissipated into so 
much thin air for the new Premier as a result of "a telephonic message at 
midnight April 10", informing that Premier - who had been very patient for four 
days - that an independent Croat state had been declared in Zagreb. At the same 
time, according to Bardossy, Yugoslav forces had evacuated the territories 
between the Danube and the Tisa [Tisza] rivers. 
"By carrying out the reoccupation, Hungary followed the Soviet exam-
ple, set on 18 September 1939 when Russian forces entered former 
Polish territories on the basis that Poland had ceased to exist. If 
Hungary would not have acted as she did on 11 April 1941, the German 
Army would have - without any doubt entered the so-called Bacska 
[Bacska] and would have kept it under German occupation". 
Thus no problem existed, since no state existed. No declaration or war 
was necessary, since one does not declare war on a non-entity. The moral 
problem of the friendship pact with Yugoslavia similarly vanished in this stroke 
of central European magic, for now the only moral problem was to save the 
territory from German occupation "with all its far-reaching political con-
sequences". 
Hungarian diplomatic tradition, together with the memory of "poor Count 
Teleki" were also simultaneously honored, for now "both of Count Teleki's 
conditions in the event of a Yugoslav-German war had been fulfilled". There 
was no Yugoslav government. There was no Yugoslav Army. Hungary's moral 
duty was clear. 
A Declaration of war and a "Declaration of Solidarity" 
Many and complicated are the questions which perplex a Pnme Minister, 
but none were more so than those of Russo-Hungarian relations. 
On 22 June 1941, the German Ambassador von Erdmannsdorff - "a 
gentleman" - paid a call on Prime Minister de Bardossy. In the course of the 
conversation the German informed him that Rumania and Finland were joining 
Germany in her war against Russia. Bardossy felt that this was "a sort of 
invitation" for Hungary to join the party too. 
That night he apparently had another of his sessions of "hesitations and 
reflections", for on June 23 the Hungarian Government formally announced that 
it had severed diplomatic relations with the Kremlin. 
To the Prime Minister's surprise and pique, "they laughed at this in 
Berlin and Rome". Meanwhile the ogre of public opinion once more raised its 
head in the Hungarian homeland. 
"Public opinion wanted the war - it was growing impossible for any 
government to resist public opinion, and the army wanted the war -
perhaps foolishly, thinking that it would go brilliantly". 
It was at this point that the Minister's perplexities and doubts were 
cleared up and the issue decided by "the repeated and unprovoked bombing of 
Hungarian towns by Russian planes". 
In 1938 the territory of Karpatho-Ruthenia (formerly the easternmost tip 
of Slovakia) was "re-annexed" to Hungary by the government of Bela Imredy. 
In his discussion of the problem Bardossy emphasized the fact that this territory 
had always constituted a kind of ethnical no-man's land, pointing out that 
President Benes of Czechoslovakia "had repeatedly said that he was holding it 
out as a sort of gage toward the Russians". When pressed the Prime Minister 
admitted that ethnically the territory was of mixed population, "mostly Slavonic 
in character". He further pointed out factors which he felt should not be 
overlooked in the connection; "But it had water-power and lumber and had been 
part of Hungary for - oh, a thousand years!" Thus it was necessary to "round 
out the economy of Hungary". It was in this territory that the towns of Muncacz 
[Munkacs] and Kassa were "repeatedly" (twice) bombed. The investigating 
committee "proved that the bombs were of Russian make". The Prime Minister 
drafted what he considered a well tempered declaration of war. As he remem-
bers it, it read as follows: 
"As a result of the repeated and unprovoked bombing of the Hungarian 
towns of Muncacz [Munkacs] and Kassa by Russian planes, the Hungarian 
Government feels itself to be in a state of war with Russia". 
Berlin and Rome made no comment. In 1942 "Ribbentrop came to 
Budapest to ask for more troops". 
In this episode too, Hungarian tradition and moral obligations were also 
happily honoured. When asked if he did not consider the possibility of keeping 
down the growing German domination by going to war with Russia against 
Germany at this point, the Prime Minister was obviously horrified, pointing out 
that for years "the leading Hungarian politician and brilliant writer Eckhart [sic, 
Tibor Eckhardt?] had unofficially made the promise that Hungary would go to 
war against Russia and defend Karpatho-Ruthenia if the Axis Powers would 
permit Hungary to re-annex it. Moreover the Regent felt a moral duty to the 
anti-Bolshevist heritage of every Hungarian government since Bela Kuhn's 
[Kun]". 
No less thorny a problem, and one which the Prime Minister eventually 
solved with the same brilliance and dexterity, confronted him later that year, 
when "one day we were told that a state of war exists between the States and the 
Reich... They made me understand that I had to declare war too". With an air 
for obvious pride Bardossy exclaims quietly: "I did not!" 
It was his impression that he was being asked to declare war under the 
terms of the Tri-partite Pact which provided that each of the signatory powers 
would come to the assistance of the other if it were attacked. 
The Prime Minister was surprised to learn that in point of technical fact 
it was Germany who had declared war on the United States. After he had been 
given a brief review of the events of the week of December 7, 1941, he ex-
claimed softly: "I am so glad to know that! You see, we had only the German 
view which told us that the United States had provoked and started the war". 
In any event he is now pleased to retail [57'c re-tell?] the facts proving 
that he never declared war on the United States. He informed the German 
representative of his position under three headings: 
(1) "I am quite willing to break off relations 
(2) "I don't want to become the laughing stock of Europe: tne little 
country, Hungary, declaring war on the colossus of America! 
(3) "I can offer neither military nor political support. I have no ships 
except those that go from Buda to Pest. There are too many 
Hungarian nationals in America, and it is also in the interest of 
the Reich not to antagonize them". 
The pressure of the German continued, however. Obviously the Prime 
Minister had to produce a Solomon's judgement. As he sees it, his problem was 
"not to provoke a power which was at its height at this point" and at the same 
time to avoid declaring war on the United States. "After many hesitations and 
reflections, I decided on the following: A Declaration of Solidarity' with 
Germany in her war with the United States. I may say that the next morning 
when Mr. Pell, the American Minister, called on me he congratulated me on the 
wording of .the formula". He further states that 
"The declaration has not been in any way a declaration of war... As 
best seen and proved by the fact that the President of the U.S. has later 
found it necessary to declare war on Hungary which he would not have 
done if he would have considered our previous statement as a declara-
tion of war". 
Conclusions 
Laszlo de Bardossy is a gracious, cultivated man; an aristocrat in the 
European sense of the term who is tied - in spite of the opportunities he has had 
to become a citizen of the world - to a narrow nationalistic point of view which, 
when stripped of its veneer of his soft-spoken punctilio, is as bigoted as that of 
the lowliest Hungarian peasant/ Laszlo de Bardossy fits the pattern of the 
gentleman - civilized conversation is possible with him. 
It might be well to consider here by way of conclusion certain statements 
made by the Prime Minister in his conversation which seem to throw a rather 
oblique light on his true convictions. It is believed that comment on these 
statements would be superfluous. 
"There was at that time a general belief that a clash of the Communist 
outlook with the Capitalist outlook was inevitable. Sooner or later it 
had to come up. This becomes important when one considers it in 
connection with Russia's obviously pan-Slavistic point of view. I may 
say that I still believe in this theory. I believe it will come". 
(Re: Declaration of war on Russia) 
"Yes, that is perfectly true - I was informed of events leading to the 
state of war between Germany and the United States through Hungarian 
diplomatic representatives in the states. But that was so long ago that 
just now it completely slipped my mind". 
(Re: When reminded that the "Ger-
man point of view" was not the only 
information he had access to) 
"Yes, it is true that we played down over the radio the extent of 
Hungarian participation in the war against Russia. But this was primar-
ily for foreign consumption. When I was Prime Minister only small 
forces were sent to the front - it is too long ago to remember the exact 
figure. I was not careful enough to make notes at the time. Later 
Kallay [Miklos Kallay] tolerated this bad and clumsy game. Luckily I 
got out of this in time". 
(Re: When proof was offered that apparently "pub-
lic opinion" had to be conditioned to the Russian 
war.) 
That this is no ordinary predicament he is in at present, Laszlo de 
Bardossy seems to realize. That he has a poised courage in view of this is 
undeniable. And yet, Laszlo de Bardossy loves life - it has treated him well, 
and there are so many interesting people. 
He professes to be curious in regard to this present status: 
"In the course of the interrogation, I took the liberty of asking whether 
the U.S.A. Government considered me as a so-called 'War criminal' 
and if so whether this is the reason for my detention here? 
"In posing the question I had in mind that should the answer be in the 
affirmative: I will have to reckon with my being brought before an 
International Court of Justice. 
"I thought and still believe that my extradition to a so-called Hungarian 
Government which is not, or at least is not yet supported by a freely 
elected Parliament, would hardly be in accordance with the principles of 
justice". 
T/5 George Freimarck 
T/5 Irving M. Rowe 
Note: The writers wish to express their indebtedness and gratitude to Lt. 
Granville (NAIC) for furnishing valuable background material on Mr. Bardossy. 
All errors of judgement are naturally the writers'. 
G.F. 
I.M.R. 
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La France et le bassin des Carpathes 
après la Première Guerre mondiale 
Paul Pilisi 
Documents diplomatiques français sur l'histoire du bassin des Carpathes 
1918-1932, Volume 1, octobre 1918 - août 1919, sous la direction de Mme 
Magda Ádám, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993. 864 p. 
Il s'agit de documents de la plus haute importance pour l'histoire contemporaine 
de la Hongrie. En premier lieu, c'est durant cette période que la configuration 
du bassin des Carpathes sera décidée: lors du traité de Trianon, les puissances 
victorieuses transformeront ce fait en droit des vainqueurs en distribuant les 
trois-quarts du territoire de la Hongrie historique à leurs clients. Deuxièmement, 
suite à l'effondrement du système soviétique à l'Est, les problèmes et les cicatri-
ces, issus de la Première Guerre mondiale reviennent à la surface au grand 
étonnement d'Etats, pourtant responsables de leur ignorance, de mauvaise foi et 
d'actes délibérés à l'époque. Troisièmement, l'Autriche-Hongrie, avec ses 
avantages et ses défauts, garantissait un bien-être matériel et spirituel à ses 
peuples jamais égalé par les États successeurs, sans parler de l'oppression ou des 
massacres délibérés en ex-Yougoslavie. Enfin, il s'agit de documents, parfois 
secrets, jamais publiés depuis lors. 
A la lumière de ces documents, il devient de plus en plus évident, sans 
parler des traités secrets, mieux connus, cédant des territoires et populations pour 
une déclaration de guerre aux mieux offrants, que le traité de Trianon n'était 
qu'une formalité, sanctionnant le fait accompli. 
Les documents numérotés sont classés en ordre chronologique en indiqu-
ant le nom, la provenance aussi bien que la nature de ceux-ci (dépêches, télé-
grammes, lettres). Les extraits des documents seront reproduits tels quels1. 
'Les references mises entre parentheses designent la classification d'origine tandis 
que celles apres les citations indiquent le classement dans le livre. 
Le 17 octobre 1918, le ministre des Affaires extérieures de la Monarchie 
austro-hongroise, le comte István Burian, présente au président américain Wilson 
l'acte de reddition. La «révolution des chrysanthèmes» met au pouvoir le 
gouvernement du comte Michel Károlyi, dont le parti, le «Parti de Károlyi» 
gouverne en coalition avec le Parti Bourgeois Radical d'Oscar Jászi, le Parti 
Social Démocrate, et exercera ses fonctions dès le 25 octobre 1918 sous le nom 
de «Conseil National hongrois». Le gouvernement avait une confiance illimitée 
dans les principes wilsoniens et dans la bonne foi des Alliés. 
Le programme gouvernemental proposait la transformation de la Hongrie 
historique en une «fédération démocratique» dont le ministre des nationalités, O. 
Jászi, avait publié le projet des «Etats-Unis Danubiens» en 1918. A ce titre, 
Jászi entamait des négociations avec les représentants des nationalités en vue de 
préserver l'intégrité territoriale de la Hongrie historique au sein de structures 
fédératives. 
Les documents diplomatiques français ne laissent aucun doute sur une 
politique foncièrement hostile à l'égard des Magyars ennemis, dont le démemb-
rement du pays n'était qu'une question de processus dans lequel Roumains, 
Tchécoslovaques et Serbes avaient le droit de nourrir «toutes les hypothèses». 
Une note sur la politique française à suivre en Autriche-Hongrie, probab-
lement rédigée par J. Laroche, sous-directeur d'Europe au Ministère des Affaires 
étrangères, insiste sur le fait que «nous avons, de tous les Alliés, la meilleure 
situation». Ce document, sans date ni numéro, prescrit le comportement que les 
corps français d'occupation devaient adopter envers les populations «ennemies» 
et «alliées» de la région. L'attitude «envers les Magyars doit être indulgente». 
(Document no 30, p. 62.) 
C'est le 13 novembre 1918 qu'une convention militaire humiliante avait 
été signée entre les représentants des armées alliées et le gouvernement hongrois 
à Belgrade. Les termes de cet armistice imposaient à la Hongrie des lignes de 
démarcations, des obligations politico-militaires et à la fois économiques 
particulièrement onéreuses. En outre, les Affaires étrangères donnent l'instruc-
tion aux ambassades, le ton et la manière de traiter la Hongrie. Le télégramme 
secret de Pichon, ministre des Affaires étrangères, adressé le 29 novembre, à 23 
heures 50 minutes, aux ambassadeurs de France, insiste sur la «lourde res-
ponsabilité des Hongrois de la guerre», met en garde contre «la tactique des 
hommes d'Etat hongrois», de «l'impudence de la part du Comte Károlyi à essayer 
de marquer ainsi par une façade ultradémocratique le but réel poursuivi par le 
Gouvernement hongrois lequel vise uniquement à maintenir dans l'asservissement 
des nationalités non magyares. Le général Franchet d'Esperey reçoit... de traiter 
le pseudo gouvernement hongrois comme une simple autorité locale, de fait, et 
n'avoir avec lui que les rapports nécessités par la situation militaire». (Document 
no 55, pp. 111-112.) 
Il n'est pas étonnant de constater que les comités roumains et slovaques 
avaient carrément rejeté les propositions de Jászi. Ce dernier mentionne, dans 
ses mémoires, que ces comités, comme celui des Roumains de Transylvanie, lui 
signifiaient qu'ils voulaient créer leurs «États nationaux». 
Les témoignages des documents diplomatiques français autorisent à 
présumer que le démembrement de la Hongrie historique avait commencé 
aussitôt. Le général Henrys, commandant de l'Armée française d'Orient, en poste 
à Belgrade, dans un télégramme (no 213/2b) du 6 décembre au général Franchet 
d'Esperey, commandant en chef des Armées Alliées d'Orient, stipule que Károlyi 
«nie le droit à la Roumanie d'occuper la Transylvanie». En outre, il ajoute que 
les «milieux serbes s'inquiètent de ce que les Roumains parlent de terre roumaine 
jusqu'au Theiss et Danube». (Document no 70, p. 126.) 
Le général Henrys, dans un télégramme du 12 décembre, (no 332/2B) 
expédié au lieutenant-colonel Vix, chef de la Mission militaire alliée à Budapest, 
transmet les instructions du général Franchet d'Esperey concernant l'occupation 
de la Transylvanie par l'armée roumaine: «...vous prie de répondre Gouverne-
ment Hongrois que l'Armistice prévoyait implicitement occupation Transylvanie 
par Roumanie, puisque Roumains sont considérés comme faisant partie entente». 
(Document no 79, p. 135.) 
Le lieutenant-colonel Vix, dans une dépêche du 19 décembre, (no 472/S) 
adressée au général Henrys, estime que, dans le processus de démembrement de 
la Hongrie, les limites ont été déjà dépassées. Il convient de souligner avec 
insistance que le lieutenant-colonel Vix, en poste à Budapest, ne cesse d'attirer 
l'attention de ses supérieurs sur les excès commis par les «petits alliés» de la 
France: «Je relève que l'acharnement des nationalités autrefois asservies à la 
Hongrie, aujourd'hui soutenue par l'Entente, peut pousser les Hongrois à bout. 
Tout en se montrant ferme et très exigeant envers la Hongrie, il est des limites 
qu'il conviendrait de ne pas dépasser. J'estime qu'on les dépasse». (Document 
no 92, p. 147.) 
A la lumière des dépêches, télégrammes et procès-verbaux, inconnus 
auparavant, le rôle de la France, dans le démembrement de la Hongrie, devient 
de plus en plus évident. La personnalité et les agissements du lieutenant-colonel 
Vix, chef de la Mission militaire alliée à Budapest, reçoit aussi un éclairage peu 
connu. Malgré tout, c'est lui qui avait même osé critiquer la politique permissive 
de son gouvernement envers les «petits alliés», d'une part, et la politique ouvert-
ement hostile et intransigeante vis-à-vis des Hongrois, d'autre part. 
Bien avant Trianon, Clemenceau, dans un télégramme (no 15373 BS/3) 
du 19 décembre à l'adresse du général Franchet d'Esperey, précise les «limites 
historiques slovaques» telles qu'établies par les «renseignements des Affaires 
étrangères». (Document no 94, p. 148.) 
Ce fait est confirmé dans un long télégramme (no 621/S) du 23 décem-
bre, émis de Budapest et adressé au général Henrys par le lieutenant-colonel Vix. 
Ce dernier signale qu'à son «grand étonnement», Milan Hodza lui a montré une 
carte «fixant les frontières qui séparent l'État Tchécoslovaque de l'État Hong-
rois», telles que décidées par le Conseil de Versailles. Comme chef de la 
mission militaire des Alliés à Budapest, il critique, il faut le dire, de façon 
courageuse, l'attitude des Alliés, leur manque de respect de la Convention de 
Belgrade du 13 novembre 1918. 
La décision prise à Versailles, en ce qui concerne l'occupation de la 
Slovaquie par les Tchécoslovaques, constitue à mon avis, une première 
atteinte grave à la Convention. La convention du 13 novembre n'est 
plus en somme qu'un chiffon de papier. L'attitude prise par nos petites 
alliés (Tchécoslovaques, Roumains et Serbes) et par nous-mêmes... 
semblent bien montrer que dès maintenant il n'est plus qu'un seul droit: 
le droit du plus fort... Les Tchécoslovaques, niant que la convention leur 
soit applicable en aucune de ses parties... s'imposent en maître absolus... 
Les Roumains, prêts à outrepasser les ordres du général Berthelot 
montrent un égal acharnement... Les Serbes ont commis dès le début 
bien des abus. (Document no 110, pp. 159-160.) 
Un rapport secret (no 5.284/3), rédigé à Belgrade le 17 septembre sur la 
situation en Hongrie, insiste sur le fait que «l'armée hongroise peut être con-
sidérée comme non existante». Ce rapport passe en revue, en connaissance de 
cause, les exactions roumaines, tchécoslovaques et serbes dans un style descrip-
tif, se limitant aux faits, sans commentaires: «...en Transylvanie, les Roumains, 
se croyant appuyés par l'Armée du Danube, tendant à dépasser la ligne de 
démarcation fixée par la Convention, et, dans le Banat de Temesvár, ne déguis-
ent pas leurs ambitions, provoquant ainsi l'inquiétude des Serbes». Le rapport 
secret décrit aussi la situation socio-économique désastreuse de la Hongrie et 
prévoit la chute du gouvernement Károlyi, «des troubles et des désordres 
graves». (Document no 111, p. 170.) 
Károlyi ne soupçonnait peut-être pas que le gouvernement français 
envisageait, dès le début, sa chute et les troubles qui se produiraient par la suite, 
ci-après. Károlyi et son gouvernement étaient limités au contact avec le lieuten-
ant-colonel Vix, représentant des Alliées. Jamais le gouvernement de Károlyi n'a 
été invité à donner son avis, des preuves, son accord ou désaccord au gouvern-
ement français. En outre, les rapports des militaires, de Vix, de Henrys ou de 
Berthelot, conformes à la situation, n'ont jamais été considérés par le gouverne-
ment français. Au contraire, Clemenceau interviendra, à plusieurs reprises, pour 
réprimander et blâmer sévèrement les hauts officiers qui oseront critiquer la 
politique officielle de la France et de ses Alliés. 
Ainsi, le comte Károlyi, président du Conseil National Hongrois, avait 
transmis une lettre de protestation, le 28 décembre, au lieutenant-colonel Vix, 
contre le démembrement de la Hongrie. 
Les territoires hongrois revendiqués par les Tchèques ne faisaient jamais 
partie du royaume de Bohême. Ils ne formaient à aucune époque de 
l'histoire une province distincte de l'État hongrois et, par conséquent, ni 
les Tchèques, ni les Slovaques ne peuvent pas réclamer des limites 
«historiques» d'une «Slovaquie» qui n'a jamais existée... L'arrachement 
ou l'occupation seule de villes ardemment vénérées comme des vrais 
foyers de la millénaire culture hongroise, telles que Pozsony (Presbourg) 
ancienne capitale de la Hongrie, Kassa, ville préférée du prince François 
Rákóczi, ce grand ami et allié de la France... exaspérerait l'âme hon-
groise. (Document no 113, pp. 173-174.) 
Les témoignages affirment que le lieutenant-colonel Vix était un inter-
locuteur loyal et défendait, de façon consécutive, les Hongrois contre les accusa-
tions gratuites. En outre, il démontre que les exactions, commises par les 
Roumains, ont été attribuées de façon intentionnelle aux Hongrois, victimes 
plutôt qu'agresseurs. En ce qui concerne les exactions en Transylvanie, son 
télégramme (no 947/S) du 6 janvier 1917 au général Henrys est révélateur: 
...des gardes nationaux roumains ex-soldats de l'armée Hongroise ayant 
conservé leur armes, ont occupé tous les villages. Sans cadre et sans 
scrupules, animés comme tous les Roumains de Transylvanie, d'une 
haine profonde des Hongrois, ces gardes nationaux ne peuvent être un 
élément d'ordre: ils ont, sinon exécuté eux-mêmes ou participé au 
pillage des propriétés Hongroises (la preuve officielle manque), du 
moins toléré ces pillages et laissé libre les exécutants.... Le command-
ement militaire roumain, considère la zone nouvellement occupée 
comme un pays conquis et devenu définitivement Roumain. La visite 
du Général Berthelot a renforcé encore ce sentiment. (Document no 
120, pp. 182-183.) 
Le supérieur immédiat du lieutenant-colonel Vix, le général Berthelot, 
commandant de l'Armée de Danube, témoin oculaire du non-respect de la 
convention de Belgrade, informait son gouvernement sur le processus de 
démembrement de la Hongrie. La preuve est irréfutable puisque Clemenceau, au 
lieu de considérer les faits, laisse entendre que tout était décidé contre «Bulgares 
ou les Hongrois, c'est-à-dire l'ennemi». Son télégramme au général Berthelot 
(sans date et no d'enregistrement) peut être considéré comme un avertissement. 
En effet, le général donnait un compte rendu objectif de la situation en Transyl-
vanie, à son gouvernement en énumérant les exactions commises par l'armée 
roumaine contre les Magyars. (N.B. Clemenceau désigne déjà la Transylvanie 
comme la Roumanie.) «Votre télégramme ne se contente pas d'exposer l'état 
d'esprit en Roumanie (Transylvanie P.P.) et les inquiétudes que vous en ressen-
tez, mais blâme la politique du gouvernement.... La Roumanie est assurée, en 
toute hypothèse, de l'agissante sympathie de la France pour ses buts essentiels 
...». (Document no 135, pp. 198-199.) 
Parmi les buts essentiels roumains, la Transylvanie représentait la priorité 
absolue, la cause même de son entrée en guerre contre les promesses de l'En-
tente. Le 17 août 1916, un traité secret avait été signé à Bucarest entre la 
Roumanie et l'Entente. Ce traité a promis la Bucovine, la Transylvanie, Le 
Banat et la partie orientale de la grande plaine hongroise à la Roumanie en 
contre-partie de son entrée en guerre contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Allemagne. 
Il est plausible que les hauts officiers français ignoraient l'existence du traité. 
Pour faire comprendre au général Berthelot le total soutien de la France à 
l'égard des Roumains et l'hostilité envers les Magyars, le télégramme secret (no 
1169/BS/3) de Clemenceau, expédié le 15 janvier 1919, répète ses avertis-
sements, cette fois sans ambages. Les adjectifs utilisés ne laissent aucun doute 
sur les intentions de Clemenceau: les rapports, documents et télégrammes sont 
considérés comme des «incriminations» nulles et non avenues. Le ton de ce 
télégramme laissait planer le doute sérieux de révocation, en cas de refus 
d'obéissance à la politique du gouvernement français: 
Les décisions que vous incriminez touchant la Dobroudja, le Banat, la 
Transylvanie, n'ont aucunement le caractère que vous leur attribuez, et 
ce que vous en dites est sans fondement en fait et en droit.... Il n'y a 
par conséquent rien de fondé dans les récriminations roumaines. Vous 
devriez être le premier à le reconnaître, à le déclarer et à vous inscrire 
en faux contre elles, au lieu de vous faire leur avocat, de les encourager 
et de blâmer la politique de la France et de ses alliés, ce qui est inad-
missible de votre part. (Document no 136, pp. 200-201.) 
Ce deuxième télégramme secret de Clemenceau dissipe tout malentendu 
possible sur l'attitude du gouvernement français à l'égard des «petits alliés» et 
des «ennemis». En outre, à la lumière de ces documents, il est également 
pertinent de poser la question à savoir dans quelle mesure le gouvernement 
français précipite l'avènement du bolchevisme en Hongrie, permettant ainsi à ses 
«petits alliés» de parachever la conquête du territoire hongrois sous prétexte de 
«combattre» le bolchevisme. Le gouvernement français, mieux que quiconque, 
disposait des informations objectives, non seulement sur la situation en Hongrie 
mais aussi sur le bassin des Carpathes. 
Émile Hauguenin, membre du Service de renseignement français (2e 
bureau), dans une étude détaillée et documentée, du 22 janvier 1919, informe son 
ministre des Affaires étrangères sur la situation socio-économique, militaire et 
politique en Autriche, en Hongrie et en Bohême. Ainsi, le gouvernement 
français savait pertinemment que la situation du gouvernement Károlyi était 
désespérée: «...Comte Károlyi... me l'a répété avec une émotion désespérée dans 
deux longs entretiens: l'Entente, sur laquelle il comptait... l'a abandonné, il est à 
présent sans appui, l'homme le plus détestable de la Hongrie». La description de 
la situation de crise est conforme à la réalité. L'agent secret prévient le ministre 
français des Affaires étrangères de cette «crise profonde, totale et bientôt, sans 
doute, tumultueuse». (Document no 148, pp. 215-216.) 
Les officiers et généraux français, déployés dans les bassins des Car-
pathes, avaient constaté les faits sur le terrain et il n'est pas étonnant d'apercevoir 
qu'au nom d'un certain honneur, ils ont défendu assez régulièrement la cause des 
Magyars. Le télégramme secret, que Clemenceau adressait au général Franchet 
d'Esperey, commandant en chef des Armées Alliées d'Orient, le 24 janvier (no 
774 BS/s, Secret), est révélateur à cet égard. Clemenceau accumulait les postes 
de président du Conseil et de ministre de la Guerre, il refusa d'accepter la 
démission du général. Par contre, il lui indique «l'attitude» qu'il «doit prendre 
vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Roumain...». Vous m'avez offert par anticipation de 
démissionner pour le cas où je ne serais pas de votre avis: je vous ai fait 
connaître que je n'étais pas de votre avis.... Ceci dit, pour que la situation soit 
claire, je dois vous faire connaître que M. Bratiano est venu me raconter sur son 
compte à peu près tout ce que vous m'avez dit de la question roumaine dans 
votre dépêche... il m'a sérieusement demandé de l'écouter pendant une heure». 
(Document no 151, pp. 220-221.) 
Ce télégramme secret démontre clairement que les émissaires roumains 
présentaient à Clemenceau leurs versions et que ce dernier leur avait donné 
raison plutôt qu'aux hauts responsables de l'Armée française. 
Ce télégramme confirme également que les représentants des «petits 
alliés» de l'Entente se trouvaient à Paris pour informer le gouvernement français 
et pour participer aux travaux des Commissions relatives au démembrement de la 
Hongrie. 
Le 8 février 1919, la Commission des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves 
s'était réunie à Paris. Le procès-verbal de la séance confirme que la réunion 
avait comme objectif principal le partage de la Hongrie (Document no 1). «Le 
Président expose que la Commission est saisie de deux mémoires, l'un roumaini 
et l'autre serbe... ces mémoires sont bien l'expression officielle des revendications 
des Gouvernements intéressés, revendications qui ont d'ailleurs été soumises au 
Conseil suprême des Alliées par M. Bratiano, pour la Roumanie, et par M. 
Vesnitch, pour la Serbie». (Document 176, p. 248.) 
L'annexe 1 de ce procès-verbal contient le «Mémoire présenté par la 
délégation roumaine. Les revendications territoriales». Ce mémoire réclame 
«pour la grande unité roumaine toutes les âmes roumaines... entre le Danube, la 
Theiss et le Dniester.... 1. La Transylvanie proprement dite, avec une partie des 
comitats limitrophes de Hongrie (en tout 85 000 kilomètres carrés). 2. Le Banat 
de Temesvár (28 000 kilomètres carrés). 3. La Bukovine (10 000 kilomètres 
carrés)». (Ibidem, p. 252.) 
Le mémoire roumain rectifie les statistiques hongroises sous prétexte qu'il 
s'agit de chiffres «volontairement falsifiés». D'après les statistiques roumaines, 
rectifiées, les Szeklers ne sont pas considérés comme des Hongrois. «Des 
rectifications incontestables portent le nombre de Roumains à au moins 2 900 
000, soit 62,5%, et réduisent le nombre des Hongrois à 7-00 000, soit 15%, non 
compris les Szeklers». (Ibidem, p. 254.) 
En ce qui concerne les revendications roumaines sur le «Banat de 
Temesvár», le mémoire roumain utilise, entre autres, des arguments semblables: 
Il n'a pu venir à l'esprit de personne de contester à la Roumanie le droit 
de revendiquer l'union politique d'un territoire où les Roumains vivent 
depuis de longs siècles, et où ils sont au nombre de 600 000 auprès de 
moins de 400 000 Allemands, colons venus depuis le XVIIIe siècle, 
pour ne parler que des éléments ethniques les plus importants. (Ibidem, 
p. 255, Les Magyars ne sont même pas mentionnés.) 
Le mémoire prévient la Commission qu'en cas contraire, «on n'aboutirait 
qu'à la désorganisation économique, à l'arrêt du développement de toute une 
région et à la perspective de conflits». (Ibidem, p. 258.) 
L'annexe II est le «Mémoire présenté par la délégation serbo-croate--
slovène et concernant les revendications du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et 
Slovènes». Ce mémoire retrace l'histoire de la Serbie, exalte la solidarité des 
Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes, et réclame «l'union à notre État de tous les 
pays qui, en accord avec le principe des nationalités doivent lui appartenir». 
(Ibidem, p. 262.) 
L'annexe III conteste les revendications roumaines sur le Banat. Du côté 
serbe, comme du côté roumain, les arguments historiques pleines de redondances 
ne s'appuient sur aucun fait et pullulent d'omissions. Cette annexe conteste les 
revendications des Roumains, au nom de l'histoire, du principe des nationalités, 
réclamant la possession «exclusive» du Banat. «Le Banat est peuplé de Serbes, 
de Hongrois, de Roumains et d'Allemands. Les Serbes sont indigènes; les autres 
nationalités sont venus s'y établir postérieurement en qualité de colons». (Ibi-
dem, p. 263.) Le mémoire propose d'identifier des arguments géographiques, 
économiques, historiques pour appuyer la revendication serbe: 
Les Hongrois se retirant de plus en plus au Nord devant l'avance 
turque... et le pays prit un caractère entièrement serbe.... Nulle part on 
ne trouve trace des Roumains... l'histoire ne mentionne absolument pas 
les Roumains dans cette partie du Banat où les Serbes ont développé 
une activité politique et civilisatrice si grande. Les Roumains ne 
descendirent pas dans la grande plaine du Banat avant le XVIIIe siècle, 
en même temps que les colons allemands et les Magyars.... (Ibidem, 
pp. 265-266). 
En ce qui concerne les statistiques, le mémoire prétend que la statistique 
hongroise «est notoirement peu sûre, surtout au détriment des Slaves». (Ibidem, 
p. 270.) LAnnexe IV concerne les frontières Nord du Royaume des Serbes-
Croates-Slovènes et la délimitation entre Serbes et Magyars dans la Batchka. 
L'annexe prétend que la statistique hongroise «de cette région est, encore plus 
que celle du Banat, faussé à l'avantage de la nationalité magyare». (Ibidem, p. 
271.) D'après les statistiques hongroises de 1910 dans le Batchka, il y avait 
812 382 habitants dont 363 513 Magyars et 145 063 Serbes. Les statistiques 
rectifiées par ce mémoire, indiquent que le nombre de Serbes, de Croates et 
d'autres slaves est de 245.567 et le nombre des Magyars diminue à 293 256. 
Parmi les arguments expliquant ces chiffres, et les écarts, voici le suivant: 
Dans la Batchka, comme dans le Banat, les fonctionnaires, employés et 
serviteurs des différents services, des diverses institutions des chemins 
de fer, étaient recrutés dans les rangs des Magyars fanatiques qui 
consacraient leur vie entière à la propagande plutôt qu'à leur service. 
Des fonctionnaires magyars abandonneraient cette région, comme toutes 
celles peuplées d'une majorité non magyare, aussitôt que le pouvoir 
magyar aurait cessé de s'y exercer. (Ibidem, p. 273.) 
En modifiant les statistiques sous n'importe quel prétexte, les revendica-
tions serbes visaient une partie des Départements de Baranya et de Somogy. Il 
convient de préciser que ces revendications se référait implicitement à la ligne de 
démarcation fixée par la Convention militaire de Belgrade, du 13 novembre 
1918, laquelle convention, d'après le lieutenant-colonel Vix, est devenue un 
«chiffon de papier». En effet, Barcs, Pécs, Baja, Mohács et d'autres localités se 
trouvaient du côté serbo-croate-slovène de la ligne de démarcation. 
Pour des raisons analogues, l'État des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes doit 
revendiquer l'étroite zone au Nord de la Drave, qui renferme le chemin 
de fer reliant les régions yougoslaves au-delà de la Moura... (ligne 
Zákány-Barcs-Siklos-Mohács). Dans cette bande de territoire, il y a de 
nombreuses localités serbo-croates, tandis que le nombre des Magyars 
de cette région, qui devraient être annexés à notre État, n'atteint que 
quelques milliers d'hommes. (Ibidem, 274.) 
Les arguments évoqués mentionnent les Hongrois et les Allemands 
comme des «colons» tandis que la population serbe est identifiée comme «indi-
gène». Le document affirme, que «Les colonies allemandes et magyares, jouis-
sant de la bienveillance et de la protection des autorités hongroises, se com-
portaient peu amicalement envers les indigènes». (Idem.) Cette affirmation est 
en contradiction avec l'argument qui sera présenté le 25 février devant la 
Commission des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves. En ce qui concerne le 
Banat, la délégation serbe affirme «que la grande majorité des terres arables dans 
;es régions appartiennent à de riches familles serbes, héritières démocratiques de 
la noblesse rurale émigrée de Serbie vers le Banat au treizième siècle». (Docu-
ment no 198, p. 356.) 
Si c'était le cas, comment est-il possible que les riches familles serbes, 
héritières «démocratiques» de la noblesse rurale, soient opprimées par les 
employés ou journaliers hongrois «inamicaux» par le simple fait qu'ils soient 
d'origine hongroise? Un autre argument évoque que la «question de la Bacska 
tient particulièrement à coeur aux Serbes, car cette province est le berceau de 
leur civilisation». (Idem.) 
Suite à la mise en demeure de Clemenceau, les dépêches des militaires 
deviennent copies-conformes à la volonté de celui-ci, malgré quelques réticences 
du lieutenant-colonel Vix. 
Ainsi, le général Patey, imposé par Clemenceau, chargé par le général 
Berthelot d'enquêter sur la situation en Transylvanie, dans un rapport sans 
numéro du 8 février, se conforme aux instructions reçues. Quant aux exactions 
des Roumains contre les Magyars, le général français les efface d'un trait de 
plume. «Si regrettables que soient les actes de brutalité subis par quelques 
personnes, ils sont infiniment moins graves que ceux commis par nos ennemis 
pendant plus de 4 ans». (Document no 177, p. 281.) 
Le général Patey reproduit dans les annexes II, III et IV, les dépêches du 
lieutenant-colonel Vix et les utilisera contre ce dernier. L'annexe IV intègre le 
télégramme (no 654/2S) du lieutenant-colonel de Budapest sans date, lequel 
réitère l'attitude du gouvernement hongrois face à l'indépendance de la Transyl-
vanie: 
Primo - Les déclarations du Comité dirigeant de Sibiu concernant 
l'indépendance de la Transylvanie ne peuvent être prises en considéra-
tion que si celui-ci peut fournir la pièce authentique établissant que le 
Gouvernement Hongrois a reconnu cette indépendance... le Gouverne-
ment Hongrois s'est toujours refusé, avant comme après l'armistice, à 
reconnaître cette indépendance. (Ibidem, p. 287.) 
Le général Patey attribue en partie l'attitude du lieutenant-colonel Vix aux 
Magyars, puisqu'il doit répondre «aux questions qui lui étaient posées par nos 
ennemis, dont l'habileté est réputée». Le général mentionne implicitement que le 
lieutenant-colonel n'était pas informé des clauses du traité secret de Bucarest de 
1916. «La teneur des télégrammes du Lieutenant-Colonel Vix montre un état de 
fatigue ou d'exaspération que j'estime incompatible avec la complexité et la 
délicatesse de sa tâche... le Lieutenant-colonel Vix qui a plus de 2 mois de 
présence à Budapest, doit recevoir, le plus tôt possible, une autre affectation...». 
(Ibidem, pp. 292-293.) 
La dernière partie du rapport, intitulée «considérations générales», con-
formément aux voeux et instructions de Clemenceau, est un plaidoyer sans 
nuance pour la politique du gouvernement français. Pour dissiper tout malen-
tendu, il attire l'attention du général Berthelot, commandant de l'Armée du 
Danube, sur le traité secret de Bucarest, d'août 1916, lequel promettait la 
Transylvanie entière à la Roumanie. 
En tout cas, tous les alliées et surtout la France, qui a accepté par 
accord de 1916 l'éventualité du rattachement de la Transylvanie à la 
Roumanie, peuvent-ils être défavorables à la réalisation des aspirations 
du conseil national roumain de Transylvanie reconnu déjà par nos alliés 
roumains?... Il importe que par l'occupation sans délai, des points 
stratégiques d'Arad, Nagy-Varad, Szatmárnémeti nous écartions le 
danger de nouvelles hostilités et protégions les populations roumaines... 
qui a mis toute confiance en nous, et à qui, à tous les points de vue 
nous avons le devoir de donner notre appui.... Le conseil national 
roumain de Transylvanie est composé d'hommes au coeur chaud... 
capables... de prendre dans la grande Roumanie la place que leurs belles 
capacités ne peut manquer de leur vouloir. (Ibidem, pp. 296-297.) 
En ce qui concerne la protection des populations roumaines, voici le document 
concerné. Le procès-verbal de la réunion de la Commission du 17 février, 
rapporte que d'après le délégué britannique, Leeper, ce triangle en question est 
habité par une population presque exclusivement magyare. À Szatmár-Németi, 
par exemple, il y a 33 000 Magyars contre 1 000 Roumains. (Document no 185, 
p. 34.) 
Il est un fait indéniable que le général, ignorant la configuration ethnique 
et historique de la Transylvanie, reproduisait les versions roumaines dénoncées 
auparavant par le lieutenant-colonel Vix. 
Voici le genre de rapport qu'attendait Clemenceau, d'autant plus que, dès 
le 11 février, les Commissions des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves ainsi que 
tchéco-slovaques se réuniront régulièrement en vue de tracer les frontières de la 
Hongrie déjà divisée. Pendant que ces commissions poursuivent leurs travaux, 
le gouvernement hongrois ne cesse d'expédier des protestations auprès du 
lieutenant-colonel Vix. (Documents no 179, pp. 303-305, no 182, pp. 315-316; 
no 186, pp. 326-327.) 
Suite au rapport du général Patey, du 11 au 25 février, la Commission 
des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves tiendra ses réunions, présidées par Tardieu, 
collaborateur et homme de confiance de Clemenceau, nommé président de cette 
Commission. Les délégations française, britannique, italienne et américaine 
participent aux réunions et les représentants roumains, serbes et tchéco-slovaques 
sont appelés devant la Commission pour justifier leurs revendications territoria-
les. 
Les procès-verbaux révèlent que toutes les délégations étaient au courant 
du traité secret de Bucarest de 1916. Ces documents confirment que si les 
arguments et les statistiques même rectifiées jusqu'à 20% contre les Hongrois 
étaient favorables à ceux-ci, les délégués évoquaient des raisons d'ordre écono-
mique, de communication terrestre ou ferroviaire, voire stratégiques contre les 
«ennemis», les Magyars, et de façon répétitive, en faveur des «alliés». Les 
interventions des délégués français et du président de la Commission, Tardieu, 
attestent que la France avait joué un rôle de leader, et de façon consécutive, 
contre la Hongrie. 
Si «la frontière revendiquée par la Roumanie engloberait une bande de 
territoire presque exclusivement hongrois...», le président Tardieu évoque que des 
«communications par voie ferrée...» ou «l'absence de toute ligne de rocade au 
pied des montagnes placerait la Roumanie dans une situation désavantageuse en 
cas de conflit avec la Hongrie». (Procès-verbal de la séance du 11 février 1919, 
Document no 178, pp. 300-301.) Lors de cette séance, sur la proposition du 
président, la Commission décide de confier au secrétariat de produire à l'échelle 
1:1 000 000 les tracés des frontières entre la Hongrie et la Roumanie. 
À l'occasion de la réunion du 13 février, le délégué britannique, Sir Eyre 
Crowe, expose, de façon explicite, les solutions appliquées aux questions ethni-
ques susceptibles d'apporter des modifications. En cas de majorité magyare, «le 
principe de sympathie pour la Roumanie» doit l'emporter. Il s'agit de deux 
poids, deux mesures applicables envers l'ennemi et l'allié. «Le problème se pose 
d'une manière toute différente pour les Grands Alliés, suivant que les difficultés 
ethnographiques se présentent entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie qui est leur 
ennemi, ou entre la Roumanie et la Serbie qui sont toutes deux leurs alliées». 
(Procès-verbal de la séance du 13 février. Document no 181, p. 307.) 
Les procès-verbaux attestent que des arguments circonstanciels voire 
négligeables ont été évoqués en vue de justifier le traité secret de Bucarest de 
1916, lequel promettait la Transylvanie entière à la Roumanie. Ainsi, le prési-
dent Tardieu fait prévaloir des conditions géographiques, l'importance ou la 
direction des chemins de fer vis-à-vis des faits ethniques attestant la présence des 
majorités magyares, «...tout en croyant devoir réviser le traité de 1916, la 
Délégation française considère que les clauses négatives de cet accord, celles qui 
enlèvent des territoires à l'ennemi, représentent le point de vue définitif des 
gouvernements signataires et ne sauraient être modifiées au bénéfice de la 
Hongrie». (Ibidem, p. 314.) 
La Commission reprend ses travaux le 17 février et l'enjeu de la séance 
est de tracer la frontière entre la Hongrie et la Roumanie. Le délégué italien, De 
Martino, déclare que la Délégation italienne se place, en principe, en faveur du 
maintien de la frontière tracée par le traité de Bucarest de 1916. Étant donné 
que la Commission est d'accord sur le principe, il ne reste que des détails à 
régler, l'appartenance de quelques villes ou villages. 
Le représentant français, Laroche, interroge la délégation britannique sur 
la raison pour laquelle elle refuse d'attribuer la ville de Huszt à la Roumanie? 
Sir Eyre Crowe lui déclare que «Huszt n'est pas nécessaire à la Roumanie» et il 
ne faut pas attribuer «à la Roumanie plus de territoire qu'il n'est absolument 
nécessaire». (Procès-verbal de la séance du 17 février, Document no 185, p. 
320.) 
Au cours de l'échange sur l'attribution de la ville de Szatmárnémeti et de 
sa régionales délégations admettent que la ville et ses alentours sont habités «par 
une population presque entièrement magyare. À Szatmárnémeti, par exemple, il 
y a 33 000 Magyars contre 1 000 Roumains, et la proportion est à peu près la 
même dans les autres parties du pays. La Délégation britannique est cependant 
d'avis que l'importance de maintenir les communications entre la Roumanie et la 
Tchécoslovaquie justifie l'attribution de cette région à la Roumanie». (Ibidem, p. 
321.) 
Le délégué français Laroche, évoque régulièrement la «supercherie» des 
statistiques hongroises et insiste sur des arguments peu habituels à propos des 
majorités des Magyars dans les villes de Transylvanie. L'argument utilisé par le 
délégué français sera évoqué presque mot à mot par Bratiano, le 22 février, 
devant la même commission. 
Laroche: «...La Commission ne doit pas se laisser impressionner par 
l'importance des majorités hongroises dans les villes. La nationalité n'a pas, en 
effet, autant d'importance à la ville qu'à la campagne.... On peut prévoir que 
dans les villes comme Nagy-Varad, qui deviendraient, si elles étaient attribuées 
à la Roumanie, des centres de commerce et d'industrie roumains, on rencontrerait 
bientôt plus de Magyars roumanisés qu'on n'y trouve actuellement de Roumains 
magyarisés». (Ibidem, pp. 321-322. Si la rectification des statistiques n'avait 
pas de poids, on utilisait ce genre d'arguments sans fondement.) 
Suite à la réunion du 19 février, celle du 22 est entièrement consacrée à 
l'exposé de Bratiano et aux réponses qu'il donne aux questions posées par le 
président. Le Président du conseil roumain, concernant les «fortes majorités 
magyares» dans les villes de Transylvanie, évoque les mêmes arguments que le 
délégué français, Laroche, servait devant la même Commission. Bratiano 
affirme que les Magyars des villes de Transylvanie, ayant une majorité magyare, 
n'ont pas autant d'importance que les villages. Ainsi, les Magyares des villes de 
Transylvanie s'assimileront plus vite aux Roumains ou ils quitteront la Rouma-
nie. 
M. Bratiano distingue, parmi la population magyare des villes, outre 
l'élément artificiel, fonctionnaires, militaires, bourgeois ou mêmes 
ouvriers maintenus par l'administration hongroise, et l'élément perma-
nent qui, par son travail, s'est créé des attaches solides dans le pays. M. 
Vaida-Voevod cite l'exemple de Kolozsvár ou plus de vingt institutions 
d'enseignement ont été concentrées en vue de la magyarisation. M. 
Bratiano déclare que le Gouvernement roumain compte faciliter la sortie 
de l'élément artificiel qu'il ne désire pas conserver et se montrer libéral, 
envers l'élément permanent dont l'assimilation sera l'oeuvre non pas de 
mesures administratives, mais du temps et de l'intérêt. (Ibidem, p. 347.) 
A l'occasion de la réunion de la même Commission, le 25 février, le 
président et les membres des délégations se trouvaient dans une situation 
embarrassante. C'était l'audience de la délégation serbe, laquelle conteste la 
prétention roumaine sur le Banat et considère le traité de Bucarest de 1916, 
lequel accordait à la Roumanie ce territoire, comme nul et non avenu. Les 
Serbes reprochent aux Alliés d'avoir promis le Banat aux Roumains comme butin 
de guerre. Dans la mesure où la Serbie n'obtiendrait pas gain de cause dans 
cette question, elle recourrait au plébiscite, aux principes wilsoniens. Pour 
évoquer l'ambiance entre Alliés, il est intéressant de reproduire un large extrait 
des reprochés et arguments servis par la délégation serbe, notés dans le procès-
verbal. 
M. Cvijitch estime que les cartes roumaines sont purement fantaisistes... 
M. Vesnitch ne peut cacher sa surprise de ce que la Serbie et la 
Roumanie, appelées à exposer leur différend devant la Commission, 
soient traitées sur le même pied. Or la Serbie a pris part à la guerre du 
premier au dernier jour sans jamais fléchir. La Roumanie après avoir 
choisi son heure et s'être fait garantir par le traité le prix de son inter-
vention... a conclu la paix avec l'ennemi.... Si les Grandes Puissances 
entendent considérer la Roumanie comme allié, la Serbie, que cette 
décision surprendrait fort, ne pourrait les suivre. En tous cas, elle ne 
peut reconnaître aucune valeur au traité d'alliance sur lequel les Rou-
mains s'appuient pour revendiquer le Banat... l'ambition démesurée des 
Roumains tire habilement parti. (Procès-verbal de la séance du 25 
février, Document no 198, pp. 355, 356 et 357.) 
Il convient de souligner avec insistance que tous les procès-verbaux des 
réunions des Commissions des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves comme celles 
des Affaires tchécoslovaques ont été classés sans numéro. 
L'attitude serbe laissait sous-entendre à la Commission que la Serbie, 
étant donné les largesses exagérées envers les Roumains, accepterait des com-
pensations ailleurs. Le procès-verbal indique que la délégation serbe revendique 
le Bacska jusqu'à la ligne de démarcation fixée par la convention de Belgrade du 
13 novembre 1918. Cependant la délégation serbe insiste que son gouvernement 
«pour le Bacska, où il se trouve en présence d'ennemi... ne se prêterait à cette 
consultation que si la Conférence décidait d'une manière générale de recourir à 
cette procédure pour résoudre les différends internationaux entre alliés et 
ennemis». (Ibidem, p. 357.) 
L'attitude de la Serbie est devenue gênante et menaçante, voire dangere-
use pour les Alliées d'autant plus que le gouvernement hongrois fondait tout 
espoir sur des principes solennellement déclarés par le président américain 
Wilson. En effet, les membres de la délégation américaine ont été disposés à 
accepter en premier, le principe du référendum ouvrant ainsi une brèche dange-
reuse dans l'unanimité de la Commission. Les Américains n'étaient pas parties 
prenantes dans le traité de Bucarest de 1916, d'une part, et les 14 points du 
président Wilson ont été en contradiction flagrante avec les clauses de ce traité 
secret, d'autre part. Lors de la séance du 2 mars, le délégué américain, le Dr 
Seymour, à propos du rattachement de Nagy-Károly et Szatmár-Németi, fait 
remarquer que «la proposition britannique ajouterait à la Roumanie 125 000 
Magyars et seulement 2 000 Roumains... il est impossible d'accepter le point de 
vue britannique». (Document no 204, p. 379.) 
En clair, la délégation serbe voulait faire savoir à la Commission que les 
largesses fantaisistes et sans bornes accordées à la Roumanie opportuniste 
devaient être également accordées à la Serbie qui a supporté, beaucoup plus que 
l'alliée roumaine incertaine, le fardeau de la guerre. 
Le lendemain, une conférence de la paix a été convoquée à la hâte, dont 
le rapport établissait les frontières entre la Hongrie et la Roumanie. (Document 
no 199, pp. 358-359.) Ce rapport sans numéro a été signé par les représentants 
en chef des délégations française, britannique, italienne et américaine. Malgré 
cela, la Commission des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves se réunira tout 
simplement pour justifier les nouvelles frontières ou les nouvelles «délimita-
tions» entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie. 
A l'occasion de la réunion de la Commission, le 28 février, le procès-
verbal atteste derechef le témoignage de partialité incontestable de la délégation 
française contre la Hongrie. 
M. Laroche (France) a été le premier à invoquer ce principe pour 
certaines villes de Transylvanie, où l'administration hongroise a créé 
artificiellement des majorités magyares... mais il conteste l'application à 
la Bacsl^a où les Serbes ont dû lutter contre l'administration hongroise... 
M. Laroche estime d'ailleurs... que la Commission ne doit pas, quel que 
soit son souci légitime d'impartialité, hésiter à faire pencher la balance 
du côté allié... M. Laroche est peu favorable à un arrangement qui ferait 
prendre pied aux Hongrois dans le Banat en introduisant ainsi l'ennemi 
entre deux alliées. (Document no 201, pp. 365-366.) 
Le délégué italien, De Martino, est d'avis que dans l'intérêt du règlement 
stable de la paix, les Alliés ne peuvent pas négliger les «considérations ethniques 
et économiques, voire stratégiques qui seraient vitales pour cette puissance» -
c'est-à-dire pour la Hongrie. Cependant, «la Délégation italienne, qui reste fidèle 
au traité de 1916, était disposée à donner à la Roumanie le Banat tout entier». 
(Ibidem, p. 367.) 
Étant donné le désaccord à propos des frontières hungaro-yougoslaves et 
yougoslavo-roumaines, mettant en jeu l'attribution de la ville de Szeged et de sa 
région, la séance est ajournée au 2 mars. 
Le 1er mars, Clemenceau, dans un télégramme secret (T.No.2138 BS/3 
Secret) au général Franchet d'Esperey, indique déjà les «limites» de la Roumanie, 
(Transylvanie, P.P.) et de la Hongrie lesquelles correspondent aux frontières 
tracées par la commission. (Document no 202, p. 369.) 
Clinchant, chargé d'affaires de France à Berne, dans une dépêche du 5 
mars expédiée à Pichon, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, annexe des 
documents originaux et attire l'attention du gouvernement français sur le non 
respect de l'armistice par les Alliées et sur la situation du gouvernement hon-
grois. 
Si dans les questions économiques les Alliés voulaient ne pas prêter 
l'oreille aux prétentions injustifiées des nationalités, le Gouvernement 
serait capable de maintenir un ordre parfait en Hongrie. Malheureuse-
ment, le'démembrement du pays, l'occupation des mines, l'interruption 
du trafic, et les difficultés de ravitaillement qui en résultent ont provo-
qué dan|s tout le pays de graves désordres politiques et économiques. 
D'autre part, l'amertume causée par l'attitude intransigeante des Alliés 
rend chaque jour plus difficile la situation du Gouvernement, de sorte 
que l'on peut craindre une explosion prochaine du Bolchévisme.... La 
convention d'armistice n'est aucunement respectée. Chacune des ses 
prescriptions est journellement violée par les Autorités occupantes, 
militaires et civiles. Le gouvernement Hongrois proteste chaque fois 
auprès de la Commission ministérielle d'armistice, mais ses protestations 
restent sans réponse.... Il suffira de citer ici quelques exemple. Je viens 
de recevoir le télégramme suivant: Jeno Sebo, Chef de gare de Lupony 
(Lupény) a été assommé à coup de bâtons par les Roumains. (No 
1766/1919 27 1.) 
D'après un rapport télégraphique, les Roumains, ont dans la houillère de 
Vulona, fusillé l'ingénieur Westhof et administré la bastonnade à l'ingénieur en 
chef Pécsi. (No 1771/1919 30 1.) 
Les Roumains font les déclarations les plus variées mais ils se con-
duisent, en réalité, comme s'ils étaient définitivement établis dans le pays. Nous 
pourrions multiplier les citations.... En ce qui concerne les revendications des 
divers États voisins, le Gouvernement Hongrois a accepté... la libre disposition 
des peuples. Il faut, par conséquent, donner à toutes les nations vivant sur le 
territoire de l'ancien Royaume de Hongrie la possibilité de faire usage de ce 
droit. (Document no 212, pp. 395-396-397.) 
Dans une dépêche du 10 mars de Budapest (Document no -7 Confi-
dentiel), le lieutenant-colonel Vix s'adresse au général de Lobit, commandant de 
l'armée de Hongrie, et précise que le 12 décembre 1918, lors de son séjour à 
Bucarest, le général en chef a «autorisé l'avance roumaine au-delà de la ligne 
d'armistice». Le 16 décembre... l'ordre était donné au général Berthelot de 
suspendre toute avance. Cet ordre n'aurait d'ailleurs été communiqué aux troupes 
roumaines qu'à la date du 24. Je ne sais si le Général Commandant l'A.F.O...» 
(A.F.O. a pris le nom de l'Armée de Hongrie dès le 1er mars 1919 sous le 
commandement du général de Lobit) «a été avisé de ces faits. En ce qui me 
concerne, je n'en ai jamais rien su». Le lieutenant-colonel informe le général 
qu'à son instigation, le gouvernement hongrois a accepté d'arrêter des principaux 
leaders bolchéviques. Il exprime l'avis selon lequel la moindre opération 
militaire hongroise aurait comme résultat de repousser l'armée roumaine en 
dehors de Transylvanie. (Document no 223, pp. 417-418.) 
Lors des séances de la Commission des affaires roumaines, yougoslaves 
et tchécoslovaques, les 11, 13 et 18 mars 1919, les procès-verbaux révèlent que 
les décisions définitives, comme le tracé des frontières, sont en train d'être 
rédigées. Fontenay, ministre à Belgrade, dans une dépêche du 18 mars a dressée 
au ministre français des Affaires étrangères, indique état d'esprit des «petits 
alliés». «Chacun de nos alliés, vainqueur ou ami des vainqueurs, escompte déjà 
les agrandissements, soit conquis et mérités, soit simplement promis et réclamés; 
chacun est impatient de s'installer dans ses nouvelles limites, on a annoncé que 
dans la sentence qui va être prononcée on ne tiendra compte que de la Justice...». 
(Document no 240, p. 461.) 
Puisque ces documents ont été rédigés en ne tenant compte «que de la 
Justice» avec une majuscule, le général de Lobit, commandant de l'armée de 
Hongrie, dans un télégramme secret, adressé au général Berthelot, dont copie a 
été expédiée simultanément au général Farret, commandant des troupes d'occu-
pation du Banat, au général de Gondrecourt à Arad, au lieutenant-colonel Vix à 
Budapest et aux chefs des 2e et 4e bureaux - (T. No 597/3 Secret) - les informe 
des scénarios à suivre. 
Priorité d'opérations: 1. Je vais présenter demain au Comte Karolyi une 
lettre lui signifiant les décisions du congrès de la paix....» (Document no 248, p. 
473.) En fait, il s'agit des décisions des Commissions des affaires roumaines, 
yougoslaves et tchécoslovaques dont celles-ci ne laissaient aucun doute sur le dé-
membrement de la Hongrie. La fameuse note de Vix a définitivement dissipé le 
peu d'espoir du gouvernement Károlyi sur les intentions des Alliés. Suite à la 
présentation de ce document, le lieutenant-colonel donne les .détails sur sa 
mission. (Document T.No 964/3S Budapest, 20 mars 1919). 
Primo: J'ai notifié la décision de la Conférence ce matin à 10 heures au 
Comte Karolyi, assisté de Mr. Berinkey, président du conseil et de Mr. 
Bohn (Bohm), ministre de la guerre. Le colonel anglais Baker, le 
commandant italien Pentimalli, le capitaine américain Roosevelt, le 
capitaine Ameil m'accompagnaient... Quinto: j'ai rompu le débat en 
rappelant que je demandais pour le 21 mars à 18 heures une réponse 
catégorique avec des garanties et que j'étais prêt d'ici là à régler toutes 
les questions de détail qui me seraient soumises par le Gouvernement 
hongrois. Sexto: Cet entretien a pris fin à 11 h 15. Conseil des 
Ministres se réunit ce soir. (Document no 249, p. 474.) 
Le 22 mars 1919, à 18 h., le ministre de France à Belgrade, Fontenay, 
adresse un télégramme à son ministre des Affaires étrangères Pichon, lui in-
diquant la démission du gouvernement Károlyi et la prise du pouvoir par les 
Bolcheviks en Hongrie. (Document T. nos 124-; 25. Très urgent). 
Un Gouvernement de soviet s'est alors constitué (et) le comte Károlyi a 
donné sa démission. Le Gouvernement des soviets a aussitôt déclaré la 
guerre aux (Yougo-Slaves), aux Roumains, aux Serbes.... Tout se serait 
passé sans (difficulté) si on se fût borné à demander l'occupation par les 
troupes françaises de toute la zone contestée.... La faute a été de 
vouloir qu'à l'abri du rideau de nos troupes, les Roumains s'emparent de 
toute cette (immense) région avant que la Conférence n'ait prononcé sa 
sentence. (Document no 250, p. 475.) 
Le général de Lobit, commandant de l'armée de Hongrie, dans une 
dépêche de Belgrade du 24 mars, adressée au lieutenant-colonel Vix, en connais-
sance de la lettre de démission de Károlyi, commente l'événement en ces termes: 
«Cette décision se trouve en pleine contradiction avec la convention militaire 
d'armistice du 13 novembre 1918 et ne respectant pas les intérêt vitaux du pays 
(Hongrie, P.P.), elle pourrait entraver le développement et troubler la Paix. Le 
Gouvernement Hongrois qui n'était pas invité à la conférence de la Paix et ne 
pouvait prêter son concours à la décision se vit obligé de donner aujourd'hui sa 
démission». (Document no 266, p. 489.) 
Le gouvernement démissionnaire libère les leaders bolcheviks de prison et 
ceux-ci proclament aussitôt l'avènement de la République des Conseils de 
Hongrie invitant la Russie révolutionnaire à les soutenir. Dans une dépêche 
(D.No 132) du 24 mars, le ministre Fontenay, en poste à Belgrade, fait savoir au 
ministre des Affaires étrangères, Pichon, que «Béla Kun salue Lénine comme 
chef du Prolétariat international, lui demande une alliance offensive et défensive 
avec le Gouvernement des Soviets et lui annonce que l'Entente en voulant 
intervenir en faveur des ambitions territoriales roumaines a provoquée la révolte 
en Hongrie... ce qui.parut insupportable, ce fut l'agrandissement roumain à l'abri 
du rideau formé par nos lignes...». (Document no 262, p. 486.) 
Dans un aide-mémoire du même jour, remis au prince Borghese, envoyé 
spécial italien, le Commissaire de peuple aux affaires étrangères de la Républi-
que des Conseils de Hongrie, Béla Kun, réitère l'attitude non seulement de son 
gouvernement mais aussi celle du précédent. «Le gouvernement de la République 
des Conseils de Hongrie se déclare prêt à négocier les questions territoriales sur 
la base du principe du droit de l'auto-détermination des peuples et il interprète 
l'intégrité territoriale uniquement en conformité de ce principe». (Document no 
268, p. 492.) 
Dans cette situation, les représentants des nationalités, Roumains, Serbes 
et Tchécoslovaques, demandent d'établir les frontières définitives aussi vite que 
possible. Ainsi, par des notes adressées à Clemenceau le 25 mars, Kramer, 
président du Conseil et Benes, ministre des Affaires étrangères tchécoslovaque 
demandent de «tracer la ligne de démarcation qui serait celle qui a été décidée 
par la Commission territoriale de sorte que nous puissions la considérer comme 
la ligne de démarcation définitive». (Document no 275, p. 497.) 
Ce document confirme en même temps l'interprétation unilatérale des 
termes du traité de Belgrade du 13 novembre où «ligne de démarcation» était 
entendue comme frontière définitive entre la Hongrie et les Etats successeurs. 
Le lieutenant-colonel Vix, par contre, avait comme mission de faire croire au 
gouvernement de Károlyi qu'il s'agissait bel et bien des «limites» provisoires 
r 
susceptibles d'éviter l'affrontement entre les Magyars et les nationalités. En 
outre, l'avènement du bolchevisme en Hongrie jouait carrément en faveur de 
l'annexion des territoires promis au nom de la lutte contre le bolchevisme. Une 
autre dépêche de Benès à Pichon, ministre français des Affaires étrangères, le 26 
mars, insiste «qu'il est absolument nécessaire» de le faire en vue de combattre le 
bolchevisme en Hongrie, d'empêcher son extension dans les pays limitrophes et 
de protéger les populations non magyares. (Cf. Document no 277, p. 500.) 
Du 31 mars au 1er avril, le lieutenant-colonel Vix expédie au général de 
Lobit, commandant de l'armée de Hongrie, les comptes rendus, suivant la 
chronologie des événements. Le compte-rendu no 4 est révélateur dans l'expli-
cation de l'avènement du bolchevisme par le témoin français le plus renseigné. 
La crise nationale est plus grave. Elle intéresse l'ensemble de la nation 
hongroise. Les abus commis par les Alliés surtout par les Roumains 
depuis décembre, n'ont fait que s'aggraver.... La notification de la 
décision des Alliés, décision qui comporte une nouvelle avance des 
roumains, eut l'effet d'une catastrophe.... L'annexion brutale des deux 
tiers de la Hongrie, au profit de nos Alliés Serbes, Roumains et Tchè-
ques rencontrera dans tous les partis des adversaires irréductibles. Il 
n'est pas un qui puisse accepter de sang froid un pareil morcellement du 
pays.... Il n'est pas douteux que les Hongrois accepteront plus facile-
ment le sort qu'il leur est réservé si les annexions faites à leur détriment 
pouvaient être précédés d'un plébiscite et si l'Entente consentait à 
recevoir une délégation de personnalités qualifiées pour le renseigner et 
pour discuter au point de vue technique les différentes questions qui 
intéressent le pays (questions ethniques, économiques, financières, 
questions des Seklers, etc...) (Document no 298. p. 531.) 
Etant donné que tout était déjà décidé dès le début, les rapports présentés 
au Conseil suprême des Alliés par les Commissions des affaires roumaines, 
serbes et tchécoslovaques définissent les frontières de la Hongrie conformément 
aux procès-verbaux et aux délibérations antérieures. En outre, les projets 
d'articles à insérer dans les préliminaires de paix avec la Hongrie régissent, entre 
autres, la nationalité. Les actes commis par les armées roumaine, serbe, tchèque 
ou par les bandes armées, dès la fin de la guerre, avaient provoqué la fuite d'une 
partie de la population en particulier de Transylvanie. Ce procédé de nettoyage 
ethnique, décrit par le romancier hongrois Dezső Szabó dans «Le village à la 
dérive», a été complété par les Alliés. 
L'article 4, concernant la citoyenneté roumaine stipule: «...les ressortis-
sants hongrois qui se seraient établis sur ces territoires postérieurement au 1er 
janvier 1910 ne pourraient acquérir la nationalité roumaine qu'avec une autoris-
ation de l'État roumain». (Document no 323, p. 581.) Les articles concernant 
les Magyars des territoires cédés à la Serbie et à la Tchécoslovaquie contiennent 
des mesures implicites a"ifaisant ces États à pratiquer, dans les faits, des 
politiques discriminatoires envers ces citoyens de seconde zone ou candidats à 
l'expulsion. Les statistiques falsifiées présentées (Annexe III) par le même 
document reflètent l'attitude des commissions. (Cf. Ibidem, p. 580.) 
Il est utile de confronter ces données avec le compte rendu du 2e bureau 
de l'état-major de l'armée, (Document C.-R., no 1870. Confidentiel, Prague, le 
17 juin 1919) dont la copie a été envoyée au ministre des Affaires étrangères et 
au maréchal Foch. 
La Slovaquie se trouve actuellement presque entièrement envahie par les 
Magyars. Il est intéressant de noter que la population, au lieu d'opposer 
une résistance aide les Hongrois contre les Tchèques.... Le mouvement 
Slovaque hostile aux Tchèques grandit de jour en jour.... Si les Slova-
ques ne veulent plus de l'impérialisme tchèque, et ces faits peuvent être 
facilement contrôlés, en dépit des mensonges de Masaryk, Kramarcz 
(Kramar) et Benes, que vaut la puissance trop élargie de ce petit peuple 
trop orgueilleux, mégalomane au suprême degré, qui veut avoir un 
mandat sur tout le monde slave? Devant ces faits, que vaut la carte 
géographique dressée à Paris où les Tchèques doivent faire jonction 
avec les Roumains et la future Russie, puisque le plus important Chaîn-
on intermédiaire, le Slovaque, se révolte déjà? Ici apparaît encore une 
fois la faillite du principe accordant trop de confiance aux comités dits 
Nationaux, dont la seule raison d'être fut de mentir.... (Document no 
437, p. 702.) 
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Fall, 1995) 
Budapest and New York Compared 
Bela Bodo 
Thomas Bender and Carl E. Schorske, editors. Budapest and New York: Studies 
in Metropolitan Transformation, 1870-1930. New York: Russell Sage Founda-
tion, 1994. Pp. xiv, 400. 
This book is a result of close cooperation between American and Hungarian 
historians. The idea of writing a comparative history of New York and Budapest 
emerged in the late seventies, when decreasing political tension made scholarly 
exchanges possible. Most of the Hungarian historians who contributed to the 
book had been already established scholars by that time. On the American side, 
except for Carl E. Schorske, the writers are members of the 'revisionist' school: 
they started their academic careers in the early 1970s. Thus, proximity in age 
and ethnic ties fostered by prominent emigre scholars prepared the ground for 
cooperation. Academic politics played an important role as well. Indeed, the 
book would have not been possible without the sharing of certain political ideas. 
The American contributors describe themselves as members of a genera-
tion who turned against the consensus school of American historiography. Their 
main experience was the Vietnam War, which, at least temporarily, destroyed 
much of the nationalist arrogance and self-righteousness that had permeated 
American foreign policy and academic discourse after the Second World War. 
Material interests, such as the need to secure employment after graduation and to 
create a distinct profile in the profession, played a role in the generational revolt 
as well. Shocked by the carnage of the war, these young scholars increasingly 
turned their attention to the Third World and, to lesser extent, the Communist 
states. They argued that detente should be extended onto the field of scholarly 
production; works dealing with the history and culture of these parts of the world 
should be based upon ideas such as coexistence, cooperation and mutual under-
standing. Thus, the rejection of the Cold War fostered sympathy for the more 
enlightened and liberal members of the political and cultural elite in Eastern 
Europe. The result of this rapprochement was rather curious. By cooperating 
with the liberal members of the elite, whose legitimacy was at best suspect in 
the eyes of the ruled, many American scholars came to defend willy-nilly the 
existence of Communist regimes. The Communist elite were also apt to use 
these relations to legitimize their power. We have to emphasize, however, that 
there was no conspiracy behind the sympathy of American liberals for the reform 
Communists. The reasons for this sympathy were more mundane. First, 
American intellectuals always had a very narrow understanding of the people of 
Central and Eastern Europe. As part of their Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage, 
many of them still considered Eastern Europeans unfit for Western culture or 
democracy. The alliance of many of the small nations in Central and Eastern 
Europe with Nazi Germany and the implication of the elite and indeed a signifi-
cant part of the population in the Holocaust only re-enforced these negative 
emotions. Secondly, as children of the American enlightenment, scholars on this 
side of the Atlantic never fully understood the political and cultural traditions of 
this region. They viewed romantic nationalism, Christian Socialism and popu-
lism with suspicion and often misinterpreted these political movements as fascist. 
American intellectuals could communicate more easily with reform Communists 
since they, at least on the surface, used the language of the enlightenment. 
Secondly, members of the American political and cultural elite had the tendency 
of seeing the world in the dichotomy of left and right. They hardly realized that 
these categories did not automatically apply to other cultures. Mistaking the 
Communists as members of the left, many American liberals reasoned that the 
enemy of their opponents could easily become their friends. This logic suffered 
from the obvious weakness that even the reform Communists sought to preserve 
one of the most dysfunctional political systems in history. Thus, the American 
left allied themselves with people who were in fact conservative. This was a 
strange, although rather harmless, alliance not dissimilar to the good relations 
between American conservatives and military dictators in the Third World. 
Unfortunately we know very little about the cultural and political odyssey 
of Hungarian historians. The book, however, suggests at least two myths about 
theix professional careers during the Kadar regime. One is the idea that 
members of the historical profession have helped to maintain, and thus have an 
exclusive claim to, the progressive intellectual tradition of the turn of the 
century. Second is the belief that, in the 1960s, Hungarian historians broke 
completely with the dogmatic Marxism of their predecessors and embraced the 
neo-positivist "New Histories" of the West. The reality must have been more 
complex. First, there is no direct line of continuity between the works of these 
scholars and the progressive writers of the turn of the century: to my knowledge, 
no surviving giant of Nyugat generation, for example, saw the historians of the 
Kadar regime as the guardians of the progressive intellectual tradition. Secondly, 
the progressives had defined their identities against the state and its official 
culture. They were influenced by the highly erotic Secession movement and the 
voluntarist and revolutionary avant-garde. Thirdly, the progressive movement in 
Hungary did not follow any official lines. Apart from the shared revulsion 
against the semi-feudal social and political system, there was very little that kept 
this movement together. Very few among these progressives, including those 
who participated in, or at least sympathized with, the revolution of 1918 and the 
Soviet Republic a year later, ended up in the Communist camp. 
After 1948, Hungarian historical profession became rapidly integrated 
into the Moscow school. For Erzsebeth Andics, Jozsef Revai, Emma Lederer 
and others, history merely provided the opportunity to demonstrate the eternal 
validity of political directives and simplified philosophical ideas. However, 
writers who contributed to the book under review here, belong not the first but 
the second generation of historians. They reached adulthood in the Stalinist 
1950s and began their careers under the tutelage of turn-coat liberal or Stalinist 
intellectuals in the 1960s. It could not have been otherwise, since the profession 
had been completely purged in the previous two decades. It is a telling sign 
about the selection of these future scholars that they, unlike the progressives at 
the turn of the century or their American colleagues in the 1960s, never turned 
openly against their predecessors. There was no student revolt in Hungary in the 
1960s; not the Vietnam War but the crushing of the Czech rebellion in 1968 was 
these scholars' most important formative experience. As a result of their careful 
selection and intellectual conformity, Hungarian historians never dared to 
challenge the official culture as directly as did their American counterparts. 
While American scholars prided themselves on their opposition to the official 
political culture, the way to success in Hungary required excellent political 
instincts and a high degree of adaptability to the ideology and political practice 
of regime. Hungary's historians of the Kadar era knew that their careers had 
been built on the ruins of the professional and private lives of the pre-Commu-
nist generation; they were aware that their position depended upon their useful-
ness to the regime. They knew that they had to defend the system and suppress 
democratic impulses and rebellious inclinations. Thus, the argument in the book 
that these historians "turned away from Marxism in all its forms" is dishonest. 
It would be very easy to show that in methodology, language and, especially, in 
political behaviour, the followers of the "New History" did not break with the 
official Eastern European historiography at least until the 1980s. Moreover, 
there is nothing wrong with Marxist history if it is pursued with intellectual 
integrity. The argument that the historians in question learned exclusively from 
the West, distorts the basic reality of the profession in Hungary in the 1960s and 
1970s.. Hungarian intellectual life, with the possible exception of literature, 
could not recover from the cultural devastation of a lost war and an unsuccessful 
revolution. A deeply anti-intellectual regime destroyed the social sciences and 
prevented their revival through political intimidation, lack of funding and careful 
selection of conformist scholars. As a result, the state of the Hungarian histori-
cal profession became characterized by provincialism and conformity. Only a 
few historians, many but not all of them members of the old generation, could 
rise above the suffocating intellectual climate of the Kadar years. These tenta-
tive arguments do not want to paint a completely negative picture. A sense of 
justice and intellectual curiosity led a few members of this generation to break 
with their own past. I would even arpue that the past is perhaps less important 
than the present or the future for Hungarian historians. Unlike in East Germany, 
the historical profession in Hungary was not purged after the collapse of the 
Communist regime in 1989. The majority of Hungarian scholars have main-
tained and indeed increased their influence in the last few years. They are still 
productive and enjoy respect as authors and teachers. For the lack of a viable 
alternative, they are the best placed to represent the Hungarian social sciences 
abroad and pave the way for a new generation of historians at home. 
The book has five parts, each discussing various aspects of social, 
political and cultural life in Budapest and New York between 1880 and 1945. 
The first part deals with political ideology and participation. In an informative 
essay, Zsuzsa L. Nagy examines the fate of urban progressivism under the tenure 
of Istvan Barczy, as mayor, before the outbreak of the First World War. In 
contrast to its American counterpart, she argues, urban progressivism in Budapest 
was represented by a few politicians elected on a very restricted franchise. The 
other important characteristic of this municipal system was virilism, which 
implied that payers of higher taxes enjoyed special privileges. Influential 
members of the German ethnic and the Jewish religious minorities played a 
prominent role in municipal politics before 1918. The position of minorities 
changed for the worse after the unsuccessful 1918-1919 revolutions. Following 
World War I, even Germans found it prudent to be discrete about their ethnicity. 
As a result of the counter-revolution, no Jew could hold municipal office in 
Budapest between the wars. The abolition of the system of virilism during the 
Bethlen administration in the early 1920s only strengthened the conservative 
gentry's hold on the city and the state. Liberalism in Budapest was also dealt a 
mortal blow in 1918. Even earlier, however, there were telling signs that 
liberalism in Hungary could not adapt itself to the age of nationalism and mass 
politics. Many of the progressives and socialists either emigrated after the 
revolutions of 1918 and 1919 or joined the radical, socialist and populist groups 
between the wars. Yet, though Nagy's essay is objective to the point of dryness, 
it lacks a clear focus. In my opinion, the economic and social developments of 
Budapest should have been the subject of a second essay. More should have 
been said about various movements and parties, such as the Social Democratic 
Party, which exerted considerable influence over the political life of the city in 
this period. 
David C. Hammack paints a very different picture of New York at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Between 1870 and 1930 the city not only under-
went an incredible expansion but its character was also transformed: in this 
period, New York turned from a mercantile city into the centre of America's 
new manufacturing corporations. The ethnic composition of the city changed as 
new ethnic groups from Eastern and Southern Europe left their mark on the 
city's political culture. In New York, the federal government never had a strong 
influence over the municipal administration; its hold actually weakened after 
1880. Loose ties to the federal government and the countryside allowed the 
development of strong local identities. The political elite in the city came to be 
dominated by a new merchant class at the expense of the old patricians. The 
members of the new elite identified with the urban progressive movement on 
social and political issues. They openly catered to the ethnic vote. Hammack 
argues that in New York ethnicity rather than class or ideology determined the 
loyalty of voting groups. The corrupt political machine fulfilled a useful 
function: it opened access to the political arena and helped to integrate individu-
als and ethnic groups into a democratic political culture. In New York, liberal-
ism addressed itself to the pressing social and political problems of the day. The 
association of progressivism with liberalism ensured the survival of the nine-
teenth century liberal tradition — liberalism grew into democracy. On the 
whole, Hammack paints a rather flattering picture of New York politics. Recent 
literature, however, questions the social and political character of the progressive 
movement. Many historians discern a conservative trend in both the urban and 
the rural wing of this movement. Some, such as Gabriel Kolko, go so far as to 
argue that the intellectual and social climate remained conservative in the United 
States in this period. Moreover, a parallel reading of the two essays leaves the 
false impression that Budapest failed to conform to the pattern set by dynamic 
cities such as New York. In fact, municipal politics in Budapest was far from 
unique. The decline of liberalism was a general European development. The 
other great cities of the Habsburg Empire, such as Vienna and Prague, experi-
enced a similar trend. If anything, the survival of liberalism was an American, 
or at best a French and Anglo-Saxon, phenomenon. 
The second part of the book deals with the expansion of public spaces in 
the two cities. On the Hungarian side, Gabor Gyani examines the original ideas 
of Christian Heinrich Nebbien, who planned Budapest's largest park, the Varos-
liget, in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Varosliget was created as a 
tribute to the nation. It was a national monument, where important national 
events, such as the Millennial Exhibition of 1896, was held. Gyani argues that 
in Budapest the occupation of spaces in parks and other public areas by various 
groups reinforced rather than blurred cultural and social differences. Parks such 
as the Varosmajor and the Nepliget became appropriated by the workers, while 
the Margitsziget (Margit Island) and the Dunakorzo (Danube Walk) were 
frequented mainly by the middle and the upper classes. Even in places such as 
the Varosliget, which was open to all classes, different parts of the park were 
occupied by different social groups. The appropriation and division of public 
space took place without serious challenges either from the lower or the middle 
and upper classes. Instead of parks, streets leading to the city centre became 
contested areas during turbulent events such as the annual May Day parades. 
Finally Gyanyi describes the topography of the "Bloody-Red Thursday" on 23 
May 1912. He relates the revolt to similar European events such as the Paris 
Commune and riots in Italy, where workers, like their Budapest counterparts, 
first attempted to conquer the city, and then having failed to do that, returned to 
their residential areas to defend themselves. 
While Gabor Gyani examines the intentions of the planners of the 
Varosliget, Elizabeth Blackmar and Roy Rosenzweig highlight the social con-
flicts that developed in Central Park in New York. Unlike the Varosliget, which 
was a national monument, Central Park was envisaged as a refuge from the 
hurly-burly of city life; it was to offer an alternative to commercial culture and 
entertainment. The designer of the park, Frederick Law Olmsted, created a rigid 
set of rules that served to enforce respectable behaviour in the park. The 
location of the park and the exclusion of a group of activities such as picnicking, 
gambling, hawking and peddling — activities that had been traditionally associ-
ated with the lifestyle of the lower-middle and working classes — ensured that 
Central Park preserved its middle-class character in the first decades after its 
creation in 1859. However, this character became increasingly challenged by the 
end of the 1870s. The rapid expansion of New York's boundaries, improved 
transportation, influx of a new group of immigrants from Eastern and Southern 
Europe, shorter working hours and rising wages made the park accessible at least 
on Sundays to the lower orders. The unrelenting campaign by religious, ethnic 
and working class organizations to democratize access to, and use of the park, 
finally proved successful. Under immense popular pressure, the Democratic city 
administration gradually relaxed the park rules after 1870. By the turn of the 
century, the rigid spatial boundaries between social classes were broken down 
and the park became an experimental field of, and indeed, a tribute to democ-
racy. The two essays make very enjoyable reading and greatly promote our 
understanding of the development and use of public space before the outbreak of 
the First World War. Methodologically, Elizabeth Blackmar's and Roy Rosen-
zweig's essay follows a more modern approach by emphasizing the users' rather 
than the planners' point of view. Gyani's work, one the other hand, makes more 
use of comparative history and places the use of public spaces in Budapest into 
a general European context. 
The book's third section discusses the role of ethnicity. Deborah Dash 
Moore shows that in New York neighbourhoods were defined by their ever 
changing ethnic composition. Ethnicity also played an important role in the 
city's economy. Many immigrants were employed in ethnic businesses; other 
obtained their jobs in local factories and businesses thanks to their national 
connections. Ethnic groups tended to carve out a place in the job market until 
they made up the majority of owners and workers in certain industries and 
trades. The city also adapted itself to the different consumption patterns of 
various immigrant groups. Moore demonstrates, for example, that the construc-
tion of houses catered to the different expectations of Finns, Germans, Italians 
and Jews. Unlike New York, Budapest did not tolerate ethnic differences in 
residence, employment and consumption. Istvan Teplan argues that the building 
style of the family houses in the St. Imre City in the outskirts of Budapest 
reflected the social conservatism and nationalism of their immigrant inhabitants 
rather than their geographical origins. Perhaps more than any other pair of 
essays, the reader can recognize important differences in the approach to social 
history between Hungarian and American scholars. While Moore's essay flows 
well, Teplan often breaks the continuity of the essay with statistics and refer-
ences. In my opinion, these should be placed in the footnotes. Moreover, 
references to authors such as Umberto Eco and Roland Barthes distract attention 
from the main line of the story. Generally they serve no useful purpose aside 
from demonstrating the author's erudition. Moore, on the other hand, strives for 
simplicity and clarity both in organization and expression. While she pays 
adequate attention to the Jewish part of the story, perhaps more examples from 
other, incidentally well researched, communities, such as the Italian or the Irish, 
would have helped the general reader to understand better the diversity and 
ethnic changes in New York. 
The fourth part of the book deals with popular culture in the two cities. 
Robert W. Snyder explains how vaudeville served to integrate New Yorkers of 
different ethnicity and class into consumers of popular culture. This form of 
entertainment was rooted in particularized ethnic communities. Vaudeville 
performers such as Eddie Cantor, Belle Baker and Sophie Tucker began their 
careers in ethnic theatres. The gradual assimilation of the performers and the 
adaptation of their shows to the taste of a multi-ethnic audience turned these 
actors and their shows into agents of cultural integration. Neil Harris' chapter 
attributes the same integrating role to the press. Popular dailies cfeated a unified 
consumer market that tied the population of the city together though gossips, 
scandals, puzzles and popularized political events. On the Hungarian side, Peter 
Hanak shows how operetta fulfilled the same role in the multi-ethnic Habsburg 
Empire. Although the nationalities could hardly agree upon anything, their 
shared indulgence in the music of Strauss, Broch, Lehar and Kalman fostered a 
common cultural identity in the region. As Geza Buzinkay explains, comic 
weeklies played on the ethnic prejudices of their readers as well. Yet the mainly 
anti-Jewish jokes lost their appeal to the mainly Jewish editors as anti-Semitism 
became a dangerous political force after 1918. Buzinkay also shows how 
Yiddish and German jokes found their ways into Hungarian culture. Yet my 
impression is that the description of Budapest jokes as mere adaptations of 
German-Yiddish jokes is overdrawn. Even as foreign products, these jokes 
underwent an important transformation during translation. Linguistic and 
cultural environment made them Hungarian in the same way as German and 
French words and expressions had become integral parts of the Hungarian 
language and culture a century earlier. Secondly, the emphasis on the weeklies 
and their mainly lower middle-class readers omits the fact that the majority of 
the city's inhabitants were still workers. In Budapest, like other great cities such 
as Berlin and Paris, workers and artisans left an indelible mark on popular 
culture. Peter Eszterhazy's works show the survival of this tradition today. On 
the American side, I feel that the statement that "nothing was more American 
than being ethnic" reflects more the consensus on the benefits of multicultural-
ism in the 1980s than the cultural reality at the turn of the century. New York 
in the 1890s was not the city of today; as the recent election campaign has 
shown, America, including New York, is still rife with anti-immigrant senti-
ments. Apart from politics, where American nativism and racism manifested 
itself in the terror of the Ku Klux Klan, restrictive immigration laws, open 
discrimination of the job market, and the shameful treatment of Indians and 
African-Americans, immigrants had little reason to feel at home in New York. 
A better description of immigrants' feeling can be found in literary works such 
as the classical novel by Carlo Levi. In Christ Stopped at Eboli, Italian immi-
grants regularly escaped from the city to the countryside. Integration for these 
people meant a loss of identity, conflict between generations, and inevitable 
assimilation. The agents of this process were not only popular culture but 
schools, hospitals, police and, later, the army. 
The book also discusses genres of high culture such as painting and 
literature. In one of the best-written essays, Wanda M. Corn explains the 
transformation of New York painting under the impact of the avant-garde. Until 
the first decade of the twentieth century, Americans used visual techniques 
borrowed from the painting of natural scenes to capture the dynamism of the 
city. Skyscrapers functioned as majestic mountains, whose height and graceful 
immobility only emphasized the faceless character of traffic and vitality of the 
masses in motion bellow. These techniques changed, however, before the 
outbreak of the First World War. Nature disappeared and the urban vision of 
New York was reduced to a few motives symbolizing modernity. Greater ab-
straction, expressionism and the distortion of space came to suggest power, 
virility, energy — the same attributes that painters and writers sought to project 
about America. As Eva Forgacs demonstrates, however, modern painters in 
Budapest did not use the capital city as the symbol of modernity. Instead, they 
tried to discover their Hungariannes in the simplicity and purity of the country-
side. Moreover, many of the progressive painters who did pay some attention to 
the modernity of Budapest were forced to emigrate after 1919. The question is 
how special were Hungarian painters in this regard? Was the abandonment of 
the city by its painters and writers a regression and a sign of backwardness as 
Forgacs' essay suggests? Indeed, other cities such as Vienna and Prague were 
hardly ever used as symbols of modernity. The development of visual symbols 
that equated New York with the essence of modernity was the result of what 
could be coined as an "American ideology." This ideology signalled a break 
with the European tradition that had sought timeless perfection not in isolation 
but through constant references to the great achievements of the past. 
Philip Fisher's essay shows a similar trend in literature. Naturalism, 
which was an international phenomenon, helped American writers to define the 
distinctiveness of New York from other cities and the countryside. As with the 
press, Fisher argues, literature served to transcend ethnic boundaries and create a 
democratic urban culture. On the Hungarian side, Miklos Lacko paints a rather 
unflattering picture of Hungarian writers and poets at the turn of the century. In 
his interpretation, Hungarian writers made little use of urban dialect and rarely 
turned to the social problems of the city. With the possible exception of Ferenc 
Molnar's novels, the city is portrayed as an unfriendly and alien place. Lacko 
argues that Hungarian writers continued to draw too much upon the vernacular 
of the peasantry. They remained preoccupied with the national question; individ-
ual modernism hardly found an authentic voice in Hungary. I am not sure how 
special Hungary was in this respect. German writers of the period, Thomas 
Mann for example, were equally interested in the social and national questions of 
the day. It is equally mistaken to describe Endre Ady, Mihaly Babits, Dezso 
Kosztolanyi and Arpad Toth as newcomers to city culture. These writers 
transcended not only the cultural barriers between Budapest and the countryside 
but they also modernized Hungarian language and raised Hungary's literature to 
a European level. In my opinion, the fashionable Hungarian view that the 
country's literature could never escape the prison of nationalism and provincial-
ism is highly overdue for revision. Too much self-hatred is contained in this 
sentiment; if anything it was Hungarian literature and music, rather than the 
social sciences that formulated and answered questions of universal relevance. 
Budapest and New York contains excellent essays from several prominent 
American and Hungarian historians. By complementing the similar works by 
Peter Hanak1 and John Lukacs,2 this book gives an additional impetus to 
- research into Hungarian social history. It also broadens the horizon of the 
reading public on both sides of the Atlantic. By comparing Budapest with one 
of the metropolises of the world, the book raises the status of the Hungarian 
capital and stirs interest among the American public in the history and culture of 
a remote part of the world. Despite these merits, however, I think that the book 
makes for poor comparative history. The book concentrated too much on 
politics and culture. At least two essays should have been devoted exclusively 
to economic and social developments. The essays hardly ever refer to each 
other; the introduction by Carl E. Schorske and Thomas Bender describes but 
does not analyze the similarities and differences between the cities. Moreover, 
there are very few similarities between Budapest and New York; in fact, there is 
virtually no single factor that was shared exclusively by these two cities. In the 
case of New York, a comparison with London or Montreal would have yielded 
more rewards. Similarly, a comparison of Budapest with Prague, Dresden, 
Vienna and Belgrade would probably be more fruitful. Nevertheless, both as a 
feat of international cooperation and a stimulus for further research, the book 
deserves the highest praise. 
' Hanak Peter, A Kerl es a Miihely. Budapest, Gondolal. 1988. 
2
 John Lukacs, Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture. New York, 
1988. 
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In English-language historiography, historical dictionaries, lexicons, and 
encyclopedias are available in scores and even hundreds on almost every topic or 
sub-topic of history, and on most parts of the world. In contrast, Hungarian 
historical writing has never placed too much emphasis on producing historical 
encyclopedias and dictionaries. Thus, outside of basic multivolume encyclopedias 
(e.g. A Pallas Nagy Lexikona, Revai Nagy Lexikona, Uj Idok Lexikona, Uj Magyar 
Lexikon, etc.) and various biographical dictionaries (e.g. Szinnyey's Magyar Irok, 
Gulyas's Magyar Irok, Irodalmi Lexikon, Magyar Irodalmi Lexikon, Magyar 
Eletrajzi Lexikon, Uj Magyar Irodalmi Lexikon, etc.), historians have no 
encyclopedia-like works to turn to for ready reference concerning their discipline. 
This is all the more unusual, as during the past three decades the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences has published numerous one- and multivolume lexicons and 
encyclopedias on such diverse subjects as philosophy, music, world literature, 
ethnography, art, and even on the city of Budapest. Historians, however, are 
forced to consult basic histories and multivolume historical syntheses in order to 
locate the needed pieces of information, even though finding them in such works 
is much more cumbersome and difficult than locating them in historical lexicons. 
The appearance of the volume under review has now eliminated some of these 
problems, especially with respect to medieval Hungarian history. 
The Early Hungarian Historical Lexicon is indeed an impressive volume. 
It must have been a formidable undertaking to accomplish, even though the 
original intentions of the editors were not fully realized. As revealed by 
Editor-in-Chief, Gyula Kristo, in his preface to the volume, their original goal was 
to produce a multivolume historical encyclopedia on the period stretching from the 
Hunnic invasions of the 4th-5th centuries to the end of the Anjous and the rise of 
the Luxemburgs to the Hungarian throne. 
Initiated in the early 1980s, the early results of this project were 
incorporated into a small booklet that was published in 1987 and contained 
twenty-six articles. But then, having come to the conclusion that they lacked the 
needed manpower and the necessary funds to carry the project to its logical 
conclusion, the editors decided to salvage it by preparing a more limited one-
volume work on the period between ca. 800 A.D. and the late 14th century. They 
did this by utilizing the already existing articles, complementing them with many 
shorter ones, and then turning the projected "encyclopedia" into a "lexikon" — 
even though many of the enclosed entries remained sufficiently extensive and 
detailed to qualify as encyclopedia articles. Thus, although called a "historical 
lexicon," the final product is really a kind of half-lexicon and half-encyclopedia. 
Yet, whatever one calls it, the Early Hungarian Historical Lexicon is an 
impressive work that is bound to make its mark upon the study and research of 
medieval Hungarian history. 
It is a large, folio-size volume of 755 pages, with double columns, which, 
if reduced to the normal size, would make a book of about 1500 pages. It 
contains over 2,000 articles, written by 170 scholars, most of whom — but not all 
— are Hungarians from Hungary. Those from abroad with the exception of Juan 
Cabello — are all Hungarians from the surrounding states that used to be part of 
Historic Hungary and thus have large Hungarian minorities. It is lamentable — 
and this is one of the shortcomings of the volume — that the work is virtually 
devoid of contributions by Western scholars, even of ex-Hungarians who are 
working and writing in one of the many European or American institutions of 
higher learning and research. Thus, the list of contributors does not contain the 
names of such well known Hungarian medievalists abroad as those of Janos M. 
Bak, Imre Boba, Thomas von Bogyay, Leslie S. Domonkos, Astrik L. Gabriel, 
Denis Sinor, and Szabolcs de Vajay — not to speak of a number real American, 
German, French, British, and Japanese (i.e. Toru Senga) historians, who could 
have contributed to the volume. This is lamentable indeed, for the presence of 
these foreign and ex-Hungarian scholars could have added some international 
flavour to this unusually useful and needed work. 
In conjunction with the 170 collaborators, it should also be pointed out that 
the list lacks not only some noted Western scholars, but also several well-known 
Hungarian scholars from Hungary and Transylvania, who normally should have 
been included. These include such well known scholars of medieval history as 
Antal Bartha, Karoly Czegledy, Gyorgy Gyorffy, Zsigmond Jako, Gyorgy Szekely, 
and perhaps a few others. We can only presume that some of them were elimi-
nated by politics (i.e. Jako of Transylvania), while others are absent as a result of 
the well-known antagonism and scholarly rivalry between Hungary's two important 
centres of medieval studies: Szeged and Budapest. 
Although lacking an international flavour, and missing some prominent 
Hungarian contributors, the Early Hungarian Historical Lexikon is not a provincial 
work. It is rather a very impressive volume that sweeps through the whole region 
of Central and Eastern Europe, and occasionally even Western Europe, Near East, 
and Inner Asia. It concentrates on the Magyars and on Historic Hungary, but it 
also covers all of the surrounding areas, countries, provinces, and peoples who 
have interacted with the Magyars. Thus, in addition to extensive essays on the 
region's current and former nationalities and ethnic groups — such as the Alans, 
Arabs, Austrians, Avars, Bashkirs, Blaks [Vlachs], Bolgar-Turks, Bosnians, 
Bulgarians, Byzantines, Chuvas, Croats, Cumans, Czechs, East Franks, Eskils, 
Germans, Greeks, Ismaelites [Izmaelites], Italians, Jews, Kabars, Kangars, 
Karakitays, Karolingians, Karuls, Khazars, Kimeks, Kipchaks, Kirghiz, Magyars, 
Moldavian Changos, Mongols, Moravains, Oguz, Paloc, Pechenegs, Poles, 
Rumanians, Russians, Sabirs, Saxons of Transylvania and Upper Hungary, Serbs, 
Slavs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Szekelys [Seklers], Turks, Uygurs, Ukrainians, Ungro-
vlachs, Vallons, Vardars, Varhuns [Varkonys], Volga Bulgars, Wangars, Yaziges 
[Jasz] — it also supplies lengthy articles on the interrelationship between the 
Magyars and many of these and other nations and nationalities. The later include 
essays on Arab-Hungarian, Aragonian-Hungarian, Austrian-Hungarian, Bashkir-
Hungarian, Bavarian-Hungarian, Bosnian-Hungarian, Byzantine-Hungarian, 
Carinthian-Hungarian, Croato-Hungarian, Czech-Hungarian, Dalmatian-Hungarian, 
Danube-Bulgar-Hungarian, English-Hungarian, French-Hungarian, German-
Hungarian, Hunnic-Hungarian, Italian-Hungarian, Khazar-Hungarian, Neapolitan-
Hungarian, Norman-Hungarian, Pecheneg-Hungarian, Polish-Hungarian, 
Romanian-Hungarian, Russian-Hungarian, Serbian-Hungarian, Styrian-Hungarian, 
Venetian-Hungarian, and Volga-Bulgar-Hungarian inter-relationships, as well as 
on Hungary's relations with the Kingdom of Jerusalem and with the Papal Court. 
The list of these essays does not include articles on Slovak-Hungarian, Sloven-
Hungarian, Ottoman Turkish-Hungarian, and Ukrainian-Hungarian interaction. But 
this is undoubtedly so because some of these nations did not as yet exist as 
distinct ethnic entities in those centuries (e.g. Slovaks and Ukrainians), while 
others did not as yet play a meaningful role in Hungarian history (e.g. Ottoman 
Turks and Slovenes). 
A number of the nationalities or ethnic groups are not included among the 
entries, others are not cited with their internationally known names, while still 
others are cited in a way that is not commonly known to the average layman in 
Hungary or abroad. As an example, there is no separate essay on the Huns, who 
are mentioned only in connection with the rejected theory of common Hunnic-
Hungarian descent. The "Vlachs" cross referenced as "Blaks" are mentioned only 
as some pre-Romanian inhabitants of the Carpathian Basin, who may have been 
Franks or others, but not in conjunction with the inhabitants of 14th through 19th 
century Moldavia and Wallachia, who in the mid-19th century had renamed 
themselves Rumanians. True, the latter can be found under the term "Ungro-
vlachs," but that is a term, which is unfamiliar to most average users. Thus, very 
few would look for them under there. Also strange is the complete absence of the 
term "Olah or Olahok" by which the Rumanians [Vlachs] have been known in 
Hungary until the early or mid-20th century. It should have been included at least 
for cross reference purposes. Its absence seems to have been dictated by political 
considerations. This also holds true for the term "Tot or Totok," which in common 
usage at least to the average Hungarian had "always" referred to the Slovaks of 
former Upper Hungary. The terms included, but only in conjunction with the 
inhabitants of medieval Slavonia [Totorszag], which few Hungarians know ever 
existed. Certainly, far less than one in a hundred educated Hungarians would 
know that this term is supposed to mean Slavonians, instead of Slovaks. Thus, 
unless this Lexicon was prepared specifically for specialists in medieval Hungarian 
history, this phenomenon should have been pointed out and this term should also 
have been discussed in conjunction with the Slovaks. 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Early Hungarian Historical 
Lexicon is a mighty work, and one that will be of great help both to historians and 
to the laymen for many years to come. Moreover, its very existence will be a 
catalyst for further research. The reason is that even unwittingly, it points to some 
of the white spots that still have to be filled by future historians. 
The editors have to be commended for their liberality in their treatment of 
the individual contributions. It is quite evident that they did not try to practice 
Gleichschaltung, but permitted each author to express his or her views concerning 
a specific topic. They also encouraged their contributors to present both sides of 
major controversies, before coming to their own conclusions. This is evident from 
many of the enclosed essays. Also commendable is the fact that, while using 
primarily Hungarian terms, they cross-referenced them to their well known Latin 
variants (e.g. evkdnyv - annales, kegyuri jog = ius patronatus, kiralyi udvar = 
curia regia, nador = comes palatinus, piispok = episcopus, etc.). This also holds 
true for geographical names. They used the Hungarian versions that were official 
in the Kingdom of Hungary, but the same time they also cross-referenced these 
terms to other variants (e.g. Brasso = Corona = Kronstadt = Brasov, Kassa = 
Kosice, Kolozsvar = Klausenburg = Cluj-Napoca, Pozsony = Pressburg = Brati-
slava, Ragusa = Dubrovnik, etc.). Moreover, they also indicated their current 
locations, if not in Hungary. They likewise worked out an acceptable system of 
transliteration of Arab, Greek, and Cyrillic Slavic terms that takes this trans-
literation uniform and easily comprehensible. 
Before closing with a general commendation and praise for the scholar ship 
that went into this work, I would like to point out a few common omissions, as 
well as some of the rejections that are evident from this lexicon. The omissions 
include "het vezer" [seven chiefs] and "het torzs" [seven tribes] that are much 
more commonly used terms than "hetmagyar" [hetumoger] that has been included. 
Thus, while the names of all of the conquering tribes and most of the tribal 
leaders are given separate entries, it is virtually impossible to find a listing of 
these tribes and their alleged leaders as preserved, rightly or wrongly, by 
Anonymus in his Gesta Hungarorum. 
The "rejections" include the short shrifting of Gyula Laszlo's "theory of 
double conquest" [kettos honfoglalas]. It is given a separate entry, but only to 
discredit it completely. While this may well be a valid scholarly pont of view, 
what is bothersome is that this attitude is so pervasive that it leads to the total 
rejection of the notion that proto-Magyars or Magyar-like peoples may in fact 
have settled in the Carpathian Basin perhaps in several waves much before the 
Arpadian conquest of the late 9th century. 
The other "rejection" has to do with Great Moravia [Moravia Magna], a 
tiny 9th-century Slavic state, which 19th century Slovak Romanticism had reshaped 
into the "Great Moravian Empire." More recently, serious scholars have come up 
with the notion that this "Great Moravia" was located really on the southern 
Morava river in present-day Serbia. While this view may not be acceptable to 
most scholars, it is a sufficiently serious and well-founded scholarly theory that 
it should have been mentioned, along with its primary proponents: Imre Boba in 
the United States and Peter Puspoki Nagy in former Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
Having made my remarks, let me re-emphasize that, notwithstanding these 
omissions and disagreements, I regard the Early Hungarian Historical Lexicon a 
work of magnificent scholarship. It will help and influence virtually everyone 
who has an interest in medieval Hungarian and East-Central European history. 
Although its contributors come from all over Hungary, it is undoubtedly the 
product of the great "Szeged School" of Medieval Hungarian History which could, 
and perhaps should be called the "Kristo School." Gyula Kristo is a historian of 
tremendous scholarly capacity and proportions, who virtually single handed made 
the University of Szeged [JATE] into a primary centre of medieval studies in 
Hungary and East Central Europe. At the same time, he created a "school" that 
none of his financially better endowed Budapest colleagues were able to do. This 
is also indicated by the fact that it was Szeged, and not Budapest, that produced 
this extremely useful pioneer historical lexicon. 
Many of the contributors of this volume, including co-editor Ferenc Makk, 
are Kristo's ex-students. And the scholarly productivity of the Szeged Centre of 
Medieval Studies can only be called stupendous. It is to be lamented that neither 
Kristo, nor his Centre, is as well known in Western Europe and North America 
as they deserve to be known. Perhaps it will be this volume that will make the 
difference, especially if it will also be published in English. In closing, I can only 
express my admiration, while at the same time encourage Gyula Kristo and his 
colleagues to continue this work, so as to come up ultimately with the originally 
proposed multivolume "Encyclopedia of the Early History of Hungary and the 
Hungarians" (p. 5). 
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